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ABSTRACT
Some have criticized pluralistic theories as failing to be decisive, in other words,
pluralistic theories fail to produce judgments that are rational and justified. The argument
starts by claiming that if a theory has neither the ability to justify actions through
comparison nor the ability to guarantee a single answer about what one ought to do, then
the theory is not decisive. The argument identifies the source of these failings in the
pluralists commitment to incomparability and non-reductionism. I argue that pluralistic
theories can be comparativist and that the demand for a single right answer is too
stringent. Thus, it is possible for there to be rational, justified decisions in the presence
of a plurality of factors.
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PREFACE
One of the most frequent questions we ask ourselves is “what ought I to do?”
This question arises in many different contexts, including moral, legal, political, medical,
environmental, and prudential. These contexts can be interpersonal or intrapersonal.
They may affect only the immediate decision, or be determinations of policy which shape
future decisions.

They may be explanations to oneself, or they may be aimed at

convincing others with whom you interact. What all of these different contexts have in
common, however, is that a correct decision about what one ought to do can be
considered a justified decision.

The notion of justification is quite broad and

philosophers are interested in a more narrow conception of justification, namely rational
justification.

But the concept ‘rational’ is one of the most contentious in philosophy.

Even within the narrower area of practical reason, the concept of ‘rational action’ is
contentious. I want to begin by asserting that an action deserves the honorific ‘rational’
when it has been successfully justified.
But what counts as justification? This dissertation defends a procedural account
of justification for pluralistic theories. Pluralistic theories in the normative realm have
become a major area of interest as more people are dissatisfied with the traditional,
monistic approaches in philosophy.

The reasons for this dissatisfaction are,

appropriately, varied. But a major stumbling block to any pluralistic theory, especially in
the normative realm, is the puzzle over how a pluralistic theory can establish that there is
a single course of action that is rational. If normative pluralism is to become a serious
form of normative theorizing that competes with both monistic theories and relativistic
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theories, normative pluralism must be able to identify single actions as rational. The
inability to do this is what I call the problem of decisiveness.
The critics of normative pluralism see decisiveness as a holy grail for the
defenders of pluralism. As some have claimed, it would be a miracle to provide rational
direction about what one ought to do if the normative universe is not unified and
monistic.

To accept pluralism, they hold, is to accept inconsistency or outright

contradiction.

To make a choice without a single overarching factor, or value, or

principle is to make a merely arbitrary, non-rational choice. In short, one goal of a
normative theory is to produce judgments that are rational and justified and it is a
hopeless task for defenders of pluralism to meet this goal of decisiveness. The defender
of normative pluralism has only two choices when confronted with this challenge. The
first is to dismiss the goal. The second is to accept the goal and demonstrate that
normative pluralism is in fact decisive. I take the latter route.
Along this route I have to consider the nature and requirements of practical
reason. If defenders of pluralism try to work with the prevailing, implicit view of
practical reason that is employed by critics, the task would remain hopeless and the quest
for an acceptable pluralistic theory would have to be abandoned. To avoid this result,
and to show that pluralism is in fact decisive, I offer a different account of practical
reason. This different account, however, abandons some implicitly accepted notions of
what a theory of practical reason should be like.
Before developing this view of practical reason for normative pluralism, one must
clearly understand what it is about pluralism that leads some to think such theories are
hopelessly indecisive. Chapter 1 carefully explores what it means to endorse normative
viii

pluralism and to expose the commitments of a pluralistic theory that appear to lead to the
problem of decisiveness. First, indecisiveness is related to conflict of incompossibles.
The conflict account of incompossibility is the idea that acts A and B are conflicting
incompossibles if and only if (1) A is favored by some factor(s), (2) B is favored by
another factor(s), and (3) A and B are severally but not jointly possible to do. The critic
argues that pluralistic theories cannot resolve such conflicts because pluralistic theories
are committed to the non-reducibility and incomparability of normative factors. This
means that factors such as duties, consequences, obligations, virtues, and constraints are
not reducible to some single ultimate factor. These two features of pluralism block any
attempt at resolving conflict and thus the theory is indecisive.
The challenge that pluralistic theories are indecisive has more than one form. The
first form of the challenge relies on the claim that in cases of conflict, one must be able to
compare the alternative actions. Commitments to non-reducibility and incomparability,
the challenge goes, prevent the alternative, incompossible course of actions from being
compared. This in turn means that there can be no single justified course of action.
Another form of the objection indicates that practical reason must result in a single
answer as to what one ought to do. If a pluralistic theory does not defuse each criticism,
it cannot be a decisive theory
Several strategies have been suggested for demonstrating that normative pluralism
is decisive. In Chapter 2 I review several of these attempts. Many of these attempts have
a common characteristic, namely relying on an axiological theory alone. Ruth Chang’s
attempted solution is to say that for every choice situation composed of a plurality of
contributory values, there will be a single covering value that determines what one ought
ix

to do. Each choice situation may have a different covering value, and thus her view is at
least consistent with pluralism. Unfortunately, developing an acceptable account of the
relationship between contributory values and covering values is fraught with problems.
Michael Stocker also suggests a solution to the problem by arguing that it arises
from a misconception of the normative realm. The debate only recognizes action-guiding
act evaluations. But, Stocker argues, there also exist non-action-guiding act evaluations.
Most conflicts of evaluation are between one action-guiding act evaluation and one or
more non-action-guiding act evaluation. However, this move of Stocker’s ignores the
problem of decisiveness instead of resolving it. As an alternative resolution to the
problem, Stocker claims that another mistake made by those discussing these issues is to
focus on making comparisons between sorts of factors, say duties and consequences. He
claims that this is a mistake because we can only compare instances of keeping a promise
with an instance of fulfilling a duty. However, having made this move, he does not
describe how such a comparison takes place.
Two more approaches similar to each other are offered by John Kekes and Robert
Veatch. Kekes suggests that we recognize the difference between primary values and
secondary values and that this will resolve the problem of decisiveness. In general,
primary values, whatever they turn out to be, take precedence over secondary values.
This produces a general hierarchy of values. Unfortunately, he does not explain how to
resolve conflicts between two or more primary values, nor between two or more
conflicting secondary values, nor how to identify those occasions when a secondary value
trumps a primary value. Instead of this general hierarchy, Robert Veatch puts forth a
strict lexical ordering view. He claims that we need to value and rank all of the nonx

consequentialist factors above consequentialist factors, and only make use of
consequentialist factors if there are ties higher up in the lexical ordering. While this
approach would resolve the problem of decisiveness, it does so at unacceptable costs to
those defending normative pluralism.
A common problem with all of the above approaches is that they do not actually
address a procedure for resolving conflicts even though the critic of normative pluralism
has asked for a procedure.

Some procedures have been developed, most notably

specified principlism, for resolving conflicts. However, specified principlism is not a
method of justification, but a method of more finely articulating one’s normative
commitments. Alternatively, one might justify decision by only focusing on factors that
two alternatives have in common. However, this solution fails to provide a reason for
ignoring non-overlapping factors and thereby is not complete theory of justification.
Finally, Peter Wenz has suggested what he calls the Concentric Circle theory, but it has
unacceptable results.
Chapter 3 addresses whether or not pluralistic theories can also be comparativist
theories. The argument against normative pluralism is simple: if a theory does not
provides a means to justify a course of action through comparison of alternatives, then
the theory is indecisive; by endorsing incomparability and non-reductionsim, pluralistic
theories are not comparativist theories. However, the second premise is false. First, the
argument makes use of a notion of comparability that involves only two choices, namely
complete comparability and complete incomparability, and this is a false dichotomy.
Second, a comparativist theory only requires that comparisons take place in terms of
factors and that these factors are borne by the objects of comparison. Pluralistic theories
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recognize some such factors, and allow them to be compared. The factors are compared
in terms of normative level criteria of evaluation and interaction principles. Normative
level criteria of evaluation are similar to meta-level criteria of adequacy in terms of their
structure. Both identify values that any choice should consider. I identify many possible
examples of normative level criteria. Interaction principles, on the other hand, specify
how various factors interact to determine which act is justified. I identify four classes of
such interaction principles:

overriding, exclusionary, synergistic, and activation

principles. Together the normative factors, normative level criteria, and the interaction
principles demonstrate how factors are comparable, and thus allow one to determine what
one ought to do.
The view outlined in Chapter 3 can be criticized because it does not appear to
provide us with a single answer about action in every given case. Chapter 4 addresses
whether or not it is a requirement of practical reason that it result in a single answer to
every normative question. One attempt to answer this question can be found in the work
of Ronald Dworkin. He has throughout his writings held the Single Right Answer
Thesis. This thesis is that there is a single right answer to every question about action.
However, as his most recent writing discusses, his position has been misunderstood. It
may very well be the case that after inquiry is finished, it is unclear which action is the
unique justified action to perform. In other words, Dworkin allows for answers to the
question ‘what ought I to do?’ to include not only ‘do A’ or ‘do B’, but also, ‘Do either A
or B’ and ‘it is unclear whether one ought to do A or B’.
The next part of Chapter 4 takes up a second line of defense that a critic might use
to resurrect the claim that there is a single correct answer to normative questions. The
xii

critic of pluralism claims that adequate normative theories must adopt the strong
determinacy thesis which states that for all possible actions in a given situation, only one
of these possible actions is the right action to perform. Different arguments have been
offered to show that the strong determinacy thesis, and therefore the single correct answer
thesis is a necessary component of a normative theory. One argument indicates that
practical reason must be subsumptive, i.e., that justification proceed in terms of
combining laws and facts in a deductive form. However, the subsumptive model of
reasoning fails to support the strong determinacy thesis. Another argument involves
making claims about the metaphysical nature of evaluative concepts such that they (a)
have sharp boundaries and (b) have to be considered fixed in terms of their application.
However, even if we grant these claims to the critic, it turns out that the claims fail to
ground the strong determinacy thesis. A third argument includes premises stating that
practical reason should be practical, complete and realistic. But once again, these aims of
practical reason do not support the strong determinacy thesis and thus do not support the
single right answer thesis.
Another attempt to support the single right answer thesis is to defend the nogenuine-normative-dilemmas thesis.

On the no-genuine-normative-dilemmas thesis,

while practical reason can allow for indeterminacy, it cannot allow for genuine dilemmas
to exist. The argument is that a normative theory must meet this meta-level criterion of
adequacy. However, this criterion has more than one interpretation. Criteria for theory
choice, as well as normative level criteria for justification, can be stated in one of three
forms, ‘absolutist’, ‘in principle’, or ‘degreed’. The ‘absolutist’ interpretation states that
an adequate normative theory must not allow for any dilemmas by rationally justifying a
xiii

course of action in all cases of conflict. The ‘in principle’ interpretation states that an
adequate normative theory may allow for dilemmas, but it must rationally justify a course
of action in all the cases of conflict that are in principle resolvable. The ‘degreed’
interpretation states that an adequate normative theory may allow for dilemmas, but it
must rationally justify a course of action in more rather than less cases of conflict. Only
on the absolutist form is it a requirement that normative theories allow for no genuine
dilemmas whatsoever. This form of meta-level criteria is unacceptable as is the ‘in
principle’ form. Thus, it is better to state meta-level criteria in terms of degrees. But that
in turn means that a theory does not have to disallow the existence of genuine dilemmas.
So, the fact that pluralistic theories do result in dilemmas is not a sufficient justification
to reject them.
Thus, normative pluralism is acceptably decisive. This clears the way for further
development of substantive accounts of normative pluralism. My solution to the problem
of decisiveness also identifies an important area of research in the area of practical reason
and normative epistemology: the further identification of the normative level criteria and
specific interaction principles that form a significant part of practical reason.
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Chapter 1: The Problem of Decisiveness
1. Everyday Problems
Every morning for the past decade I have been faced with the same choice—
should I or shouldn’t I make a pot of coffee? The banal nature of this choice, and the
simplistic way that I just described it, hides a series of choices that I actually face, even if
I don’t consciously consider them most of time. These choices are prudential concerns—
should I have caffeinated or decaffeinated coffee—as well as aesthetic concerns—should
I add cream and sugar or leave it black. More recently, however, the choice has taken on
moral dimensions regarding issues to which my friends and family have drawn my
awareness. My parents introduced me to coffee beans bought from a worker owned cooperative. They have always been concerned with social justice issues and informed me
of the unfair treatment many people face working in coffee fields. The workers who pick
the beans receive very little compensation and many of the profits go to absentee owners,
middle men, governments, etc. The worker owned co-operatives, however, avoid many
of these social ills because the workers own the plantations. By raising these issues, my
parents made me question whether I should drink coffee again. Fortunately, they offered
me a solution at the same time they made me aware of the problems. Life was good.
All of that changed during Christmas 1997 when one of my dear friends severely
upset my cozy world of warm black liquid. Jacqueline, who has always been concerned
with environmental issues, gave me one pound of shade-grown coffee. She explained to
me that most of the coffee we drink is from plantations where it is necessary for large
tracts of rainforests to be cut down. Shade-grown coffee, however, is cultivated in the
1

rainforest without cutting down trees because it needs the shade in order to grow
properly. Thus I was faced with a conflict—do I buy coffee I know is better for the
environment but possibly harvested in a manner that violates my concerns about social
justice, or do I buy coffee that has some positive social ramifications at the expense of the
environment, or do I stop drinking coffee altogether, especially since both of these types
of coffee are so expensive for a graduate student?
To make matters worse, this situation contains further ethical issues.

If we

assume, for the moment, that all value is anthropocentric, that seems to provide a reason
to favor the human-centered solutions and thus the co-op coffee.

Furthermore,

deontological considerations about the subversion and promotion of autonomy favor
buying the co-op coffee instead of no longer drinking coffee at all—buying that coffee
supports the promotion of autonomy for the worker-owners that is undermined if I buy
non-co-operative coffee or buy no coffee at all. In favor of buying the shade-grown
coffee are consequentialist concerns. The number of beings positively affected when
buying co-op coffee is small compared to those that are affected by buying shade grown
coffee. Not only am I affecting the entire human race currently and in the future by
contributing to the slowing down of rainforest destruction, I am also positively affecting
all the animals that depend on such habitats and benefiting the stability of the overall
environment.1 Another concern, sometimes lost in these lofty ideals, is the pleasure I
receive from drinking coffee that continues to ground my desire for the next cup.2

1

For a discussion of these different concerns when making choices about coffee, see (Castle 2001).

2

Since I drink only decaffeinated coffee, I am fairly certain my pleasure is not related to an addiction.
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The choice of whether to have coffee, given all of the above, seems intractable.
These

concerns—deontological

considerations

of

autonomy,

consequentialist

considerations regarding animals and the environment, egoistic and hedonistic
considerations related to my well-being—point in many directions. The matter would be
even more complex if I would consider questions of character, the primary concern of
virtue ethics. In medical contexts we can clearly see how virtue based concerns often do
have a role.
Consider the case of 72-year-old man suffering from both Alzheimer’s and
Parkinson’s.3 He has been in nursing care for 5 months, during which time his condition
has steadily worsened: his weight has dropped from over 200 pounds to under 100, he
has become progressively less responsive to his environment, and for the last month has
had three emergency surgeries for different organs that have failed, and has been on a
respirator and hydration for 2 weeks since his last surgery. On a Friday evening when his
condition has noticeably declined over the past 48 hours, the family, including his wife of
35 years, four of his children, and 6 of his adult grandchildren have gathered at the
nursing home once again. After a great deal of discussion, the family as a whole has
decided to end hydration, remove him from the respirator, and take additional palliative
measures. A new problem arises, however, in that the attending physician for the nursing
home does not return any of their calls or other attempts to reach him. On Sunday
evening, the patient dies of respiratory failure, still being hydrated and with no contact
between the family and the physician.
3

This is a fictionalized account of events that I actually witnessed. I have fictionalized certain parts to
highlight the conflicts that arise with virtues and other moral concerns.

3

The family is relieved by the passing of its patriarch, but several members feel as
if the physician deliberately refused to respond to attempts to contact him. This, let us
assume, is an accurate understanding of the physician’s actions.

The physician’s

reasoning, however, was not over concerns about the legal or ethical status of removing
the hydration and the respirator. The doctor knew that the family was devoutly Catholic
and that the patient, in fact, was an ordained deacon. In order to spare the family the guilt
they may individually, and as a group, feel for carrying out their decision, the physician
decided to ignore their calls. His hope was that the patient would pass away before
Monday morning rounds.
There are, of course, non-virtue ethical issues involved with this case. Primarily,
there is the physician’s violation of autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress understand
autonomy as follows:

“personal rule of the self that is free from both controlling

influences by others and from personal limitations that prevent meaningful choice, such
as an inadequate understanding. The autonomous individual freely acts in accordance
with a self-chosen plan” (Beauchamp and Childress 1994, 121). We can rephrase this
concern for Beauchamp and Childress as a principle which says the following:
To preserve autonomy, one ought (a) not exert controlling influences on
another agent, (b) not perpetuate current but removable limitations of an
agent, and (c) to allow an agent to act in accordance with a freely chosen
and morally permissible self-chosen plan.
Ignore any additional questions that might arise because the decision-maker in this case is
the family and not the patient. There is no question of who has authority to make the
decision in this case because there is unanimity in the family. Given the above, the
physician has violated clause (c) by keeping the family from performing their considered
4

plan of ending hydration and respiration. He has done this by an act of omission as
opposed to an act of commission, but he has nonetheless constricted the family’s ability
to act freely.
Let us suppose that the reason for this violation of autonomy, however, is virtuebased.4 It is based on the virtue of compassion directed at the family. Compassion is an
other-directed virtue that aims at the alleviation of suffering, either physical or mental, of
another. In this case, the physician determined that in order to alleviate long-term mental
suffering (i.e., guilt) for the members of this Catholic family, the compassionate thing to
do would be to arrange things such that their considered plan would not be carried out, in
the hope that in the next 48 hours the patient would pass away on his own. Whether or
not he was justified in this decision to violate autonomy in order to be compassionate to
the family is, of course, open to question. In fact, it is not clear that in a medical decision
the potential long term mental suffering of the family should dominate the acute mental
suffering the family is experiencing as they watch the patriarch decline. But even leaving
this aside, it is unclear whether the future mental suffering of the family, while it ought to
be considered, should dominate the Principle of Autonomy in this case.

A further

complication arises when one considers that the physician’s concern for compassion is
directed solely at the family and not the patient who may be suffering a great deal as well.
Of course, this ‘fact’ is open to debate because it is unclear whether a unresponsive
patient suffering from two neurological disorders can experience suffering, either mental
or physical, in a meaningful sense. If we suppose that the patient is suffering in some
4

This is the key fictionalization in this example. I have fictionalized the explanation of the physician’s
motivation for not responding to the family. The point of this example, and thus this fictionalization, is to
bring out how virtues and deontological concerns can conflict in action guiding.
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sense, then how do we determine that compassion for the future mental suffering of the
family should trump the current mental and physical suffering of the patient? In other
words, the virtue of compassion not only conflicts with the principle of autonomy, but
can conflict with itself when the objects of compassion are significantly distinct, as the
patient and the family are in this case. Of course, these considerations do not exhaust the
complications and conflicts involved in this case,5 but these considerations illustrate how
virtues play a role in decision-making, and can cause additional conflicts in making
decisions.
When we consider policy-making, especially on an international scale, we
encounter similar problems in decision-making. Consider a case that began in 1999 when
Ontario authorized the removal of water from the Great Lakes for bottling.

The

authorization was later rescinded, but raised public concerns about use of the fresh waters
of the Great Lakes Basin. The largest concern seems to be the commodification and
privatization of water. An International Joint Commission was instructed to study the
issue of protecting the Great Lakes and make recommendations on a broad range of
issues including the removal of water for bottling and other purposes. The commission
formed many conclusions include the following:
•
•
•

“Removals of water from the Great Lakes Basin reduce the resilience of the
system,”
“Any water taken from the system has to be replaced in order to restore the
systems lost resilience” and
“It is not possible at this time to identify with any confidence all the adverse
consequences of water removals.” (International Joint Commision 2000, 40)

5

One could argue, for example, that the physician failed to act courageously by avoiding discussion with
the family in the hopes that the patient would pass away and to avoid exacerbating the suffering of the
family. In other words, his concern for compassion in minimizing suffering conflicted with the virtue of
his acting courageously by confronting the situation instead of avoiding it. See (Brody 1988, 35-42).
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These conclusions are grounded by a number of factors that need to be considered
whenever making a policy decision regarding the Great Lakes Basin.
The factors that the commission identified included not only economic interests,
but international law, international treaties, and agreements from relevant States and
Provinces, and cultural concerns. One example of economic interests is the rights of those
who have lake front property. As the commission states, riparian homeowners “might
welcome a means of removing water from the Basin during periods of extremely high
levels” (International Joint Commission 2000, 14).

These homeowners have two

economic reasons to remove water from the Great Lakes Basin in times of high water.
The first is the ability to claim the water and sell it. The second is to reduce the threat of
water damage to their homes. But other groups composed of commercial navigators and
recreational boaters would oppose removals during low periods. In fact, considering that
the Commission notes that “once removal of water begins, it would be very difficult to
shut [the diversion] off at some time in the future,” commercial navigation interests
provide reasons to oppose any removal of water at any time (International Joint
Commission 2000, 14). Thus the economic interests can be broken down into camps that
do not agree with each other as to whether water should be removed. More importantly,
it is not clear that these interests can be summed up in a single cost-benefit matrix in
terms of a neutral measure such as money. While those who want to remove the water
for bottling have only economic interests, those who live on the lakes or use them for
recreation could claim that their interests extend beyond mere economic value.
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Furthermore, there exist environmental and cultural concerns that are not easily translated
into monetary terms and thus may be left out of these cost-benefit evaluations.
The environmental concerns cut across the economic concerns. The Commission
notes that “The waters of the Great Lakes are, for the most part, a nonrenewable
resource” and that “[a]lthough the total volume in the lakes is vast, on average less than
1 percent of the waters of the Great Lakes is renewed annually by precipitation, surface
water runoff, and inflow from groundwater sources” (International Joint Commission
2000, 5). This low renewal rate has been a concern as the Great Lakes have recently
expereinced record low levels from environmental changes. As the commission notes, in
1998-9, “the levels of Lakes Michigan and Huron dropped 57 cm (22 inches) in 12
months” (International Joint Commission 2000, 6). This all helps support the statement
that the ecosystem of the Great Lakes Basin is quite delicate and needs to be better
understood before the development of policies that would allow for the removal of water.
Recreational and cultural concerns are also affected by the water levels. Waterrelated activities form part of the cultural heritage of the Great Lakes Basin. Low levels
of water, such as existed in the 1960’s, affects part of the culture of the Great Lakes
Basin. Tourism, especially in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, relies on the scenery and
lower water levels can create less attractive vistas. Recreational activities such fishing,
skiing, boating, etc., also are a major part of the Great Lakes Basin culture. Lower water
levels can make docking facilities unusable and affect the population of fish. While
revenues would be lost if the water levels were reduced too much, it is unclear that the
tourists or residents could express their recreational losses in purely economic terms.
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More conflicts arise from the various agreements that currently regulate the Great
Lakes. First there is The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Second there is the Great
Lakes Charter of 1985 which is not binding, but has been followed by the signatories. At
the international level, as the commodification and privatization of water becomes an
issue, the World Trade Organization (WTO), The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could come into effect.
The Commission notes that the public has raised concern that provisions of NAFTA and
the WTO could prevent Canada and the United States from protecting the Great Lakes
(International Joint Commission 2000, 28).

Furthermore, it is not clear that each

agreement and treaty bases its decision procedure on the same concerns. The agreements
may be in place to foster cooperation, as does the Great Lakes Charter, or they may focus
more exclusively on economic concerns, as does NAFTA. Even within an agreement or
treaty there may not be a homogenous set of principles, as in the case of the Great Lakes
Charter which includes concerns about integrity and sustainability, as well as the
economic concerns.
Finally, the Commission lists many principles of action to guide the management
of the water in the Great Lakes. The commission justifies its use of The Precautionary
Approach because of uncertainty about the use and availability of the water in the Basin
in the future. The Precautionary Approach principle is the idea that “caution should be
used in managing water to protect the resource for the future” and that this entails “a bias
in favor of retaining water in the system” (International Joint Commission 2000, 45).
This has led the Commission to make as its first recommendation that
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the governments of the Great Lakes states and Ontario and Quebec should
not permit any proposal for removal of water from the Great Lakes Basin
to proceed unless the proponent can demonstrate that the removal would
not endanger the integrity of the ecosystem of the Great Lakes Basin
(International joint Commission 2000, 46-7).
Other principles include the Principle of Sustainability, which seeks to preserve “options
for future generations to meet cultural, economic, environmental and social needs”
(International Joint Commission 2000, 45) and the Principle of Fairness, which seeks to
protect the interests of all the communities that are part of the Great Lakes Basin
(International Joint Commission 2000, 46).
One of the most interesting things to observe about this example is that the
Commission did not try to claim that environmental, economical, cultural, and social
interests were entirely comparable. In fact, the Commission seems to put forth a great
deal of effort to show that they are not entirely comparable.

Furthermore, the

Commission was willing to admit that interaction between the various treaties and
agreements is unclear and could not be determined by the Commission. Given these
epistemological problems, one might think the Commission would merely call for further
study. However, the Commission did not hesitate to recommend, amongst other things,
that no large scale removal from the Basin should be allowed. Whether this was a
rational recommendation, and whether the conclusions used to reach it were rationally
determined, are still open questions. In other words, one cannot claim ex ante that the
Commission has reached an irrational decision based solely on the complicated nature of
the problem they were asked to investigate. If we assume that the Commission was
correct in identifying a number of incomparable factors, and that the commission reached
a rational conclusion, that seems to mean there must be some understanding of rationality
10

that permits the possibility that even with incomparability and epistemic gaps one can
arrive at a rational decision.
The conflict in these examples appears so extreme, especially in the policy
example, that it is a miracle that we can function in our daily lives at all. To resolve the
plethora of conflicts one may argue that the above problems can become tractable only if
one accepts that there exists a common measure for all the stated factors. In fact, some
may argue, a willingness to view these examples in a pluralistic manner is what gets in
the way of rationality. The criticism states that the intractable nature of these examples
only arises because I am willing to accept a theoretical position that says all of these
factors have moral relevance. If I give up this pluralistic orientation I can decisively
identify the normative course of action; if I maintain the pluralistic orientation I preclude
any possibility of rational, justified decisions. It is at this precise point that I balk. I
maintain that it is possible for there to be rational, justified decisions in the presence of a
plurality of factors. To defend this claim, however, will not be easy. The first step is to
understand the nature of conflict and how it raises questions of decisiveness.

1.1 The Problem of Decisiveness
Normative pluralism is a type of theory in which it is possible that more than one
normative factor is independently significant for determining what one ought to do. A
normative factor is a factor that helps determine the normative status of an act (Kagan
1998, 17). The problem of decisiveness6 is put forth by the critics of pluralism as a

6

One may be tempted to call this the problem of decidability. However, the term ‘decidability’ is used in
mathematical and deductive contexts and, as will be come clear throughout this dissertation, I view
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formal failure of pluralistic theories. A type of normative theory7 formally fails if a
feature of that type of theory precludes the possibility of the type of theory achieving one
of its defined goals. One goal of a normative theory of action is to produce rational
judgments about action. Critics charge that certain features of pluralism almost always
preclude such judgments.8 Notice how different people have stated the major stumbling
block for a theory that includes pluralistic elements. Michael Stocker, a defender of
pluralism, reports the following criticism:
I was not at all surprised when a colleague, upon hearing my claim that
plural values are no impediment to sound decision, asked me to detail the
miraculous decision procedure that makes such decision possible—with
the clear implication that we need a decision procedure, and that it would
be a miracle to give us one for plural values (Stocker 1992, 177).
J. Baird Callicott, an opponent of pluralism, focuses on a version of pluralism that
involves a multiplicity of principles instead of values:
Consistency is not just a shrine before which philosophers worship. There
is a reason for wanting consistency, insured by organization around or
derivation from a ‘master principle,’ among one’s practical precepts.
Attempting to act upon inconsistent or mutually contradictory principles
results in frustration of action altogether or in actions that are either
incoherent or mutually canceling (Callicott 1990,110).

practical reason as non-deductive and non-mathematical. Thus, to avoid some confusion, I will use the
term ‘decisiveness’.
7

Throughout this dissertation I will be discussing a very general form of pluralism that I call normative
pluralism. By this I mean to include both moral and prudential theories. It is not the case that only moral
considerations conflict with other moral considerations, nor that only prudential considerations conflict
with other prudential considerations. It is possible, and perhaps even frequent that moral considerations
conflict with prudential considerations. Thus, I will often use examples that include both moral and
prudential considerations to highlight the difficulties in arriving at rational, justified judgments.
8

I say ‘almost always’ here because when all factors agree which action ought to be done, then even with a
plurality of factors there is a clear course of action to take. What is more interesting is when the factors do
not all point in the same direction.
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Martha Nussbaum, in describing Aristotle’s concept of rationality, states the following
objection:
First, how can non-metric9 choice really be rational? If in choosing
between A and B I do not choose so as to maximize one single item, and
do not even compare the two in terms of a single item, then how on earth
can I rationally compare the diverse alternatives? Isn’t choice without a
common measure simply arbitrary, or guesswork? Second, suppose that
Aristotle has correctly described the way in which most people do in fact
make choices, seeing their values as plural and incommensurable. Why
should we think this a particularly good way to choose? (Nussbaum 1990,
59)
Each of these quotes explains the goal of decisiveness differently. We can generalize
these quotes as stating one goal of a normative theory is to produce judgments that are
rational and justified. Normative theories should provide evidence that this criterion is
met.10 Critics of pluralism see this as an especially worrisome concern for normative
pluralism because, as the above quotes indicate, they assume that monistic theories avoid
this particular problem by utilizing either a master value or a master principle for
decision-making. By abandoning a commitment to monism, pluralistic theories, on the
other hand, can not meet this goal in a way that is satisfactory. I contend that the claim
that pluralistic theories fail to be decisive is false. Pluralistic theories can generate
rational and justified judgments.
9

‘Metricity’ is a technical term in Nussbaum which designates conditions in which “in each situation of
choice there is some one value, varying only in quantity, that is common to all the alternatives” (Nussbaum
1990, 56). Thus, ‘non-metricity’ is the denial of this claim.

10

The problem of decisiveness is only one functional concern that moral theories must address and even
purely monistic theories can face the problem of decisiveness. Suppose that we have a theory that has only
one factor, namely ‘keep promises’. It may very well be the case that one is incapable of keeping two
independently made promises. Such a theory has no way, at first blush, to resolve this conflict of promises.
Most people have in mind consequentialist theories of some sort when discussing, however obliquely, the
problem of decisiveness, and consequentialist views are much less susceptible to the problem. That does
not mean that they do not face it. For an in-depth discussion of concerns that reasons theories should be
functional, see chapters 6 and 7 (Postow 1999).
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1.1.1 Interpretations of the Problem of Decisiveness
The problem of decisiveness can be interpreted in four distinct ways. I will call
these the ‘at least one’ interpretation, the ‘in principle’ interpretation, the ‘degreed’
interpretation, and the ‘absolutist’ interpretation. The ‘at least one’ interpretation is the
very weak claim that a normative theory fails to be decisive if it does not rationally
justify at least one judgment in the presence of some conflict. This articulates a very
grave concern facing pluralistic theories, namely, that no version of a pluralistic theory
can elicit a rational judgment in even one situation of conflict. If this concern turns out to
be correct, I think that we must oppose any version of normative pluralism.
Even if one can demonstrate that pluralistic theories can resolve at least one
conflict, this is not sufficient to overcome the problem of decisiveness. This is because
the ‘in principle’ interpretation includes the claim that a normative theory fails to be
decisive if it does not rationally justify judgments in the presence of conflicts when those
conflicts are in principle resolvable. A conflict that is in principle resolvable is one in
which a conflict can be eliminated through additional information, better reasoning, a set
of more fine-grained distinctions, etc. This interpretation leaves room for the existence
of moral dilemmas and recognizes that some conflicts may be, in principle, not
resolvable. If a theory fails to elicit a rational judgment in some conflicts that should be
resolvable, then the theory falls short of achieving the goal of decisiveness.
A variant on the ‘in principle’ interpretation, the ‘degreed’ interpretation, is the
idea that a normative theory fails to be decisive if it fails to rationally justify enough of
the resolvable conflicts. The key distinction here is that the ideal nature of the ‘in
14

principle’ interpretation calls for a rational judgment in all cases of resolvable conflicts.
The ‘degreed’ interpretation relaxes the stringent nature of the ‘in principle’
interpretation and includes the claim that a theory should merely provide rational
judgments in more cases of resolvable conflict rather than fewer. Finally, the ‘absolutist’
interpretation is the idea that a normative theory fails to be decisive if it does not
rationally justify judgment in the presence of all conflicts. This interpretation denies the
existence of genuine normative dilemmas and designates that if a theory does not elicit a
rational judgment in all instances, even those of apparent conflict, then the theory is not
decisive.

1.1.2 The Incompossibility Account of Conflict
To understand fully the problem of decisiveness we need to begin with the nature
of conflict. Throughout the dissertation I will use of the incompossibility account of
conflict.11

Writers like Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker express the

incompossibility account of conflict in terms of values: acts a and b are conflicting
incompossibles if and only if (1v) a has value, (2v) b has value, and (3v) a and b are
severally but not jointly possible to do (Williams 1973; Stocker1992, 85-128; 241-280).
This account, in and of itself, does not truly get at the notion of a conflict. To express
this in terms of values is merely to describe a choice situation. Two possible choices, for
example the choice of which academic position to accept, each can have a value.
Suppose that choice a is working for a research based university in the West and choice b
11

This seems to be the relevant account of conflict that is at the heart of the problem of decisiveness. This
account clearly identifies how conflicts in evaluation can frustrate action. For a list of sources dealing with
other accounts of conflict, (Stocker 1992, 85).
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is working for a liberal arts university with a masters program in one’s home state in the
Midwest. Each of these jobs can be given a value, but it is not clear that this describes a
conflict between a and b. If one grants a higher value to a, then one ought to choose a.
There is no conflict, merely choice. So we need a different way to express the conflict of
incompossibles. I will express the conflict of incompossibles in terms of factors, which
can include values, duties, constraints, virtues, as well as practical considerations that are
not necessarily normative. The factoral conflict account of incompossibility is the idea
that acts a and b are conflicting incompossibles if and only if (1f) a is favored by some
factor(s), (2f) b is favored by another factor(s), and (3f) a and b are severally but not
jointly possible to do.12 This is a better expression as our example of the choice between
job offers illustrates. The factors favoring working at the research university, choice a,
include prestige, higher pay, working with graduate students on dissertations, more
university resources, and a lower teaching load. The factors in favor of working at the
liberal arts program include teaching smaller classes, living near one’s family and friends,
a more relaxed atmosphere, and lower costs of living. Trying to determine rationally
which job one ought to take, when it is not clear how one should compare these different
factors, more accurately expresses the problem of conflicting incompossibles than the
value based account.
The incompossibility account of conflict illuminates the ubiquitous nature of
conflicts. Using the factoral conflict account of incompossibility, the factors favoring an
act could be obligations, duties, desires, projects, etc. This encompasses the possibility
12

One might also express this in terms of reasons: acts a and b are conflicting incompossibles if and only if
(1r) a is favored by some reason(s), (2r) b is favored by some other reason(s), and (3r) a and b are severally
but not jointly possible to do.
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that one’s obligations and one’s desires conflict in general. For example, one might
wonder whether obligations, as a group, always trump desires, as a group, when fulfilling
both is not jointly possible. Recall for the moment the second case presented at the
beginning of the chapter concerning the Alzheimer’s patient. The family has the desire to
end the patriarch’s suffering, but they also have an obligation as devout Catholics to
follow the teachings of the Catholic Church against euthanasia. Since the stated method
of ending the suffering is to end hydration and remove the respirator, one cannot appeal
to the doctrine of double-effect in order ease the conscience of the family members, for
their aim is to more quickly end the life of the patient in order to have the further effect of
ending suffering.

Acting on this aim goes against Catholic prescriptions against

euthanasia. The question still remains, at this point, which is the stronger factor. Do the
desires trump the obligations, or vice versa, and is it the case that obligations (or desires)
always trump desires (or obligations)?
Second, the conflicting factors could also be of the same sort—obligations, duties,
or desires. For example, one might wonder whether to not fulfill the desire for chocolate
chip cookie dough ice cream in order to fulfill the desire to get in better shape. As in the
case of removing water from the Great Lakes Basin, homeowners and shipping
companies have desires concerning the removal of water from the basin that could affect
water levels. In fact, these desires, for both groups, are grounded in economic concerns.
And yet, the desires point in opposite directions. So, in both intrapersonal cases like
whether to eat ice cream, and interpersonal cases having to do with desirable water levels
in the Great Lakes, different desires can conflict amongst themselves. With so many
potential mundane conflicts like whether to eat ice cream or not, resolving the problem of
17

decisiveness is very important. If normative pluralism cannot resolve these everyday
conflicts, then how can the theory have any hope of resolving more difficult choices such
as those in the medical ethics and international policy examples?

1.2 Monism and Factoral Pluralism
It will be helpful to distinguish different types of pluralism from each other, as
well as from monism. One motivation for making these distinctions is to clear up some
confusion regarding whether or not traditional normative theories are monistic or
pluralistic. As it turns out, most traditional normative theories are pluralistic. So, if the
problem of decisiveness cannot be overcome for the pluralist generally, then almost all
traditional normative theories fail to meet the goal of decisiveness. By distinguishing
these three types of normative theory—monism, factoral pluralism, and foundational
pluralism—we can better understand the exact nature of the problem of decisiveness for
both factoral pluralists and foundational pluralists.
Shelly Kagan in his book Normative Ethics identifies the three types of normative
theories as monism, factoral pluralism, and foundational pluralism. The basis of the
distinctions relies on a recognition that a normative theory has two distinct tasks:
identifying normative factors and articulating normative foundations. As stated before, a
normative factor is a factor that helps determine the normative status of an act (Kagan
1998, 17). A foundation is “a theory that attempts to explain the basis of the truly
relevant normative factors” (Kagan 1998, 21). To endorse a purely monistic theory
entails accepting in all action-guiding evaluations a single foundation and a single factor
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whose significance is independent of all other factors.13 If goods were the only factors,
then we could express this statement in Christine Korsgaard’s terms by saying that a
monist accepts a single foundation and a single final good. On Korsgaard’s terminology,
a final good is valued for its own sake, an instrumental good is valued for the sake of
something else, intrinsic goods have value in themselves, and extrinsic goods get their
value from some other source. By articulating the distinctions in this way, Korsgaard
argues that you can have both goods that are intrinsic goods and final goods as well as
goods that are extrinsic goods and final goods. Her examples, from Kant, are that a good
will is both an intrinsic good and a final good while happiness is an example of an
extrinsic good that is also a final good (Korsgaard 1983, 180). The key here is that both
the intrinsic good of a good will and the extrinsic good of happiness are valued for their
own sakes, in other words, independent of each other, and yet they have different sources.
The source of value for the good will is the will itself. The source of value for our desires
is happiness.

To further clarify what it means to be a monist, as opposed to a pluralist,

some examples from the history of moral theory are in order.
The closest example of a purely monistic theory is the utilitarianism of Jeremy
Bentham in his Principles of Legislation and Morals.14 In the first chapter, Bentham
states that “The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work” (Bentham 1939,
791). While he does not have in mind the definition of ‘foundation’ given by Kagan, it is
13

Kagan says things like “most of us believe that there are other factors that have intrinsic moral
significance beyond that of goodness of outcomes” (Kagan 1998, 70 my emphasis; see also 80 and 202).
This is unfortunate terminology and apt to be misleading. Hence I will use the term ‘independent’ to
indicate what I believe a pluralist is really committed to and to more accurately portray the distinctions
between monism, factoral pluralism, and foundational pluralism.
14

I call Bentham’s version of utilitarianism the ‘closest example’ of a purely monistic theory because as I
point out in Chapter 4, even Bentham is incorrectly considered a monist.
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clear that he means something analogous. This is evidenced when he states that the
principle of utility “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, … , not only of
every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government” (Bentham
1939, 792). In other words, the principle of utility is to serve as the ultimate arbiter in all
areas of life and it is not grounded in any further consideration. This makes him a monist
at the foundational level—there is only one principle, the principle of utility, that
determines the relevant normative factors. He is also a monist at the factoral level. This
becomes clear when he defines utility as “that property in any object, whereby it tends to
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case
comes to the same thing)” (Bentham 1939, 792). In other words, the only factor to be
used in making decisions is utility, and all other evaluative terms are to be understood as
equivalent to utility, sapping them of any independent meaning. Bentham is usually
understood to view utility in purely hedonistic terms. Calling pleasure the final cause of
action, he states that pleasure is “the sole standard in conformity to which each individual
ought, as far as depends on the legislator, be made to fashion his behavior” (Bentham
1939, 800). Thus, Bentham’s act utilitarianism can serve as an example of a purely
monistic theory.
Consequentialist theories do not have to be purely monistic, however; they can be
what Kagan identifies as instances of factoral pluralism. To endorse factoral pluralism
entails accepting that “some single basic foundational approach (whatever it is) accounts
for all of the content of normative ethics at the factoral level” but allows for a plurality of
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factors in action-guiding evaluations (Kagan 1998, 294).15

Consider one possible

interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism. On this interpretation, Mill recognizes
that there exists a plurality of independently relevant factors—namely, at least two
different kinds of pleasure—that properly figure into a individual’s evaluations.16

15

Kagan does not explain how we know that the factors are distinct from each other and do not collapse
into a single factor. Nor does he discuss whether it might be possible to have a set of distinct factors that
can be weighed on a single metric allowing for their comparability while maintaining their distinctness.
There is a good reason for keeping things vague at this point, namely, there might be differing accounts
about how one maintains a distinction between two factors. Since I am trying to characterize general
features of normative pluralism, to offer a more specific, substantive account of how we identify two
distinct and relevant factors will unnecessarily complicate, confuse, and limit the scope of the exposition at
this point.
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Nothing in the argument of this dissertation depends on which interpretation of Mill, the single scale
interpretation or the multiple scale interpretation, is correct. All that matters is that the multiple scale
interpretation is possible because on this interpretation utilitarianism can be an example of factoral
pluralism and not just monism. Nevertheless, I think a bit more should be said about this interpretation.
A significant difference between Bentham and Mill is that Mill recognizes qualitative differences
in pleasures; there exist qualitative differences between pleasures of the intellect and pleasures of sensation.
This distinction between two qualitatively different values serves as part of his defense of utilitarianism
against those who think it entails that only sensual, animal-like appetites yield pleasure. Mill’s version of
utilitarianism not only recognizes this distinction, but holds that “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings
and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, [are assigned] a much higher value as pleasures than those of
mere sensation” (Mill 1974, 26). This distinction is explained further when Mill discusses how a properly
experienced person will react to a choice between intellectual and sensual pleasures:
If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far
above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater
amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which
their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small
account (Mill 1974, 27).
On the interpretation I am putting forth here, the key is how we understand 1) the term ‘higher’ and 2) the
idea that one would not resign an intellectual pleasure for any amount of some sensual pleasure. One
interpretation holds the use of the term ‘higher’ implies that there exists a single metric of measurement,
and that both pleasures of the intellect and pleasures of sensation are on the same quantifiable scale,
Perhaps, as David O. Brink suggests they could be lexically ordered (Brink 1997). Another interpretation,
one that focuses on the use of the term ‘quality’ in the above quote, holds that pleasures of the intellect and
pleasures of sensations are on different scales. If they were being evaluated on the same scale, then three
units of intellectual pleasure from listening to a live performance of Mussorgsky’s Pictures at an Exhibition
could be outweighed by 10 units of sensual pleasure from eating a wonderful meal. This is exactly what
Mill states will not happen in the quote above, since listening to the symphony will normally be preferred
(by competent judges) to the eating, no matter how little intellectual pleasure you get from the symphony
and how much sensual pleasure you get from the dinner. So, even though both intellectual and sensual
pleasures are understood as types of pleasures, there are important qualitative differences between them
that, on this interpretation, suggest they are not commensurable in a quantitative way (Edwards 1975)
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Even though on the multiple scale interpretation of Mill there exists a plurality of
factors, Mill is still, on this interpretation, a monist in terms of foundations. This is
evidenced by his acceptance of the principle of utility as the only action-guiding
principle. According to Mill’s version of the principle, “actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness” (Mill 1974, 25). Furthermore, Mill arguably subscribes to a optimization rule
as the foundation of his moral theory when he distinguishes utilitarianism from egoism.
He states that the utilitarian standard “is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the
greatest amount of happiness altogether” (Mill 1974, 31).17 The key here is not how he
distinguishes between egoism and utilitarianism, but that in both cases he thinks of the
foundation requiring the optimization of outcomes.

So, like Bentham, Mill is a

foundational monist. Unlike Bentham (as presented here), Mill is a factoral pluralist.

1.3 Foundational Pluralism
The most extreme form of pluralism is foundational pluralism. Foundational
pluralism seems to be the position that writers like Callicott have in mind when they
attack pluralistic theories.

There are important differences between factoral and

foundational pluralism, as well as important similarities that distinguish both from
thoroughly monistic theories. At this point it will be helpful to consider in more detail the
differences between monism, factoral pluralism, and foundational pluralism, as well as a
couple of ways not to demonstrate the indecisiveness of pluralism a priori.
17

Mill is not clearly an act utilitarian, as I am presenting his view here. However, it makes no difference if
we interpret him as an act utilitarian or a rule utilitarian—in both cases he sees only one principle as
justifying either the proposed act or proposed rule.
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As indicated above, factoral pluralism is the view that “some single basic
foundational approach (whatever it is) accounts for all of the content of normative ethics
at the factoral level” (Kagan 1998, 294) but allows for a plurality of factors in the actionguiding evaluations. For example, we have seen that Mill is arguably a foundational
monist and a factoral pluralist. To take another example, a factoral pluralist might
endorse rule egoism as its foundation, then, at the factoral level, require all evaluations
include a consideration of the good that results from the act as well as to recognize
deontological constraints against doing harm, lying, etc.18 For example, consider the case
I described concerning the choices I face when drinking coffee. You might describe this
as a case where I accept only rule egoism at the foundational level. If we view egoism as
the notion that I only consider my own interests, but my interests can concern others, then
we can describe the different factors mentioned as egoistic rules. The factors would be
rules stating that I am concerned with my well-being in terms of pleasure, the well-being
of the environment in terms of a prohibition on acts that detract from stability, and a rule
concerned with the support of autonomy of others.19

Each rule is justified by the

foundation because each rule is connected to some interest that I have.

18

Kagan’s notion of factoral pluralism allows one to be a foundational rule egoist and at the factoral level
accept prohibitions and constraints one normally considers deontological. Kagan states the following:
As we have observed in previous chapters many of the rules of commonsense morality
seem to take the form of constraints (ruling our various actions even if the greater good
would result from the impersonal point of view). It seems likely, therefore, that many of
the optimal egoistic rules will take the form of constraints as well. And this means that
rule egoism at the foundational level will generate deontology at the factoral level (Kagan
1998, 202).

19

The last two, if one wants to push the stronger position of egoism as selfishness, can of course be given
psychological explanations that make them more directly in my self interest—I benefit from a stable
environment and I hope that if I promote the autonomy of others my own autonomy will be secure.
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Foundational pluralism, in contrast, is the view that a complete account of
normative ethics “needs to appeal to several foundational theories, each of which is able
to explain the basis of some of the normative factors, but no one of which explains all of
them” (Kagan 1998, 295). For example, a foundational pluralist may accept rule egoism
as the foundation that grounds the goodness associated with the consequences of an act,
but accept a deontological foundation as the foundation that grounds the constraints
relevant to acting. Consider a situation in which a man determines that he ought to
collect as many hardcover, first edition books as possible because it brings him
happiness. This can be developed as a rule that he should purchase such books whenever
the opportunity arises. However, he also recognizes that merely collecting the books gets
in the way of certain special obligations to himself, such as paying for continuing
education courses to improve his teaching that provides his livelihood. If he always
follows the rule, he would not be able to afford the courses to improve his teaching,
which can be considered a talent. But, as Kant suggests, developing our talents is an
obligation and not one that is to be understood in terms of consequences. So, in order to
meet that special obligation the man has to temper his egoistic, eudemonistic rule about
purchasing first edition hardcover books so that he can fulfill his duty to improve his
talents, which also takes money. Another case that Kagan does not seem to consider, is
that a foundational pluralist may accept two distinct grounds for goodness—one that has,
say, rule egoism as a foundation that grounds the goodness associated with the
consequences of some acts and another that has act utilitarianism as a foundation that
grounds the goodness associated with the consequences of some other acts. For example,
not lying, paying one’s debts, and similar events that involve other people directly are
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determined by a rule of action that considers the overall goodness that I can experience
by following that rule faithfully. However, other acts, such as whether I should watch the
A & E biography on Presidents Washington and Lincoln as opposed to going to sports
bar to watch Monday Night Football, are something that I determine in each new
situation, and do not have any rule prescribing which activity I should perform. With
these examples we can see that foundational pluralism is different from both thoroughgoing monism and factoral pluralism, since both monism and factoral pluralism are
monistic at the foundational level. As Kagan articulates this, “Someone who is a monist
at the foundational level believes that everything about the factoral level can be explained
in terms of a single, unified account. In contrast, foundational pluralists reject the
possibility of such a unified account” (Kagan 1998, 297).
Supporters of both factoral and foundational pluralism disagree with supporters of
monism on one notion: both sorts of pluralists hold that different factors—perhaps
goodness and individual constraints, for example—are independently significant for
guiding action. Suppose that a thoroughgoing monistic act egoist refers to both goodness
and constraints as normative factors. The monist must understand the constraints as
instrumentally significant, not independently significant, in determining the goodness
associated with the consequences of an act. On the monistic view the instrumental
factors “play no role in making it the case that a given act has the moral status that it
does” (Kagan 1998, 70). A main point of pluralism, whether factoral or foundational, is
to reject the idea that there is only one independently significant factor; in order to be a
pluralist one must accept the existence of a multiplicity of independently significant
factors. Nevertheless, factoral and foundational pluralism disagree with each other on the
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issue of whether each factor is grounded in a single foundation. For the factoral pluralist,
one foundation grounds all independently significant factors. For example, a factoral
pluralist who accepts goodness of results, constraints on doing harm, special obligations
to family and friends, as well as certain positive duties conferred by an agent’s
professional role as independently significant factors, might ground all of them in
foundational egoism. The key is that at the foundational level only egoism, or only
utilitarianism, or only some single form of deontology, grounds all the independently
significant factors (Kagan 1998, 194-204).20 For the foundational pluralist, in contrast,
there must be at least two foundations grounding independently significant factors. For
example, the goodness of results as a factor might be grounded in act egoism, while
constraints and special obligations might be grounded in some form of universalism,
while our professional duties might be grounded in contractarianism.21 There is also the
case mentioned above that there can exist two or more independent sorts of goodness,
each grounded in a different foundation. In this case, one has a plurality of foundations,
and a plurality of factors, but all of the factors are some form of goodness.

20

A recent example of a deontological theory used as a ground for a pluralistic theory is Robert Audi’s
discussion of intuitionism (Audi 2004)

21

This example may strike some as odd since it is not clear that an egoist would accept any sort of
universalistic based obligations. But remember, this is not an example of an egoistic theory, but of a
pluralistic theory. A pluralist would have no problem accepting both egoistic and universalistic parts of a
theory.
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1.3.1 Problem # 1: Lack of Unity
The above is only a description of logical possibilities regarding the different
types of normative theories, however, and it does not demonstrate that one could actually
develop an acceptable form of foundational pluralism. Kagan notes that “if foundational
pluralism is correct, the best overall account would simply add together what intuitively
strikes us as being distinct foundational views” (Kagan 1998, 295).

He also says,

however, that “this merely ‘conjunctive’ account will lack the kind of conceptual unity
that has been present in more monistic foundational theories we have been examining”
(Kagan 1998, 295). It is not clear to me, however, that a conjunctive account is the only
viable form of foundational pluralism, nor that it is the ‘best overall account’. If other
forms of foundational pluralism do turn out to exist, then Kagan’s argument misses the
point because it is only applicable to the conjunctive account of foundational pluralism.22
But even if all examples of foundational pluralism are merely conjunctive, Kagan’s
argument faces other problems. While it may be true that a merely conjunctive account of
foundational pluralism would lack conceptual unity, that fact is hardly a sufficient
argument against its plausibility. First, it assumes that conceptual unity is all-important
to normative theories. One defense of foundational pluralism might make use of more
criteria for theory choice than just unity.23 For example, a foundational pluralist might
22

Rebecca Walker develops and defends a conjunctive account of normative pluralism (Walker 1998).
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It is interesting that Kagan only mentions the criterion of unity here. In his The Limits of Morality, he
mentions the following five criteria of theory choice: simplicity, power, coherence, ability to explain, and
the lack of dangling distinctions (Kagan 1991, 11-15). If we take unity to be equivalent to simplicity, then
the question arises: why does Kagan not reference these other criteria for theory choice in his argument
about the unacceptability of foundational pluralism? We might also ask what is so special about these five
criteria and should we also consider a criterion like non-distortion as an additional criterion of theory
choice?
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claim that under a monistic theory some of our understanding of normative theory is
unacceptably lost or distorted in striving for conceptual unity.

This non-distortion

criterion states that it is better for a normative theory to countenance less distortion of
normative phenomena rather than more distortion of normative phenomena.24 Can we
brush aside considerations of non-distortion in favor of considerations of unity a priori?
To do so requires justification of two claims: (a) that the two criteria are not mutually
realizable and (b) that the non-distortion criterion is less relevant than unity. As a logical
matter, a problem with an a priori argument for (a) is that it is unclear whether the two
criteria are not mutually realizable. It may turn out to be the case that the most nondistorted normative theory is also the one with the most unity. But this is not a purely
logical question. In fact, one of the implications of Quine’s attack on the analytic –
synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is that it is no longer clear that any
question can be settled on purely logical grounds (Qunie 1980, 20-46). Quine states that
[t]he totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the casual matters
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or
even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man made fabric which impinges
on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science
is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A
conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the
interior of the field” (Quine 1980, 42).
Suppose, as does Quine, that logical matters are near the center of the field, and thus are
more immune to revision than beliefs at the periphery. This immunity to revision is not
absolute. The above quote indicates that a change of information from our experience,
such as the discovery that a unified normative theory is highly distorted, or that the

24

For further discussion of the non-distortion criterion, see section 1.5.1.
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opposite is true, that a unified normative theory has almost no distortion, will change our
understanding of the logical relation between the two criteria. But, as Quine also points
out,
it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which
hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold
come what may. Any statement can be made true come what may, if we
make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system (Quine 1980,
43).
It is also important to note that Quine’s thesis implies that “no statement is immune to
revision” (Quine 1980, 43). So, with enough adjustment to the system of beliefs, it could
either be the case that one cannot satisfy the two criteria simultaneously, or that both can
be maximally satisfied simultaneously.

But that is not a purely a priori matter as

Kagan’s argument seems to imply because any change to the system, whether logical or
empirical, will possibly affect the other extreme. These considerations suggest that the
mutual realizability of two criteria cannot be determined a priori, as Kagan appears
forced to accept if the argument is to work. Thus, considering the existence of other
criteria for evaluating theories, an a priori demand for conceptual unity is not conclusive,
and may even be harmful, to normative theorizing. Since both (a) and (b) must be met to
brush aside the criterion of non-distortion (or, for that matter, any additional criterion),
Kagan has not provided a reason to ignore the non-distortion criterion.
Second, Kagan in his quest for unity states the importance of unity as an all-ornothing criterion. However, there is reason to believe that criteria for theory choice ought
not to be cast in all-or-nothing terms.25 Take simplicity, for example: what would it
mean for a theory to be absolutely simple? Is simplicity to be determined by the number
25

I address this point more fully in section 4.6.
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of principles of action it endorses? Is simplicity to be determined by how uncomplicated
a principle of action is stated? Consider what I will call the ‘Nike theory’ of rational
action, made so famous in their commercials, that approaches the limit case for both
considerations. The Nike theory has just one, short principle of action: ‘just do it’.
However, we can simplify the statement of this principle further, at least in terms of the
structure of the proposition by just saying ‘act’. The Nike theory, in either form, is
hardly a useful, or enlightening, or even sensible theory of action. It does not help us
determine what actions are correct prudentially, morally, aesthetically, politically, etc.,
and it seems to ignore the entire idea of incompossible actions. Furthermore, it can lead
those who subscribe to the theory to do things which are completely irrational, such as
walking to the edge of a cliff and then jumping off. Nothing in the Nike theory says this
act is better than turning around and walking away. But it does seems to suggest that
jumping off the cliff is better than standing there and doing nothing at all. Such a theory
may be simple, but that hardly makes the Nike theory one that we ought to adopt.
Consider next the idea that the simplicity of a theory is one that has the fewest principles
of action. A theory that had no principle of action at all would be even more simple than
any version of the Nike theory. And yet, it is not clear that this null theory is a theory at
all! Appealing to an absolute criterion of simplicity, however, seems to point us in this
direction. The way to avoid this absurd result is to realize that criterion of unity must
stated in terms of degrees. But this means that the use of unity as an all-or-nothing
criterion to argue for the rejection of a view is illegitimate. Thus, we should not reject
foundational pluralism solely on the basis of Kagan’s appeal to conceptual unity.
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1.3.2 Problem #2: The Collapse of Foundational Pluralism
Kagan does raise another concern regarding foundational pluralism. This concern
relies on his notion that all normative theories, including monistic theories, must include
interaction principles specifying how factors interact. The interaction principles govern
“the various ways in which one factor, or combination of factors, can outweigh (or be
overridden by, or modify the impact of) another factor, or combination of factors”
(Kagan 1998, 295) For monistic and factoral pluralistic theories, these interaction
principles will be accounted for by the foundational theory (Kagan 1998, 295). For
example, to identify interaction principles appropriate to foundational contractarianism
“we could look to see which interaction principles would be agreed upon by
appropriately specified bargainers, or which could be universalized without anything (of
the relevant sort) going wrong, or which would lead to the best results overall and so on”
(Kagan 1998, 296). Similarly for a Kantian or consequentialist foundational theory, one
would ground the significance of the interaction principles through appeal to the
Categorical Imperative or to maximization of the good. Kagan goes on to say that a
plausible account of the ground for the interaction principles may not be available to the
foundational pluralist. This conclusion seems indicated to Kagan because he understands
a foundational account as grounding both the factors and the interaction principles. Since
each foundation can ground different sets of factors and interaction principles, a
foundational pluralist appears to need an account of ‘transcategorical interaction
principles’ that bridge the differences between the foundations (Kagan 1998, 296).
Kagan implies that the grounding of these transcategorical interaction principles will
have the form of one of the foundational views he has sketched previously in the book.
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However, he also recognizes that a nonfoundationalist account of the interaction
principles is possible. Such an account states that
Nothing grounds, or explains, the moral relevance of the basic normative
factors. Similarly, there is no explanation to be had concerning why the
various basic factors interact in the particular way that they do. According
to the nonfoundationalist, then, the quest for a more substantial
foundational theory is misguided (Kagan 1998, 190).
A thoroughly non-foundational account, of course, contrasts to an account that merely
lacks a foundation for transcategorical interaction principles. Nothing in the quote
precludes having a foundationally pluralistic account of factors and a non-foundational
account of the interaction principles, except, of course, that this may go against Kagan’s
demand for conceptual unity in a normative theory. Foundational pluralists might agree
with Kagan that each factor is grounded in a foundation, and that within each foundation
there are interaction principles. However, the foundational pluralist might also claim,
contrary to Kagan’s assumptions, that there are no transcategorical interaction principles,
or alternatively might claim that while they do exist, they are not grounded in anything
like a theory. This latter alternative might be something like the formation of general
principles from cases in casuistry.26 On this account, the transcategorical principles are
not exceptionless universalizations, but generalizations from experience that attempt to
explain how factors grounded in different foundations interact. Kagan himself recognizes
such a possibility in the context of discussing the interactions principles grounded in one
foundation. He states that one could argue for a particularist position that, in its strongest
form, denies any type of generalized interaction principles (Kagan 1998, 184). But, as he
26

Jonsen and Toulmin provide an account of the nature and history of casuistry (Jonsen and Toulmin 1989,
251-265).
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states, a moderate particularist is “prepared to accept the existence of generalizations—
provided that it is understood that these generalizations never take the form of principles
that are exceptionless and universal” (Kagan 1998, 185). The point here is that the nature
of interaction principles for a foundational pluralist is a concern for such theories.
However, it is a concern that does not eliminate the possibility of foundational pluralism
by showing it collapses into factoral pluralism. Each theory of foundational pluralism
must develop an account of interaction principles, and each account must be individually
judged on its own merits. So while Kagan can be granted the weak conclusion that the
account of interaction principles is a concern for those wishing to defend versions of
foundational pluralism, one should not grant him the stronger conclusion that this
demonstrates that foundational pluralism will collapse. At best Kagan has pointed out
that any theory of foundational pluralism can be assessed in terms of the acceptability of
its substantive claims about interaction principles.
Nevertheless, concerns about the origin of interaction principles do raise a bigger
problem. The following argument might be brought in support of the conclusion that
foundational pluralism collapses into a type of factoral pluralism.
If you accept that all the transcategorical interaction principles are
grounded in a single approach such as egoism, or utilitarianism, or
contractarianism, then you have merely moved the question of ultimate
foundation back one level. You may say that two separate foundations
ground separate sets of factors. However, by admitting that the
transcategorical interaction principles are grounded in a meta-foundation
of a single type, you have only offered a more complicated version of
factoral pluralism, not an actual version of foundational pluralism.27

27

This is not an argument explicitly put forth by Kagan, but he seems to hint at this argument (Kagan 1998,
294-9).
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There are at least two general ways to block this argument. One is to accept some form
of particularism.28 The other is to accept a form of holism.

On the particularist

approach, the transcategorical interaction principles arise from the details of the situation
one finds oneself in, not from one simple foundational theory. On the holistic approach,
the transcategorical interaction principles develop not from a theory, but from the totality
of the sentences one accepts as true, or from the entire web of beliefs one assents to. In
either case, foundational pluralism does not collapse into a version of factoral pluralism
because the account of the transcategorical interaction principles is based in something
other than a foundational theory.

Since such nonfoundational accounts of the

transcategorical interaction principles are at least initially plausible, so too is the notion of
foundational pluralism as independent from factoral pluralism.

Again, whether a

particular substantive version of foundational pluralism is acceptable is a concern to be
dealt with when assessing a full-blown version of a theory. The concern does not
establish a priori that foundational pluralism is not possible.
So far then, it appears as if monism, factoral pluralism, and foundational
pluralism are initially plausible as well as logically possible types of moral theory. This
is only an initial run at understanding some background to the main issue to be discussed
here, namely, the problem of decisiveness. The next step is understanding some basic
theoretical commitments made by pluralists to which opponents to pluralism attribute the

28

For an in depth discussion of particularism, see the individual papers in Moral Particularism (Hooker
and Little) 2000.
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formal failure of pluralism.

It is these commitments to incomparability and non-

reductionism that make pluralistic theories appear to be indecisive.29

1.4 Non-Reductionism and Incomparability
As mentioned earlier, normative pluralism, whether factoral or foundational,
accepts that there exist more than one independently significant factor in making
decisions. I now want to look at two important characteristics of normative pluralism,
namely incomparability and non-reductionism, that are important to ensure that pluralism
holds. These characteristics are instrumental to our understanding of the decisiveness
problem, and their endorsement can be viewed as departures from simplicity.30
Most writers either do not connect comparability and reductionism with simplicity
or do so only indirectly.31 However, I do want to directly connect these concepts. In
doing so, I am arguing that the acceptance of incomparability and non-reductionism is a
rejection of two forms of simplicity. Moreover, I am using a top-down analysis whereas
most writers on pluralism have used a bottom-up analysis. In other words, most writers
on pluralism begin discussing the notion that there exists a plurality of factors or values,
etc., and move up from there to discuss commitments to non-reductionism and
incomparability. For example, Thomas Nagel discusses incomparability—he refers to it
29

As I said earlier in footnote 10, it may be the case that monistic theories also face this problem and so
they may fail to meet the criterion of decisiveness as well. If I can establish my thesis that pluralism does
not wreck on the rock of the problem of decisiveness, then of course monism will also be saved from a
similar fate.
30

I do not think that comparability and reductionism exhaust the possible interpretations of simplicity. For
example, a version of simplicity says we should not make use of any non-essential or non-helpful
distinctions, categories, or ontological commitments, but this version of simplicity does not entail monism
as reductionism does.

31

John Dupré is an exception to this statement (Dupré 1993).
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as incommensurability—and non-reductionism as consequences of the fact that there is a
plurality of independently significant and distinct values that inform our moral lives
(Nagel 1991, 34). John Kekes and Christopher Stone see both non-reductionism and
incomparability as consequences of the pluralist denial of overriding factors or
foundations (Kekes 1993, 20; Stone 1987, 137-141). I mention these positions not to
criticize them here, but to contrast them with my approach. The top-down approach I am
using starts with the abstract notions of non-reductionism and incomparability so that we
can see both how commitments to these features leads to a plurality of factors, and also
how the commitment to these features leads to concerns about decisiveness for pluralistic
theories.
First, we need to define more clearly the notions of non-reductionism and
incomparabilty. These are both negative notions but in the case of non-reductionism I
think it will help the exposition if we consider the positive notion of reductionism.

John

Dupré defines the general notion of reductionism as “the commitment to any unifactorial
explanation of a range of phenomena” (Dupré 1993, 87). The phenomena in question in
normative theory, at least as I am discussing it here, are the factors we use to determine
the normative status of an act. So, a normative theory is reductionist if and only if the
theory offers a unified account of factors in which all factors are understood to be
different manners of expressing a single independently significant factor. This makes
Kagan’s notion of factoral monism identical to the reductionist program in normative
theory. It is also the case that reductionism is a more specific claim than comparability.
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Comparability, which is compatible even with a plurality of factors,32 would enable us to
rationally resolve a conflict while allowing for the initial factors to retain independent
significance. A normative theory endorses comparability if and only if it allows for at
least one value relation to hold between alternatives.33 To see this more clearly, consider
an example of a theory that views pleasure and happiness as two distinct factors.34 This
theory could be non-reductionist in that it recognizes a major difference between
happiness and pleasure. First, the distinction could be maintained by stating that pleasure
is intimately connected with the body, while happiness is purely a state of mind.
Furthermore, we might recognize that the experience of pleasure is episodic and usually
of short duration, while happiness applies not only to episodes, but to whole lives in
general. Third, we could recognize that there is no limit on the amount of happiness one
can have, but there seem to be limits on the amount of pleasure—too much pleasure
could lead to a neural-stimulus overload that results in pain, while too much happiness
does not lead to unhappiness. Thus, these two factors cannot be reduced to one another
and both have independent significance.
These assumptions, however, do not preclude the possibility of comparability. As
Mill points out in Utilitarianism, there are two kinds of pleasure, the pleasures of the
intellect and the pleasures of sensation (Mill 1962, 258).

These pleasures are

qualitatively different and thus not reducible to one another, nor reducible to mere
32

For a more full defense of this claim, see Chapter 3.

33

I will discuss the exact meaning of the definition in section 1.4.2
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I am not claiming that any historical theory fits this description. However, similar claims have been
made, for example, by Lawrence Hinman (Hinman 2003, 164-7). In any case, I think that the distinction
has prima facie plausibility.

37

quantity. Nevertheless, they are comparable. Mill states that “[o]f two pleasures, if there
be one to which all or almost all who have experience or both give a decided preference,
irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable
pleasure” (Mill 1962, 259).
What this shows is that non-reductionism does not entail incomparabilty; you can
be a non-reductionst and endorse the view that two independently significant factors are
comparable.

By accepting reductionism one also accepts a strong notion of

comparability: if you accept reductionism, where all factors a, b, …, n are examples of
factors which allow for the intersubstitutivity with a single independently significant
factor α without the loss of meaning, then (1) you must accept that all of those other
factors are comparable with α, and (2) you must endorse that a, b, …, n are comparable
with each other through α. However, one can deny the first clause of the consequent and
yet still hold the second. In other words, one can hold that a, b, …, n are comparable to
each other, at least enough to generate an ordering, without also holding that a, b, …, n
are merely different ways of expressing α.

The point is that reductionism entails

comparabilty. But, by contraposition, we can also see that incomparability entails nonreductionism. John Kekes’ definition of incomparability35 includes the following: two
values are incomparable if and only if
1. There does not exist a highest value or combination of values in terms
of which all other values can be evaluated; and
2. There does not exist some medium that allows for a ranking of
different values; and
35

It should be noted that Kekes’ uses the term ‘incommensurability’ in his text. However, it is clear that
the more accurate term for what he is talking about is incomparability since he is not addressing the more
limited conception of numerical comparability.
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3. There is not some a set of principles that provides an ordering of all
values that is also acceptable to all reasonable people.36
Part 2 of his definition indicates that incomparability entails non-reductionism. For, if
reductionism were true the base entity would be a medium that allows for a ranking in
terms of one independently significant factor. So, by accepting incomparability, you are
committed to also accepting non-reductionism.
In what follows, I explain in detail the way in which reductionism and
comparability are related to the notion of simplicity, and provide reasons to question the
exalted status of reductionism and comparability for normative theory.

1.4.1 Simplicity and Reductionism
I will begin with a brief discussion of the term ‘simplicity’. There is no clear
consensus on its meaning, or on the practical upshot of requiring a theory to be simple.
However, many writers use simplicity as a criterion for theory choice.

For example,

Shelly Kagan claims it is a necessary criterion for any ethical theory (Kagan 1991, 11)
and Postow lists it as one of the surviving candidates for systematic criteria of Reasons
Theories (Postow 1999, 190). To see the ambiguity about simplicity, consider some
examples: is nominalism more simple than universalism by doing away with universals,
or is a theory that includes universals more simple because it expedites the explanatory
process? Is a normative theory with few very general principles of right action simpler
because it has fewer principles to appeal to, or is a theory with many very specific
36

I have rephrased Kekes’ description of what incomparability entails in order to clarify his definition.
Kekes’ original statement of incomparability in unnecessarily wordy and confusing (Kekes 1993, 56).
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principles simpler because such a theory requires less work to identify the correct action
in a given case (since the principles are much closer to the details of the situation)?
Appealing to the criterion of simplicity without stating more fully its substantive
requirements leaves the criterion too open to interpretations to be useful.
Fortunately, some theorists do provide substantive definitions of this criterion.
Kagan, for example, says “roughly a moral theory has simplicity if it yields a body of
judgments out of a relatively sparse amount of theory, deriving the numerous complex
variations of the phenomena from a smaller number of basic principles” (Kagan 1991,
11). Postow, in a similar vein, identifies simplicity as a Systematic Criterion that holds
that a Reasons Theory should “have fewer rather than more principles” and “make fewer
rather than more distinctions” (Postow 1999, 185). And, even though she defends this
criterion against some charges, she notes at the end of the defense that “the acceptance of
simplicity as merely one among many meta-level criteria would be compatible with the
acceptance of a Reasons Theory with a much lower degree of simplicity than that
enjoyed, say, by act utilitarianism” (Postow 1999, 185). This last quote is perhaps the
most important, especially since Kagan does not explicitly recognize the idea that
simplicity may not be the most important criterion for theory choice. Recall that earlier I
stated that another criterion for theory choice, one that is important for the defense of
normative pluralism, is that a theory should, when explaining normative phenomena,
have less rather than more distortion of those phenomena. One could argue that a
thoroughly monistic theory of act utilitarianism, while clearly possessing a high degree of
simplicity, also distorts moral phenomena to a high degree. The thorough-going monism
of such a theory requires us to view specific aspects of consequences, say the state of
40

affairs produced, as the only independently significant factor, requiring all other factors
to be understood completely in terms of such states of affairs. As Bernard Williams
famously argues, this seems to be a distortion. In the article “Consequentialism and
Integrity” he discusses the cases of Jim and George who are faced with choices of
whether to participate in a firing squad or work for a chemical and biological weapons
plant respectively (Williams 1988, 33-5).

Williams wants us to see that utilitarian

theories force us to view our feelings and actions in a particular way, a way in which we
are alienated from our moral feelings and our actions (Williams 1988, 38). First, under
utilitarianism, our moral feelings are to be discarded. If we follow Williams and think of
consequentialism as concerned with states of affairs, then the evaluation of the states of
affairs is independent of our feelings about them. In fact, feelings enter the evaluation
only after one has determined which state of affairs is the best. It makes no sense, even
in cases where one has to choose the lesser evil as opposed to a greater evil, to have any
negative feelings whatsoever.

That is just a misguided emotional reaction to the

rationally and morally correct choice. This applies to any consequentialist choice in that
one is always forgoing something and it makes no sense on such a view to have any
feelings about that missed opportunity at all. Second, under utilitarianism, our
relationship to a particular act, for example shooting one person to save nineteen others,
seems to be too distant by viewing our performing the act as no different from some other
person doing the act. In both of these ways, the consequences resulting from our action,
by alienating us from our feelings and our actions, distort to an unacceptable degree our
understanding of both. Williams’ solution is to provide a more complex theory that must
make room for the virtue of integrity in these moral situations. By doing so, the moral
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description of the situations, especially the psychological effects on the agent, is less
distorted, but it is also less simple. Now, if we accept that concerns for both simplicity
and distortion are important for theory choice, then we cannot wield simplicity as the
most important criterion of theory choice without further argumentation.37

Since

Williams’ arguments demonstrate the importance of virtue-based notions to avoid such
distortion, we must recognize that the over-reliance on the simplicity criterion by
detractors of pluralism is suspect.
Another reason to be suspicious of over-reliance on the simplicity criterion in
arguments is an ambiguity about whether the criterion is normative on its own authority
or normative because our theories should reflect the simplicity of the normative world.38
There are problems with both interpretations. If it is conceived as normative on its own
authority and requires that our theories should be simple, another question arises: Why is
simplicity, whatever it means substantively, necessarily better than complexity? We
should get some argument that justifies this widely cited criterion, and not just cite it.39 If

37

One may try to salvage the arguments of Kagan by stating that he has implicitly invoked ceteris paribus
clauses in their arguments against pluralism. However, this will not work for they do not attempt to
establish the truth of the view that other things are equal. In other words, he has to establish that on every
other criterion monistic and pluralistic theories are the same save for simplicity. It is doubtful that this is
true, so until he provides an argument for the truth of this assumption, we are free reject his conclusion.

38

Some readers may question the relevance of descriptive accuracy to normative theory. However,
depending on your views related to normative realism, accuracy of the normative theory could be relevant.
For example, if you were to take a strong naturalistic and realistic attitude toward the ontological
commitments of morality and your theory fails to accurately capture those commitments, then you would
have to admit that the theory is faulty.
39

Kagan shirks this responsibility by saying of the criteria for theory choice that “there is no room here to
give these matters the attention they deserve” and yet throughout the Limits of Morality appeals to the
criteria as if we all agree about the list of criteria without argument (Kagan 1991, 11). Thomas Kuhn ,
discussing theory choice for science, states the following:
These five characteristics—accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness—
are all standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory. If they had not been, I
would have devoted far more space to them in my book, for I agree entirely with the
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it is conceived as being normative because the normative world is simple, a different
question arises:

what evidence suggests the normative world is simple?

With

consequences, positive duties, constraints, and virtues all having intuitive plausibility as
part of the normative world, one cannot just say the normative world is simple. Before
using the simplicity criterion one must establish that the intuitions regarding the
relevance and plausibility of the various factors are to be discarded. To avoid begging
the question, the defender of simplicity cannot use the criterion of simplicity to argue that
the normative world is simple but must use independent reasoning. Until such arguments
are forthcoming, I think it is reasonable to maintain that given our intuitions, the criterion
of simplicity may not match up with the world.
One possible response to the above argument is that there is an obvious pragmatic
reason for keeping simplicity as a criterion of theory choice.40 This pragmatic reason
states that simpler theories are easier to use and to correct. It makes no sense, in terms of
ease of use, to discuss factors, values, principles, etc., that serve only to complicate the
theory but fail to add to a theory’s power.41 As such, the criterion of simplicity is a
purely practical criterion and clearly acceptable. But, there are a couple of problems with
this response. First, a pluralist will not have a problem with such a pragmatic claim.
Pluralists are not advocating a plurality of factors, values and principles, etc., for the sake
traditional view that they play a vital role when scientists must choose between an
established theory and an upstart competitor. Together with others of much the same
sort, they provide the shared basis for theory choice (Kuhn 1998, 436).
He does not waver from the claim that simplicity is to be used in theory choice even though throughout
“Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” he questions the applicability of simplicity.
40

I would like to thank John Nolt for raising this concern.
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‘Power’ is an additional criterion of theory choice beyond simplicity. The idea contained within the
pragmatic criticism is that in order to give up some simplicity, there must be a positive payoff in terms of
some other criterion of theory choice.
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of plurality. They are advocating the plurality because such a theory is more powerful
(amongst other consideration such as a theory is more accurate). So, the pluralist can
accept the pragmatic concern especially since it still allows for a great deal of complexity
in a theory as long as the complexity has benefits, such as power, non-distortion, and
accuracy. Second, this response does not address the actual conclusion of the above
argument. My argument does not demonstrate that simplicity is to be abandoned as a
criterion of theory choice; it only proposes that the burden of proof is on those who want
to claim that simplicity is to be understood in a particular way and is always to be given
an exalted place in discussions of theory choice.
Regardless of these arguments, someone may deem it plausible to develop a
definition of simplicity as reductionism. On the view discussed here, concerns about
simplicity involve the question of whether there exists a multiplicity of independently
significant moral phenomena. Simplicity as reductionism is the idea that the number of
independently significant phenomena should be minimized, ideally to the limit case of
only one independently significant phenomenon. On this view, if one insists on using
additional terms, say both ‘pleasure’ and’ happiness’ as forms of ‘good’, then ‘pleasure’
and ‘happiness’ must be seen as synonyms for each other and ‘good’. All three terms
pick out the same, single, referent.42 Thus, simplicity as reductionism achieves a unified
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John Nolt has objected that I have constructed a straw person here by insisting that a reductionist has to
see the terms ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ as referring to the exact same item as ‘good’. Another possibility
may be that both ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ refer to species of goodness. However, such a ‘sophisticated
reductionism’ is not really reductionism. If both ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ refer to items that are distinct
from each other and goodness itself, then you do not have a reductionist theory. ‘Goodness’ would either
refer to an independent entity, or it would refer to a schematic notion that had no content and reference. In
either case, the terms ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ refer to something different from each other and different
from goodness (either because goodness exists independently or does not exist at all).
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account of all phenomena by eliminating all but one independently significant factor. On
this understanding of simplicity, any factor that initially appears necessary for a decision
is either already considered in the single independently significant factor or not actually
necessary for the decision. In the discussion of consequentialism and integrity put forth
by Williams, the utilitarian reply to Williams argument is as follows: either the concern
for integrity is already built into the utilities, or it is not necessary for rational choice.
Once one rejects the notion of simplicity as reductionism, as defenders of pluralism do,
the utilitarian counter argument loses its straightforward plausibility.

Williams’

argument for including integrity in our decisions points out that some phenomena cannot
be captured by the utilities and yet are still significant for making rational choices about
action. By doing so, Williams shifts the burden of proof onto those who wish to defend
the criterion of simplicity as reductionism by showing that integrity is both important for
decision-making and not captured by utilities.

1.4.2 Simplicity and Comparability
Simplicity in terms of comparability is slightly different. One difficulty with
understanding the positive notion ‘comparability’ is the fact that there is no agreement
about what the term means. The second is that the literature about this topic talks about
incommensurability. Ruth Chang’s discussion is an example of both difficulties. She has
identified three different possible meanings for incommensurability. The first is found in
the work of Thomas Kuhn, and states that “evaluation across different conceptual
schemata, ways of life, or cultures is impossible” (Chang 1997, 1). A second is found,
presumably, in those objecting to decision theoretic approaches to practical rationality,
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and states that “incommensurable items cannot be precisely measured by a single ‘scale’
of units of value” (Chang 1997, 1).

I believe Chang intends this notion of

incommensurability to refer to axiological accounts that mathematically compare two
items. This differs from the final version of incommensurability as incomparability in
that incomparability is not restricted to mathematical incommensurables, but to any
attempt, including mathematical, to compare two items. Chang defines incomparability
such that “for each particular positive value relation, it is not true—that is, false or neither
true nor false—that it holds between [two alternatives]” (Chang 1997, 5). This statement
is very pregnant and it will be helpful to break it down into two different clauses. The
first clause is that two alternatives a and b are incomparable with respect to a particular
value relation ℜ if and only if neither aℜb nor bℜa holds. This clause does not establish
that any two items are incomparable in a strong sense in which a and b are completely
incomparable. In order to achieve this stronger result we have to add to define complete
incomparability: two alternatives a and b are completely incomparable if an only if for
all ℜ there does not exist an ℜ in which either aℜb nor bℜa. What Chang seems to be
getting at here is the following: in a particular circumstance in which one wants to
compare two alternatives—say comparing a career in law with a career in philosophy—
one fails to find a meaningful value relation ℜ between the two such that one can say the
career in law is better than a career in philosophy in terms of ℜ.43

43

Surely this is not true. When comparing careers, there are several value relations that can be compared.
These include income, prestige, benefits packages, mobility, free time, etc. But being comparable on one
particular value relation, or even twenty, is not sufficient show that two alternatives are completely
comparable. One has to show also that the list of value relations in which the two are comparable is
exhaustive.
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These definitions of commensurability, including my explication of Chang’s
definition of incommensurability as incomparability, have in common the notion that
there is some way, either directly or indirectly, to make an evaluative comparison
between alternatives.44 One difference between comparability and reductionism, as we
have seen, is that comparability allows one to accept a multiplicity of independently
significant factors, whereas reductionism does not. The point here, however, is that
comparability is a form of simplicity in that comparability implies that there will not be
instances where direct or indirect evaluations cannot take place.

1.4.3 Incomparability and Pluralism
To more fully understand the problem of decisiveness, we must sketch the
concerns that arise because pluralists accept incomparability and non-reductionism.
Chang’s third definition of incommensurability implies that two objects which are
incommensurable are not comparable on any value relation ℜ. This is a strong claim, and
one to which the pluralist is not committed. This is because a pluralist is only committed
to the claim that some alternatives are not completely comparable. For example, the
position held by defenders of factoral pluralism, where there is a single foundation to
ground the plurality of factors,45 amounts to the claim that there exists no single factor
that allows us to articulate precisely the meaning of independently significant contributory
44

Helen Longino in Science as Social Knowledge identifies two different ways in which theories can fail to
be indirectly comparable. The first holds that there are no neutral or independent data to serve as an arbiter
between theories and the second holds that theories are expressed in mutually untranslatable languages
(Longino 1990, 27). I believe that similar thoughts can be expressed about foundations (instead of
theories) in foundational pluralism.

45

This qualifying clause is actually entailed by the definition of factoral pluralism.

47

factors.46 But there exist a great many types of comparability that fall between this strong
notion of complete comparability and the strong notion of complete incomparability. As
we stated before, two alternatives a and b are completely incomparable if an only if for all
ℜ there does not exist an ℜ in which either aℜb nor bℜa. On the other hand, two
alternatives a and b are completely comparable if an only if for all ℜ, a and b can be
compared on a ratio scale.47 Suppose that we have alternatives a and b and we are trying
to compare them on the positive value relations ℜ1, ℜ2, and ℜ3.

Complete

incomparability would hold that a and b are not comparable on any of the three relations
ℜ. However, if a and b are ordinally comparable on ℜ1, but not ℜ2 or ℜ3, then we have
some form of comparability that is significantly short of complete comparability. This
allows us to at least ordinally rank the alternatives in terms of ℜ1. Once there is at least
one value relation ℜ on which a and b are comparable, then we can say that the relation
that holds between a and b, at least in terms of ℜ1, are asymmetrical (if aℜ1b, then not
bℜ1a), connected (aℜ1b or bℜ1a) and by adding a third alternative that is comparable in
terms of ℜ1, transitive (if aℜ1b and bℜ1c, then aℜ1c).48 However, one may not have as
much confidence in this ranking as compared to being able to provide an ordering that
relies on both ℜ1 and ℜ2. In other words, there are degrees of ordinal comparability based
on the percentage of positive value relations ℜ in which the alternatives are comparable.
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Chang makes a similar point using the language of values rather than factors (Chang 1997, 1-10).
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On ratio scales, there is a zero point as well as standard unit of measure for each thing compared
(Resnick 1987, 83).
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This is not to say that one has to accept each one of these conditions. For example, transitivity has come
under criticism as part of an ordering relation (Anand 1993, 55-71). Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapter
two, you can have partial orderings which fall short of ordinal comparability since they need only accept
that the relation between a and b is transitive and reflexive (aℜa).
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Even if we stated that a and b were comparable in terms of all ℜ, that does not entail
complete comparability. This is because you can have interval comparability. On such a
form of comparability, you not only have a mere ordering that meets the conditions of
asymmetry, connectedness, and transitivity, but you can express relative lengths of the
intervals between the alternatives. Complete comparability only begins when you have
ratio comparability. Ratio comparability with its known zero point involves absolute
numerical intervals, not the relative numerical intervals between alternatives,. However,
suppose that one has our three positive value relations between a and b, but for some
reason ℜ1 is only an ordering scale relation, ℜ2 is only an interval scale relation, and ℜ3 is
a ratio scale relation. I do not think we want to say that even though a and b are
comparable on all ℜ that we have complete comparability. Complete comparability only
occurs if for all positive value relations ℜ between a and b, each ℜ is on a ratio scale. As
we shall see later,49 a pluralist only needs to accept the claim that some alternatives are
comparable in a sense in which at least one positive value relation ℜ does not go reach
ratio comparability. Thus two items are still comparable, but not completely comparable.
One reason for accepting incomparability can be explicated with the choice
between going to a symphony or reading a book. Any attempt to assign commensurable
numerical values results in distortion of our understanding of the variety of ways we value
the activities in question. For example, in using the willingness-to-pay model, one must
assume that the amount of time spent reading and the amount of time listening to a
symphony can be valued in monetary units. But this ignores the very different reasons we

49

See Chapter 3.
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have for both activities. Sometimes we read for pleasure and sometimes, at least in
academic settings, we read books in order to learn. Sometimes we read because there is
nothing else to do, and sometimes we read because there are many things to do but we
want to avoid them. Sometimes we go to the symphony to hear a new piece of work, and
other times we go to listen to a familiar piece. Sometimes we go to the symphony because
a friend has invited us, and other times we go to get away from our friends. To claim that
all of these values can be captured in terms of money, and that the monetary value is the
only reason to act or choose, is ludicrous. Few if any of the contributory values expressed
in these reasons have to do with money. To express them in terms of money is to change
our understanding of these activities in a way that results in the exaggeration of some
aspects, perhaps the money spent for a book or a ticket, while entirely ignoring other
aspects.
Someone might still want to push an objection to this line of thought. The
objection would state that even if you do not actually spend money for the book or the
ticket, you might still be able to put a value on these items and activities in terms of your
willingness-to-pay for them. The pluralist would reject this objection because it asks us to
compare all value in terms of the medium of money, even when questions of money are
not at the center of the decision making process, or are completely absent from the
decision making process. Since the objection requires accepting that there is a single,
proper medium through which all value should be understood, the pluralist would reject
such an objection. It is not merely a dogmatic rejection—for a pluralist could accept that
there are times in which a medium can exist through which comparisons can be made. It
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is a rejection of the notion that willingness-to-pay is always a medium, or always a
preferred medium, for such cases as under discussion. Given the argument above, I think
the burden of proof is on those who want to push the mathematical models like the
willingness-to-pay model, since money appears to have little to do with the cited reasons.
Without this argument, there is plausibility to the pluralist view that not all items are
commensurable.

1.5 Pluralism and the Problem of Decisiveness
Recall the generalized way we have stated the incompossibility account of
conflict: acts a and b are conflicting incompossibles if and only if (1f) a is favored by
some factor(s), (2f) b is favored by another factor(s), and (3f) a and b are severally but not
jointly possible to do. The critic of pluralism argues that pluralism fails to be decisive in
the presence of conflicts on the factoral conflict incompossibility account because of
pluralism’s commitment to incomparability and non-reductionism. The first objection by
the critic of pluralism states that evaluation of options requires that they be comparable
while the commitments to incomparability and non-reductionism appears to disallow
comparability. Even if the comparability objection is dealt with, another objection based
on the ‘absolutist’ awaits the defender of pluralism. This objection states that practical
reason requires each choice situation to result in a single justified choice as the rationally
justified choice. Pluralism, by endorsing incomparability and non-reductionism, does not
allow for this. Finally, there is the very specific objection that genuine dilemmas do not
in fact exist, and pluralistic theories allow for true dilemmas. In what follows, I want to
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detail these objections to identify more clearly the difficulties facing the defender of
pluralism.

1.5.1 Comparability of Options
Some argue that for a normative theory to justify a course of action, it must treat
alternatives as comparable. Ruth Chang sees this as a precondition for any theory of
practical reason. She argues as follows:
Every justifying reason, I wish to claim, has a justifying force in virtue of
a comparison of alternatives. To see why this is so, suppose the opposite.
If a choice can be justified without depending on the comparison of the
alternatives, then the putative justifying reason will justify the choice no
matter what the comparative merits of the alternatives (Chang 1997, 12).50
Chang here is claiming that the justification of a course of action is, at minimum, a binary
relation. This binary relation is one expressed in one of four ways: ‘greater than’, ‘lesser
than’,’ equal to’ and ‘on a par’. These relations are distinguished by Chang according to
two binary concepts zero and nonzero, and biased and unbiased. According to Chang, a
“difference is zero if it does not have extent. A difference is biased if it favors one item,
and correspondingly, disfavors the other” (Chang 1997, 26). The ‘greater than – lesser
than’ relations are defined in terms of being nonzero and unbiased. The ‘equal to’
relation is defined as being both zero and unbiased. The ‘on a par’ relation is defined in
terms of being nonzero and unbiased. Without these binary comparison relations, the
argument continues, it is not clear how an action is justified. This does make some sense.
If practical reason is supposed to make a determination between alternatives, then the
50

Chang has made an interesting slide between the justifying force of a reason, and whether a choice is
justified. While it is true that it is a necessary condition for a justified choice that a reason has justifying
force, it is not sufficient. A reason with justifying force does not entail that the choice it supports is in fact
justified. Much more needs to be said.
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alternatives must be comparable (if only in some weak sense) for the choice to be
rational. Chang points out that “there can be no justification of choice in [a given]
situation unless there is such an evaluative comparison” (Chang 1997, 13). In other
words, if a theory does not provide a means to rationally justify an alternative through
comparison with other alternatives, then the theory is indecisive.

By endorsing

incomparability, pluralism eliminates the means to rationally justify an alternative.

1.5.2 Practical Reason and a Single Answer
The requirement that alternatives be comparable is a requirement about the inputs
of a piece of practical reasoning. However, one might focus on the product of a piece of
practical reasoning and argue that practical reason, as a procedure through which we
justify a course of action, must imply the existence of a single unique answer to each
choice situation. Without a unique answer, conflicts about the appropriate course of
action become intractable. According to this problem, a theory that fails to identify a
single answer as the sole correct answer is indecisive.
The requirement that there be a single answer in every case might be grounded in
what I will call the strong determinacy thesis. This thesis states that for all possible
actions in a given situation, only one of these possible actions is the correct action. In
other words, if you ask ‘ought I to do A’ it must be answered with either ‘A is the right
action to perform’, or ‘B is the right action to perform’. Normative pluralism appears to
state that in some cases there cannot be such an answer to the question ‘what ought I to
do?’ and therefore cannot be decisive.
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Even if the strong determinacy thesis can be shown to be unacceptable, the nogenuine-normative-dilemmas thesis can be used to support that requirement that there be
a single correct answer in every case. This thesis states that normative theories should
not countenance genuine normative dilemmas. According to Alan Donagan, a moral
dilemma occurs in “a situation in which, according to the true principles of morality, a
moral agent was obliged both to perform an action of a specified kind and not to perform
it” (Donagan 1993, 9). A genuine dilemma, or as Donagan puts it, a dilemma simpliciter,
are “those [dilemmas] that would have come about even though no violation by you of
those principles was among its direct causes” (Donagan 1993, 9). What Donagan is
trying to do here is remove from consideration cases like those in which you have
promised to marry two different people. You cannot fulfill both promises. The second
promise to marry violated some principle of morality, according to Donagan, so it is not a
‘genuine’ dilemma. An example of a genuine dilemma might be one where a physician
on her way to the hospital to perform a life saving surgery witnesses an accident in which
at least one person is critically injured and she is the only available physician. Here she
is obligated to keep the surgery appointment and she is also obligated to stop at the
accident. She has not found herself in this situation because she violated a principle of
morality. As Donagan might put it, the no genuine dilemmas thesis is the idea that “[t]he
generation of [genuine] moral dilemmas is to moral rationalism what generation of selfcontradiction is to theories generally: an indispensable sign that a particular theory is
defective” (Donagan 1993, 13). At first blush, a pluralistic theory allows for such
dilemmas and thus is defective according to this objection. By accepting incomparability
and non-reductionism, the pluralist must, prima facie, allow for true dilemmas to exist. If
54

a theory countenances the existence of genuine dilemmas, then the theory is indecisive.
By endorsing incomparability, pluralism countenances the existence of true dilemmas
and is indecisive.

1.6 Conclusion
The problem of decisiveness results from a theory failing to meet a specific goal,
namely that a normative theory is to produce judgments that are rational and justified. It
is part of the goal of all normative theories to provide a guide for action through rational,
justified judgments, so any theory that blocks such judgments fails to achieve an
important goal. Two main problems appear to demonstrate that normative pluralism
cannot meet this goal. The first is that normative pluralism endorses incomparability and
practical reason requires that alternatives be comparable. The second problem is that
practical reason requires that there be a single right answer to every question. Normative
pluralism, according to the criticism, can not meet these requirements and thus will fail to
be decisive.
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Chapter 2: Attempts to Resolve the Problem of Decisiveness
2. Introduction
Several possible solutions to the problem of decisiveness suggest themselves.
These solutions are found in theoretical treatises as well various sub-disciplines of
Philosophy including environmental ethics and medical ethics. Each of the solutions fail
to resolve the problem. I argue that many of the possible solutions share a common
methodology that in itself fails adequately to resolve the problem of decisiveness.

2.1 Meta-values and Procedures
A theory of practical reason is arguably the part of a normative theory that will
resolve the problem of decisiveness. A theory of practical reason includes, at least, both
commitments to the existence of normative factors and a commitment to procedures that
operates on those normative factors.

For example, a consequentialist theory makes

commitments concerning the nature of goodness as pleasure, happiness, etc. In decision
theoretic versions of consequentialism, a commitment is also made to the nature of
probability information such as whether it refers to subjective states of belief or the
objective degree to which a state of affairs will likely occur.

Decision theoretic

consequentialism then provides procedures such as methods of eliciting measurements of
utility, Bayes’ Theorem for updating probabilities, and the expected utility calculus that
uses this information to determine the action that maximizes expected utility. Focusing
on the factors does help us understand the myriad of difficulties that surround the
problem of decisiveness. But, if we focus only on factors we cannot resolve the problem;
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we must focus also on procedures. If we consider Stocker’s articulation of the problem
of decisiveness for critics of pluralism, we can see clearly that the critic demands such a
procedural answer:
I was not at all surprised when a colleague, upon hearing my claim that
plural values are no impediment to sound decision, asked me to detail the
miraculous decision procedure that makes such decision possible—with
the clear implication that we need a decision procedure, and that it would
be a miracle to give us one for plural values (Stocker 1992, 177; emphasis
added).
It could be a legitimate response to such a criticism to argue that the demand for a
procedural solution is mistaken, and that the problem may be avoided. This will not
satisfy the critic of pluralism. The challenge has been put forth specifically in terms of
developing a procedure of justification. Thus, while it may be important to argue against
the demand in some forms, it is a mistake not to offer a procedural solution in
conjunction with such arguments.
Nevertheless, focusing only on factors in lieu of any discussion of a procedure is a
tactic found throughout philosophical literature concerning justification. This chapter
will, in part, discuss different attempts to resolve the problem of decisiveness that use this
tactic. The common move in each of these attempts is to identify a heretofore ignored
factor that could be considered a meta-value and argue that appropriate understanding of
this meta-value will resolve the problem of decisiveness. Each of these attempts has
serious flaws. While there can be no general proof that all such attempts will fail, the
arguments here provide good motivation to abandon such a program in favor of one that
utilizes a procedural approach. Finally, I will look at procedural approaches and while
these approaches are superior to the meta-value approaches, they fail substantively.
57

2.2 Chang and Covering Values
Ruth Chang has argued that “the comparability of alternatives is necessary for the
possibility of justified choice” (Chang 2002, xviii). For example, the justification for
helping an old man across the street must include a comparison of that act with the act of
not helping the person, or helping some other person, etc. Without such a comparison of
alternatives, choice cannot be said to be rationally justified. A key element of her
‘comparativist’ position is the relationship between covering values and contributory
values. A covering value is “any consideration with respect to which a meaningful
evaluative comparison can be made” (Chang 1997, 5); contributory values are “values
that contribute to the content of the covering values” (Chang 1997, 5). For example, one
may try to decide which university to attend, Ohio State University or the University of
Tennessee. There could be several factors that go into determining which is the best
educational institution. Some factors that might be considered, such as diversity of
student population, student to professor ratio, the amount of publishing done by the
faculty, etc., would be the contributory values. Together, these values would make up a
covering value that governs the choice situation which we can call the ‘expected quality
of education’. According to Chang, every choice situation has a single covering value,
and this covering value “is, roughly, ‘what matters’ in the choice situation” (Chang 1997,
7).

When one is comparing two public, land grant institutions of higher learning,

Chang’s claim that we can refer to a single covering value composed of the contributory
values has some intuitive merit.51 Furthermore, Chang’s discussion of the relationship
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It should be noted that Chang’s view allows for every choice situation to have unique a covering value.
Thus for any given two choice situations, there are can be two different covering values that determine
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between covering values and contributory values might lead one to a claim that she has
resolved the problem of decisiveness: if there is a single covering value for every choice
situation, that value can determine the correct choice. As she says, “I have assumed that
there is always one covering value for any comparison. Put differently, I have assumed
that whenever there are multiple values relevant to a comparison, these values are all
contributory values of a single covering value” (Chang 2002, 9).

If there is a single

covering value for every situation, then every situation can have a justified choice. 52
Unfortunately, due to problems with the exact nature of the relationship between
covering values and contributory values, we must reject Chang’s move to the recognition
of a single covering value for each situation. There exist three interpretations of the
relationship between covering values and contributory values that are amenable to
Chang’s view, and each one of them is problematic. Interestingly enough, she mentions
each of these views in a footnote: “Although I favor constitution, others may think the
dependence relation [between contributory values and a covering value] is reductive or
supervienient” (Chang 2002, 35; fn12).

In Section 2.2.1 I discuss the reductionist

interpretation, in section 2.2.2 I discuss the constitution interpretation, and in section
2.2.3 I discuss the supervenience interpretation.

choice. In this sense, since there not some overall unifying value, for example utility, her view is a form of
pluralism.
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There are a host of implicit restrictions on Chang’s claim that every choice situation has one covering
value. The most important restriction is that the covering value is essential for the choice. If a covering
value cannot be found, because there is no value that is essential to the choice, then we have
noncomparability (Chang 1997, 27-28).
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2.2.1 The Reductionist Interpretation53
Chang uses the example of attempting to discern the creativity of the musical
composer Mozart and the painters Michelangelo and Talentlessi to argue that
comparisons are possible even when they appear elusive.54 What she wants to show is
that even though the contributory values borne by painters and composers are completely
different, we can make comparisons between composers and painters. She describes the
challenge as follows:
So, for example, Mozart and Michelangelo are incomparable with respect
to [the covering value of] creativity if the contributory values of creativity
borne by Mozart are so different—that is, irreducibly distinct, or of a
different type or genre, or occupying a different scale or dimension—from
those borne by Michelangelo that comparison is impossible (Chang 1997,
14).
In other words, she wants to argue that even if we start from a recognition that the
contributory values borne by the objects of comparison are entirely distinct, we can still
discover a covering value that will determine the correct choice in the situation. It is hard
to see how this argument could work if we accepted a reductionist interpretation of
covering values for on the reductionist interpretation of a covering value, a covering
value is identical to the concatenation of the contributory values.

To support this

conclusion, however, we need to take a closer look at her argument that there can be a
covering value of creativity that covers both Mozart and Michelangelo.
Chang’s argument relies, in part, on the distinction between notable and nominal
bearers of value: “Call a bearer ‘notable’ with respect to a value if it is an exceptionally
53

I would like to thank James Mazzocoulo for helping me clarify the argument in this section.

54

This is the first in a series of arguments Chang considers to determine whether substantive
incomparability is ever possible.
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fine exemplar of that value and ‘nominal’ if it is an exceptionally poor one” (Chang 1997,
14-5). The first part of Chang’s argument concedes that “Mozart and Michelangelo are
incomparable with respect to creativity if the contributory values of creativity borne by
Mozart are so different … from those borne by Michelangelo that comparison is
impossible” (Chang 1997, 14). She goes on to argue, however, that it does not follow
from this concession that all comparisons between painters and composers are
impossible. To see this consider the very bad painter Talentlessi, who is only a nominal
bearer of the covering value creativity. Chang argues that “If Mozart and Michelangelo
are incomparable in virtue of diverse contributory values of creativity they bear, then so
too are Mozart and Talentlessi. But we know that Mozart is better than Talentlessi with
respect to creativity” (Chang 1997, 15, Chang 2002, 72). More recently she has provided
a more detailed form of the argument.

First, she states that

“Talentlessi and

Michelangelo differ in creativity only in the way they bear creativity; they bear the same
contributory values of creativity, but one bears them in a notable way and the other in a
nominal way” (Chang 2002, 73). When we make improvements to the way Talentlessi
bears the contributory values, we can get Talentlessi+ who is still comparable with
Michelangelo. From this, she concludes that “we can construct a ‘continuum’ of painters
including Talentlessi and Michelangelo, each bearing the same contributory values of
creativity but with increasing notability” (Chang 2002, 73). So far, her argument appears
sound. However, she makes an interesting and unjustified move to secure the claim that
Mozart and Michelangelo are comparable:
if Mozart is comparable with one item on the continuum, he is comparable
with all items on the continuum. Therefore, given that Mozart is
comparable with Talentlessi, he is comparable with Michelangelo, who
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differs from Talentlessi only by some notches on the continuum (Chang
2002, 73).
The claim that all three are somehow on the same continuum is very problematic, as the
mathematical notion of a partial ordering shows. An example of a partial ordering is the
subset relation.55 Given this, partial orderings allow for both non-linear lattice structures
and linear lattice structures. Suppose that we have set A whose members are 1 and 3 and
a set B whose members are 2 and 4. Both sets are related by the subset relation to the
null set as shown in Figure 1. Even though the null set is a subset of both A and B, it is
not the case that because A and B have this in common that A and B are comparable. In
fact, on a non-linear partial ordering such as the subset relation, A and B are not
comparable. Suppose, then, that Talentlessi—symbolized as “T”—is so talent-less as to
have no creative qualities whatsoever. He is analogous to the null set. We can then
substitute Michelangelo—symbolized as “MI” for set A and Mozart—symbolized as

Figure 1. Numerical Non-Linear Partial Ordering
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Partial orderings are sometimes defined as being only transitive and reflexive. Other times, partial
orderings are defined as being transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric. Let ℜ be a relation on set A. ℜ is
antisymmetric if and only if no two distinct elements of A are in both ℜ and its converse. In other words.
If xℜy and yℜx, then x=y.
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“MO”—for set B. We thus get the structure shown in Figure 2. But on this partial
ordering, we do not have a continuum in which all three artists can be placed. We have
two separate structures in which Mozart is on one and Michelangelo is on another. Thus,
even though Mozart is comparable with one item on the continuum that includes
Michelangelo and Talentlessi, it is not the case that Mozart is comparable with all of the
items on the continuum that includes both Michelangelo and Talentlessi.
There is another problem with Chang’s argument at this point. Notice that Chang
asserts, but does not argue for, the claim that Talentlessi is comparable with Mozart. But
this move is illicit; it is not clear at all that Mozart the notable composer and Talentlessi
the nominal painter are comparable. To see this more clearly we need to fill out Chang’s
example.
Chang does not define the contributory values related to creativity. If we define
these contributory values for artistic creativity the difficulties with the reductionist
interpretation become apparent. For all of these artists, we might cite mastery of one’s
medium, originality in one’s medium, and innovation in one’s medium that the artist

Figure 2. Artistic Creativity Partial Ordering
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moves beyond current convention and introduces new forms. At first blush, it would
seem as if Chang has resolved the problem of decisiveness since describing these
contributory values in such general terms makes it appear that the creativity of painters
and composers is developed out of the same contributory values. The first problem with
this is that if Chang intends for creativity for both painters and the composer to be based
on the same contributory values, then we are no longer dealing with the initial problem.
The initial problem assumed a set of different of contributory values, not a single set of
contributory values.
The second problem with this suggestion, at least on the reductionist account, is
that if we maintain the original problem concerning different sets of contributory values,
then the mastery, originality, and innovation values are not the same for the painters as
for the composers. For Michelangelo and Talentlessi the contributory values would
include specific painting skills while for Mozart the contributory values would include
musical composition skills. It is within the bounds of the example to assume that there is
no overlap whatsoever in these sets of contributory values.

This suggests that

Michelangelo and Talentlessi bear the contributory values ‘mastery in painting’,
‘originality in painting’ and ‘innovation in painting’ that are part of the covering value
‘creativity in painting’. Mozart, on the other hand, bears the contributory values ‘mastery
in composition’, ‘originality in composition’, and ‘innovation in composition’ that are
part of the covering value ‘creativity in musical composition’. The reason for this is that
the contributory values that make up the set of contributory values and thus the covering
values are different. Each of the contributory values is itself composed of different
second level contributory values.

For example, Michelangelo and Talentlessi are
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evaluated in terms of the mastery, originality, and innovation of use with regard to colors
and brush strokes. Mozart, on the other hand, is evaluated in terms of the mastery,
originality, and innovation of use with regard to which instruments, alone and in
combination, at the appropriate tempo, playing certain scales creates a similar mood. For
the sake of keeping the argument simple, I will not analyze these second level
contributory values any further. On the reductionist account, the covering value is just
the concatenation of the lowest level contributory values. So, we only need to look at the
contributory values of instrumentation, tempo, scales, color, and brush stroke. We may
assign contributory values as in Table 1. Table 1 illustrates that the contributory values
for each activity are not the same. Since there are no mutually instantiated or overlapping
contributory values, it is difficult to see how one can claim, on the reductionist
interpretation, that Mozart and Talentlessi can be comparable in terms of some single
contributory value we can call ‘artistic creativity’ that applies to both painters and
composers.

The meaning of ‘creativity’ in painting and ‘creativity’ in musical

composition, as made up by from each set of contributory values, are entirely different.
Thus, it is better to see Mozart as a notable bearer of ‘creativity in musical composition’,

Table 1. Artistic Skill Contributory Values
Person ↓ Skill →
Mozart
Michelangelo
Talentlessi

Instrumentation

Tempo

Scales

Color

10
n/a
n/a

8
n/a
n/a

9
n/a
n/a

n/a
10
2
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Brush
Stroke
n/a
10
3

Michelangelo as a notable bearer of ‘creativity in painting’, and Talentlessi as a nominal
bearer of creativity in painting.

But that means that Chang, on the reductionist

interpretation, is not justified in claiming that there is a covering value ‘artistic creativity’
because there is no concatenation of an inclusive set of contributory values. But this is
precisely what Chang needs for her conclusion. So, if Chang accepts the reductionist
interpretation, her argument must be seen as a failure.
One reply to the above argument would be to argue that creativity in musical
composition and creativity in painting are themselves contributory values for a more
general covering value ‘artistic creativity’. There is nothing in Chang’s account that
precludes a complex hierarchy of contributory and covering values such that what is a
covering value in one instance is a contributory value in another instance. In fact, my
example above relies on just such a hierarchy. The problem with this approach is that
Chang needs to convince us of the existence of additional contributory values beyond
creativity in painting and creativity in musical composition in order to establish a single
meaning to the value of ‘artistic creativity’. If she merely asserts that ‘artistic creativity’
is the same in both cases, she has once again abandoned the original problem with regard
to a different set of values. If she keeps the original problem, it is unclear on the
reductionist interpretation how ‘artistic creativity’ does not have two meanings, namely
‘creativity in musical composition’ and ‘creativity in painting’. Thus, Chang will be
guilty of equivocation if she claims that Talentlessi is a nominal bearer of artistic
creativity and Mozart is a notable bearer of artistic creativity, since artistic creativity
means only the single contributory value in each case. In order for her solution to work,
then, Chang needs to identify what those different contributory values are and they need
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to apply to both Talentlessi and Mozart. So far, Chang has not done this, and it is very
unclear to me how she could do this with her example.
As a last gasp on this line of argument, Chang could attempt to pair up each
contributory value, and claim that the numbers that represent each pairing are
comparable. For example, instrumentation is paired with color, and tempo is paired with
brush stroke, and thus the numbers related to each are comparable. One then does the
same at the next level with originality of brush stroke with originality of tempo, and
mastery of instrumentation with mastery of color, etc. Then, at the next level up one does
the same with creativity in painting and creativity in musical composition (assuming that
the rest of the contributory values at this level are the same). But this move runs into a
variety of problems. First of all, it is an ad hoc attempt to save the view. There is
nothing in her discussion of Mozart, Michelangelo, and Talentlessi that suggest that such
a pairing is possible. It is an assumption added to the view for the sole purpose of
dealing with the above difficulty. Second of all, it begs the question. Her opponent is
arguing that “some items are ‘so different’ that there is no ‘common basis’ on which a
comparison can proceed” (Chang 1997, 14). In order to answer this challenge, Chang
must show how one can have comparisons in terms of covering values even when there
do not exist one-to-one comparisons in terms of contributory values. But the move of
pairing up contributory values assumes such a comparison at the contributory level, and
thus begs the question. Finally, as in the example, what does one do with unpaired
contributory values that influence only one person, such as which scales are used in the
musical composition? Do we leave them out, which requires an argument and not a mere
assertion, or do we keep them in, and thus open up the charge of equivocation between
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the meanings of the covering values again? For all of these reasons, I think Chang cannot
accept the reductionist interpretation.

2.2.2 The Constitution Interpretation
The reductionist interpretation is not the only way in which to conceive of the
relationship between contributory values and covering values. As we have seen, Chang
herself claims she favors a constitution interpretation of the relationship between
contributory values and a covering value. However, it is not clear what she means when
she asserts that a covering value is constituted by its contributory values. David Brink
offers one possible alternative (Brink 1989).

On his view, there is a way of

understanding the notion of constitution that does not require reduction. He states the
following:
If G actually composes or realizes F, but F can be, or could have been,
realized differently, then G constitutes, but is not identical with, F. For
example, a table is constituted by, but not identical with, a particular
arrangement of microphysical particles, since the table could survive
certain changes in its particles or their arrangement (Brink 1989, 157-8).
As an example of a nonphysical object, Brink points out that for a naturalist about moral
terms such as justice, a just organization of a society could be realized by different
configurations of social and economic properties, and yet still be examples of justice
(Brink 1989, 158). For Chang, this means that any covering value V can be composed of
different configuration of contributory values v1, v2, …, vn. So, if V is artistic creativity,
there exist multiple combinations of the contributory values that refer to the same
covering value V.

This view appears to sidestep the problems indicated for the

68

reductionist interpretation because it removes the restriction that a covering value must
always be made up of a specific set of contributory values.
But, the constitution interpretation faces other problems.

Historically,

constitution interpretations of identity face a problem of the ‘Ship of Theseus’. The ship
of Theseus is constituted of the wood planks that make it up. Over time, each plank is
removed and immediately replaced with another wooden plank. Each plank that is
removed is saved until every original plank on the ship of Theseus is replaced. Then,
once this complete overhaul of the ship of Thesus is over, the original wooden planks are
reassembled, in their original places, to form another ship. We now have two ships, one
which has been continually called the ship of Theseus although its parts have been
replaced, and one that is made out of all the original material of the original ship of
Theseus. So, which ship is the ship of Theseus? On the constitution interpretation, it
seems as if we want to say that both ships are the ship of Theseus. This is definitely a
problem for physical objects. Eli Hirsch says we “might define ‘x is constitutively
identical to y’ (or ‘x and y constitute each other’) as meaning ‘x and y occupy the same
place’” (Hirsch 1982, 59). If we do so define constitutive identity, then it is not the case
that both of these ships are the ship of Theseus.
Concepts, unlike physical objects, do not have this spatial problem, so we could
say that the problem of the ‘Ship of Theseus’ is not a problem for the constitutive
interpretation of concepts. However, a modified version of the problem still bedevils the
constitution interpretation. The problem must be understood as developing along the
lines of weakening our intuitions about whether two concepts, in this case covering
values, remain the same after a series of changes to the contributory values. Consider
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Brink’s example of what constitutes a table. The example is designed to show that a
table can survive changes of the parts that constitute a table. If we remove all four legs
and rearrange them, I think we are inclined to say that the table has survived—nothing
about the identity of the table requires the legs be always affixed to the same corners.
Furthermore, I think we can replace each leg with a different leg made of the same
material, and the table has not changed. The same goes for the separate leaves that make
up the tabletop. They can be disassembled and reassembled in a different configuration
and the table stays the same, as it does also if we replace some of the leaves with some
other leaves of the same type of material. Similar things can happen at the micro level
and, given the understanding that atoms are continually changing electrons, this appears
to be intuitively acceptable. So far, things seem to be ok.
However, our intuitions can be weakened. For example, suppose that we take all
of the plain, square wooden legs off of the table, and replaced them with legs made of
intricately shaped wrought iron.

When we exchange plain wood legs for intricate

wrought iron legs do we still have the same table? Surely we still have a table, but I am
no longer sure that we have the same table. However, individual intuitions may differ
with this example.
But suppose we replace the legs with casters, not different legs. Once we do this,
the table ceases to be a table at all, let alone the same table—it is now a pallet. If one is
still not convinced that the object is no longer a table, than we can make further changes
such as replacing the wooden table top with a mattress. Once we have changed the legs
to casters and the top to a mattress, I think we intuitively want to say that these changes
are such that we no longer have a table, but instead we have a bed. What this shows is
70

that the constitution interpretation has intuitive, if not precise, limitations as to what can
change in the original object and it remain the same original object.
Another example to consider is one that moves away from the strictly material
table – bed example is the constitution of gangs. A particular gang of teenagers can
continue to exist even though over time each individual member of the gang is replaced
with a new individual. However, if we begin replacing the members of the gangs not
with teenagers, but 40 year old executives who like to spend there down time the way
teenage members of the gang do, it is no longer clear that we have the same gang once all
of the teenagers are removed. To push the example one more step, if we replace the
human teenagers not with other, albeit older, humans, but with robots, I believe we are
less likely to consider a group of all ruffian robots a gang.
Similar to the table – bed example as well as the human teenager – robot example,
suppose we change each contributory value v of some covering value V. Once each v has
been changed, then we no longer have the original covering value V, even on the
constitution interpretation. Let us consider the Mozart, Michelangelo, and Talentlessi
example put forth above.

In the case of creativity for Mozart and Talentlessi, the

contributory values of mastery, originality, and inventiveness in use of instrumentation,
tempo and scales are different from the contributory values of mastery, originality, and
inventive use of colors and brush strokes. So, once again we have an example where the
contributory values are entirely different in this case, resulting in different covering
values. Since the covering values can not be considered the same in the two cases, there
is no unique covering value that one can use to compare Mozart and Talentlessi. And
this, once again, puts the soundness of Chang’s argument in question.
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2.2.3 The Supervenience Interpretation
The third interpretation of the contributory values-covering value relationship is
the idea that covering values supervene on the contributory values. This interpretation
avoids the objection just raised because a supervenient value does not have to be
composed out of the same contributory values. Brink views supervenience as
a nomological or law-like relation between, say, properties such that one
property F (the supervening property) supervenes on another property or
configuration of properties G (the base property or properties) just in case
it is a law that if something is G, then it is F (Brink 1989, 160).
However, Brink notes that “supervening properties need be neither identical with nor
constituted by base properties” (Brink 1989, 160). In a footnote, Brink provides an
example where “epiphenomenalists can claim that mental states, though neither identical
with nor constituted by physical states, supervene on the physical states” (Brink 1989,
160). So, what differentiates supervenience from the previous interpretations is that F
could have arisen from a set of base properties H, where the base properties of H were
completely different than the base properties in G. Supervenience is the idea that given
G, F is given, but it is not the case that given F then G is given. Furthermore, there can
be no change in F without a change in G, but there can be a change in G without a change
in F (Dupre 1993, 96).56 So, we could perhaps change G by subtracting one property,
making G-, without there being any change in F. We could perhaps also change G by
adding a property, making G+, without there being any change in F. Finally, after a
56

This does not disallow the possibility that F supervenes on two different properties A and G
independently. It merely states that once we establish that F supervenes on a property G, F and G—or F
and A—will have these relationships.
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series of steps of adding and subtracting base level properties, we can change G
completely into H which has no base properties in common with G and yet there still be
no changes in F. The advantage of supervenience should be obvious: the covering value
artistic creativity can supervene on the contributory values for creativity in painting and
also the contributory values for creativity in musical composition. This is certainly the
conclusion that Chang wants, and it avoids the problems I articulated for the reduction
and constitution interpretations of the relationship.
However, the supervenience interpretation has its own problem for Chang. It is
unclear that she is entitled to the claim that a single property, artistic creativity,
supervenes on different sets of values creativity in painting and creativity in musical
composition.

This is an existential claim, but describing the relationship between

contributory values and covering values as one of supervenience only entitles her to the
possibility of such existential claims. She needs to provide an additional argument to
establish that artistic creativity actually does supervene on the values of creativity in
painting and creativity in musical composition. She has not provided such an argument.
In fact, it seems to me that we can use Moore’s open question argument to make this
point:57 even though it is possible that the contributory values for both Mozart and
Talentlessi result in the same covering value of artistic creativity, it is still an open
question whether these different contributory values result in such a covering value.
Since there is still an open question whether the covering values supervene on these
57

Moore uses the open question argument to discount naturalism in favor of a non-natural theory of
goodness according to which goodness supervenes on natural properties. To use the open question
argument against certain types of supervenience would not be welcome by him. Nevertheless, it is
applicable to the claim that specific supervening properties do in fact exist. See (Moore 1988, 10-20) and
(Brink 1989, 160-5)
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different sets of contributory values, Chang is not entitled to claim without further
argument that the covering values do in fact supervene. Furthermore, if it is always an
open question whether artistic creativity supervenes on both sets of contributory values,
then Chang would never be entitled to make such a claim.
Chang’s account of covering values can be seen as an attempt to resolve the
problem of decisiveness. The plausibility of Chang’s account hinges, in part, on the
plausibility of her account of the contributory value-covering value relationship. Yet, we
have seen that the contributory value-covering value relationship is problematic for her
and thus cannot be considered a solution.
2.3 Stocker’s Approach
Stocker offers three distinct arguments in an attempt to overcome the decisiveness
problem. In Chapter 4 of Plural and Conflicting Values he argues that not all moral
conflict produces a stalemate. In chapter 6, he charges that the chief argument put forth
by critics of pluralism has an unjustified premise. Finally, again in chapter 6, he argues
that only sortal comparisons, and not comparisons of particular instances of sorts, are
precluded by pluralism.

Each of these arguments fails to resolve the problem of

decisiveness.
Stocker’s thesis in Chapter 4 is that pluralism in the face of conflict is neither
impractical nor incomplete (Stocker 1992, 85-6).

A normative theory faces the

decisiveness problem when it tells us to achieve all the conflicting values (making it
impractical) or fails tells us which value to achieve (making incomplete). Stocker claims
that most of the discussion in current ethics focuses too much on the action-guiding
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nature of ethics such that the parties to the dispute about the incompleteness and
impracticality of ethics agree that all conflict is conflict between action-guiding
evaluations (Stocker 1992, 91-2). Action-guiding evaluations are evaluations of options
or choices such that the evaluation tell us “that we ought to do a given act or that we
ought not to do it” (Stocker 1992, 12).58 If ethics is only concerned with action-guiding
evaluations, and such evaluations properly construed are overall claims, then conflict is
impossible because for any given situation there can be only one overall action-guiding
evaluation about what one ought to do. Against this, Stocker argues that not all conflicts
are conflicts between two or more action-guiding evaluations. Once this is recognized,
he thinks he has overcome the decisiveness problem, at least in terms of impracticality
and incompleteness.
Unfortunately, his argument leads not to this strong conclusion, but to a much
weaker one that leaves the problem of decisiveness unresolved. His argument relies on
the recognition of two points. The first is that ethics involves not only action-guiding
evaluations, but also evaluations of agents, emotions, character structures, virtues, etc.
(Stocker 1992, 93). Also, he argues that there are non-action-guiding act evaluations.
With this distinction between action-guiding and non-action-guiding act evaluations, he
states that “my own view is that to understand conflicts and to understand their bearing
on ethical theory, we must question and ultimately reject the assumption that conflict is
conflict between action-guiding evaluations” (Stocker 93). He argues that when conflicts
arise, they are really conflicts between non-action-guiding act evaluations and action58

Stocker, unfortunately, does not clarify his meaning any further. An action-guiding evaluation might
mean any one, and possible all of the following: (a) it aims at producing an action; (b) motivates one to act;
(c) is used as a reason to act; (d) evaluates only possible actions.
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guiding evaluations. This dismisses the possibility of action-guiding act evaluations
being in conflict, but does allow for action-guiding act evaluations to conflict with
something else, namely non-action-guiding act evaluations. If it were true that the only
conflicts were between action-guiding act evaluations and non-action-guiding act
evaluations, then Stocker would have dissolved the problem of decisiveness. In fact,
however, Stocker is entitled not to the conclusion that he has dissolved the problem of
decisiveness, but only to the weaker claim that when there exists conflict between actionguiding evaluations and non-action-guiding act evaluations, the problems of
incompleteness and impracticality do not arise.
To see the exact problem with Stocker’s argument, we need to look at it in more
detail. Action-guiding act evaluations must assume independent act evaluations that are
in themselves not action-guiding. In the appropriate circumstances, say when one can
actually act, these non-action-guiding act evaluations can be seen as providing the
content of the action-guiding evaluations. Stocker argues for the existence of non-actionguiding act evaluations as follows:
even if I cannot do an act, it can still be true that I ought to do it. This is
clearest if I am culpable for my inability. So, it would at best be a bad
joke for me to suggest that since I have squandered my money, I no longer
ought to repay my debts now. ‘I ought to repay my debts now’ is still true.
However, if I cannot repay the money now, ‘I ought to repay my debts
now’ cannot be action-guiding. But then, ‘I ought to repay my debts now’
is at once true but not action guiding (Stocker 1992, 95-6).
In other words, non-action guiding act evaluations must exist because we can, in certain
circumstances, hold that a person ought to perform an act even though it is impossible to
perform that act.

76

Stocker gives several additional arguments for non-action-guiding act evaluations.
Regardless of the success of Stocker’s own arguments for the existence of non-actionguiding act evaluations, I will assume their existence.59 For example, you might find
yourself in a situation such that you have an action-guiding act evaluation that you should
discipline a child even though you have made a non-action-guiding evaluation such that
the disciplinary measures will produce negative feelings in both you and the child. On a
Stockerian account there are different evaluations going on here. First is the evaluation
of emotional states of the parent and child. Second is the evaluation of the act that
produces the emotional states. Third is the evaluation that one ought to discipline his or
her child in the given circumstances. The first two evaluations are non-action guiding in
themselves. The second non-action guiding evaluation, however, provides the content of
an action-guiding act evaluation that conflicts, in some manner, with the non-actionguiding act evaluations. The thrust of Stocker’s argument is that if you have such a
conflict between one action-guiding act evaluation that, in our example, says one ought to
discipline a child for wrongdoing, and one non-action guiding act evaluation that says
producing a negative emotional state in myself in others has negative value, then there is
no conflict about how one should act. The overall evaluation of the situation has only
one action-guiding act evaluation that is not opposed by another action-guiding act
evaluation. Thus, you have a situation where only one value is to be achieved through
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I say ‘regardless of the success’ because on Stocker’s account, action-guiding act evaluations assume
non-action-guiding act evaluations have taken place. Stocker’s arguments rely on an unclear notion of
‘non-action guiding evaluations’. Some of the possible meanings include the following: (a) does not aim
at producing action (Stocker 1992, 96); (b) does not motivate one to act (Stocker 1992, 101); (c) is not used
for a reason to act; or (d) evaluates an ideal world rather than possible actions in the real world (Stocker,
1992, 109).
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action. Since there is only one value to be achieved, then ethics is both complete and
practical.
As I have said, however, this is too strong a conclusion since it does not address
the possibility of there being conflicting action-guiding act evaluations. The point of the
problem of decisiveness is the claim that ethics is incomplete or impractical when it can
not determine which action-guiding act evaluation identifies the best act to perform.
Stocker recognizes the incompossibilty account of conflict as the one which needs to be
addressed, and on one interpretation—though perhaps not Stocker’s—the account of
conflict is about action-guiding conflicts.60 And yet Stocker himself admits that this
discussion is silent on “whether there can be conflicts between overall action-guiding
evaluations” (Stocker 1992, 123).

By ignoring this conflict between action-guiding

evaluations, Stocker has ignored the problem of decisiveness, not resolved it.
Stocker’s second attempt to resolve the decisiveness problem can be found in the
argument of Chapter 6. Unfortunately, this attempt also fails. In this chapter he argues
that pluralism cannot be an impediment to action because plural values are pervasive and
yet we make decisions every day (Stocker 1992, 178).

He sums up his argument as

follows:
Put another way, the worries that plural values make sound judgments and
action impossible—unless we have some algorithmic or near mechanical
way of comparing them—seem not to come from reflection on how we
actually do judge and act. These worries seem, rather, to come from
mistakes philosophers have made about how judgment must work—e.g.
by recourse to statable, non-evaluative, rules which can be applied in
uncontroversial, perhaps mechanical, ways and which when applied
correctly give a unique answer. The fact that we judge and choose show

60

Stocker, Chapter 4
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this mistaken—or it shows that our judgments and choices are almost all
arbitrary and unreasoned (Stocker 1992, 194)
This passage actually includes two separate arguments against those who claim that
pluralistic theories are not decisive.

The first argument misrepresents the critics’

argument. The second argument is not strong enough for its conclusion.
Consider first the argument attributed by Stocker to critics of pluralism that
focuses on statable rules and mechanical procedures.
1. Decisions are either irrational and arbitrary or they are rational and
nonarbitrary.
2. If a decision is rational and nonarbitrary, then the decision must be a result
of an algorithmic procedure with statable rules for making a decision in
cases of conflict.
3. Pluralism does not allow for any algorithmic procedure with statable rules
for making a decision in cases of conflict.
4. Thus, it is not the case that pluralism allows for rational and nonarbitrary
decisions.
5. Therefore, the decision generated by a pluralistic theory is irrational and
arbitrary.
The entire argument hinges on Stocker’s claim that the critic of pluralism is committed to
premise 2. Stocker identifies this as the mistake that the critic makes because it lacks
justification. So far so good, because I will grant Stocker the claim that premise 2 is
unjustified and should be rejected. However, his opponents do not have to make the
strong claim that there must be an algorithmic procedure with statable rules.

The

opponents could make a weaker claim, that there must be some procedure for resolving
conflicts, algorithmic or otherwise. For example, Stocker’s opponents could claim that to
solve the problem of decisiveness one must have a procedure with at least two distinct
steps: (a) identification of actual conflicts and (b) a rational procedure—for example
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consultation with experienced experts—to resolve such conflicts when possible.61 The
first step of the procedure allows for the possibility of the existence of a conflict. But
notice that if (b) involves consultation with an expert, it could very well be the case that
there are no statable rules or algorithmic procedure used to produce the judgment. The
judges might rely on intuition, or experience, or some other non-algorithmic judgment
that cannot be stated as a simple rule. If this is the case, then premise 2 should be
replaced with the following weaker claim:
2* If a decision is rational and nonarbitrary, then the decision must result
from some procedure (not necessarily algorithmic) for making a decision
in cases of conflict.
This premise makes it harder for Stocker to dismiss the conclusion of the argument by the
reasoning he uses. The fact that we make decisions even when there are a plurality of
factors seems to indicate that there is some procedure for making the decision. While this
procedure does not have to be algorithmic and mechanical, it seems correct to claim that
a theory must articulate some procedure for resolving conflicts, or it allows the conflicts
to remain unresolved. If conflicts remain unresolved, then one is still faced with the
problem of decisiveness. In the case of this argument, Stocker has failed to defuse the
challenge because he constructs a strawperson.
This first argument has an additional problem, and one that is very important to
recognize.

Grant that the modified argument with the premise 2* is the correct

interpretation of the critics’ argument. First, notice that we have to change premise 3 to
the following:

61

For someone who advocates consultation with experts see (Mill 1974, 259-261).
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3* Pluralism does not allow for any decision procedure in cases of
conflict.
One way to block the argument is to demonstrate that premise 3* is false. Premise 3* is
essentially a burden shift challenge which designates the defender of pluralism needs to
produce a procedure that can resolve conflict. Unless a defender of pluralism can show,
for some reason, that this challenge can be ignored, the only thing to do is describe a
procedure. Stocker has so far failed to show that this challenge can be ignored, so he
needs to develop a procedure. However, he has not done so.
The second, distinct argument of the quote is much simpler. It is the claim that
we do in fact make decisions, and thus pluralism, since it is descriptively accurate,62 is
not an impediment to decision and action. Grant the contentious claim that pluralism is
descriptively accurate.

This is not sufficient for the conclusion.

To resolve the

decisiveness problem it is not enough to show that we make decisions and act on them in
the presence of pluralism. As Stocker points out in the last sentence of the quote,
opponents of normative pluralism are concerned with a more specific claim, namely that
normative pluralism fails to provide for the possibility of a reasoned or non-arbitrary
action. In other words, reasoned and non-arbitrary actions must be possible under the
theory. There is nothing in Stocker’s premises stating that we make rational or nonarbitrary decisions. Unless Stocker develops a procedure that allows one to say that a
particular action is justified and rational he is only entitled to the weaker claim that we
can make decisions and act on them, with the recognition that all of the actions may be
unjustified and irrational. So, simply showing that decisions are made in the presence of
62

By ‘descriptively accurate’ I mean that it is true that the world is made up of a plurality of factors, or
values, or reasons that bear on the questions concerning which course of action is justified
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plural values and potential conflict does nothing to answer this more specific concern of
whether or not the decisions are rational, and thus, again, he does not resolve the problem
of decisiveness.
Stocker’s third attempt at resolving the decisiveness problem involves making a
distinction between sorts of values and individual instances of sorts of values. His
conclusion is that we should only be worried about making comparisons between
particular instances of values of different sorts, not with comparisons between different
sorts which he terms ‘sortal comparisons’. He thinks that if we try to make sortal
comparisons, for example, comparisons between promise-keeping and gratitude, as
opposed to comparisons between particular promises made and particular occurrences of
expressing gratitude, we will be stymied (Stocker 1992, 201). Sortal comparisons are
thwarted because although a particular promise and a particular expression of gratitude,
have weight allowing for comparison, sorts do not. Thus, while performing promises
may generally have more weight than gratefully returning favors, this is not always the
case. The argument here is that pluralism only appears to preclude decision and action
because its opponents have focused on comparing sorts, not instances. Once we realize
the distinction between sorts and instances, and we confine ourselves to comparing
particular instances of sorts, Stocker thinks the problem is resolved.
This is not correct. Even if sortal comparisons are impossible, that does not entail
that comparison of particular instances of sorts is possible. Stocker still needs to show
how we compare these instances when they conflict. But he has failed to do this.
Stocker’s distinction between sortals and instances does help us see why one version of
his opponents’ argument does not work, namely that it is difficult and perhaps impossible
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to resolve conflicts between sorts. However, the distinction still fails to meet a different
version of the argument which demands that pluralism be capable of resolving conflicts
between instances of different sorts. But that means the problem of decisiveness remains
unresolved.

2.4 Kekes’ General Hierarchy Approach
Stocker is not the only pluralist to offer arguments attempting to quiet the
concerns raised by the problem of decisiveness. John Kekes offers a different approach.
This approach tries to resolve the conflicts by focusing on an existing hierarchy of goods.
Kekes claims that “[t]his approach to conflict resolution is a program, not a solution”
(Kekes 1993, 80). I take it that this means he wants to establish the context in which a
solution might present itself. The context he develops is based on the relative importance
of different values.63
Kekes program relies on a distinction between primary and secondary values.64
He states that “[p]rimary values are connected with benefits and harms that count as such
for all conceptions of a good life, while secondary values have to do with benefits and
harms that vary with conceptions of a good life” (Kekes 1993, 38). He goes on to say
that primary values are grounded in a view of human nature that is itself pluralistic. He

63

Kekes may have in mind what Stocker has called sortal comparisons. In other words, the goods or values
are separated into types and then Kekes tries to explain how comparisons of goods and values take place by
putting the sorts at specific points in a hierarchy. It is far from clear that Kekes would be happy with such a
description of his view. In any case, my argument does not depend on the assimilation of Stocker’s and
Kekes’ discussions.

64

Kekes also discusses a second distinction, namely the distinction between moral values and non-moral
values. Given the problems I point out for the primary – secondary value distinction, I do not feel it is
necessary to discuss the moral – non-moral distinction.
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develops an account on which physical and psychological similarities make up ‘the facts
of life’, where our being born into small groups and acquiring friends and enemies are
similarities that make up ‘the facts of intimacy’, and the Hobbesian notions that humans
are vulnerable, limited in strength and intelligence, and face of world of scarce resources
make up ‘the facts of the social order’ (Kekes 1993, 39-40). Taken together, these three
sets of facts, the facts of life, intimacy, and the social order, determine the primary
values, or the goods that need to be satisfied in all conceptions of a good life (Kekes
1993, 41).
The secondary values, on the other hand, provide a more complete expression of
the primary values that are grounded in specific conceptions of the good life. They
produce a second set of normative factors derived in part from the primary values (Kekes
1993, 32-34). These conceptions vary with persons, societies, traditions, and historical
periods and are the concrete expressions of the primary values in a conception of the
good life (Kekes 1993, 18; 42-3). As Kekes puts it, “[o]ne way in which secondary values
may be said to be contingent on primary ones is that some secondary values are the
particular forms in which primary values are interpreted in some context” (Kekes 1993,
42) Secondary values break down into substantive and procedural secondary values.
Substantive values are concrete expressions of secondary values (Kekes 1993, 82).
Procedural secondary values are concrete expressions of acceptable modes of interaction
among people (Kekes 1993, 82). In short, the distinction between primary and secondary
values relies upon a recognition of their different sources. Primary values have as their
source general, universalizable, and stable facts of human nature (Kekes 1993, 39).
Secondary values have as their source the primary values. Together, these two sets of
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values form the conception of a good life held within a society, person, etc. (Kekes 1993,
42).
Kekes’ use of the primary-secondary value distinction provides only a statement
about how the two sets of values are related to each other when conflicts occur. In
general, but not universally, primary values should be ranked higher than secondary
values (Kekes 1993, 77). For Kekes, this general hierarchy as opposed to an absolute and
universal hierarchy is what distinguishes pluralism from monism. Monists are committed
to the existence of overriding values while “Pluralists deny that there is an authoritative
system of values and, consequently, that there is any value that is always overriding”
(Kekes 1993, 19).65 According to Kekes, a value is overriding if it takes precedence over
any other conflicting value, in any context, holds for all human beings at all times, and is
never to be violated.66

While it may be the case that primary values usually take

precedence over secondary values, pluralists are committed to denying the claim that they
always do so. Instead, there can be circumstances, according to the pluralist, where a
secondary value could take precedence over a primary value.

Recognition that primary

values do not always take precedence over secondary values leaves him open to the
following question about decisiveness: when values conflict, how do we determine
which value is to take precedence? To answer the question requires a discussion of a
procedure to resolve the conflict.

65

It is important to notice here that it is not the case that pluralists deny there is ever an overriding value,
but only that there is always an overriding value. It may very well be the case that there are circumstances
in which there is a single overriding value and the pluralist is not committed to denying this. A pluralist
only denies that for every choice situation there exists an overriding value.
66

While Kekes’ definition of ‘overriding’ is not the exact converse of the definition of non-overriding I
provide in 4.6, it is consistent with this later definition.
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But Kekes’ outline does not discuss a procedure. To see the shortcomings of his
outline, consider the following example. Suppose that security and freedom are primary
values. In one specific conception of the good life, distribution of goods based on a
market has secondary value in that it substantively identifies freedom as economic
freedom. This economic freedom is such that it allows one to use her money and goods
as she sees fit.

Economic freedom, at least occasionally if not frequently, takes

precedence over the primary value of security in such a system. This is because a feature
of markets is the risk one takes when using market mechanisms to trade goods. This risk
can be seen as a willingness to forgo some amount of security for the freedom one finds
in the market.

You must trade off the security that is valued because of human

vulnerability in order to promote economic freedom instantiated in the market. I think
this is the argument that many free market and libertarian thinkers have in mind when
they argue that there can be no redistribution of goods after the market forces have
worked their magic even if redistribution provides a greater level of security for all those
in the market. Economic freedom expressed by the workings of the market always takes
precedence, even over security, which is also valuable. A market does not guarantee an
equal distribution of goods, but is to ensure the overall maximization of goods. It could
result in very unequal distributions such that the security level possessed by some
participants is significantly lower than that of other participants. For example, if most of
the wealth is concentrated in a few individuals, that means that many people are
vulnerable to the loss of other goods, say health, life, home, etc., because those with less
wealth are unable to weather bad circumstances. The recognition of the lower level of
security that some may face due to the distribution outcome of a market shows that the
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defenders of markets are making very strong claims about the relationship between the
primary value of security and the secondary value of economic freedom. This position
must establish both (1) that freedom always takes precedence over security, and (2), that
the secondary value of a market distribution always takes precedence over security. But
such a view is merely dogmatic, overstated and ought to be rejected. The case for
rejection of such a view is strengthened since there is a weaker version of the claim that
is much more palatable. On the weaker version of the argument, economic freedom and
market outcomes are given the benefit of the doubt and the burden of proof is on those
who wish to claim that security is to favored in a particular instance. On the weaker
version we realize that there can be occasions where we have to give up economic
freedom and market distributions. However, on the weak version, we are left with an
unresolved conflict. If economic freedom and market distributions conflict with security,
and it is also the case that freedom and market distribution does not always take
precedence over security, then how do we determine when freedom and the market
distribution override security? To answer this question we need to have an explicit
procedure to determine which value takes precedence. Thus, it is the case that merely
discussing the general ranking in importance of primary to secondary values, or even the
general ranking in importance of two primary values, is not sufficient to resolve any
conflict. At best it helps us see the possibility of conflicts and the need for a detailed
procedure to resolve the conflict.
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2.5 The Lexical Ordering Approach
A similar attempt at ordering has been suggested by Robert Veatch, namely, a
lexical ordering of conflicting factors.67 One difference between this form of conflict
resolution and that just described for Kekes is that the lexical form is more strict than
Kekes’ approach. If Kekes had embraced a lexical ordering approach, he would have
held that primary values would always take precedence over secondary values. But then
Kekes, by his own reckoning, would no longer be a pluralist. If Kekes’ is correct that one
way to distinguish between monism and pluralism is that a monist sees certain factors as
always taking precedence over others—in essence certain factors trumping others—then
Veatch’s approach should not be acceptable to the pluralist.

The lexical ordering

approach does hold that certain factors trump others, making it an approach acceptable
only to the monist according to Kekes. Again, this is true only if Kekes is correct in his
assessment of one of the differences between monism and pluralism. I am not convinced
that Kekes’ view is correct. On the way I have distinguished monism and pluralism, the
distinguishing feature is that a pluralist holds that there exists a plurality of independently
relevant factors. Nothing in this distinction disallows for a lexical ordering approach to
conflict resolution.

Since I do not think we can just brush away lexical ordering

approaches as contrary to pluralism, I offer additional arguments against the lexical
ordering approach.
67

Veatch does not offer an account of conflict resolution that is strictly lexical. He mixes his approach with
a balancing between consequentialist principles (say utilitarianism versus egoism) and then separately with
balancing between non-consequentialist concerns (say autonomy and justice) before lexically ordering nonconsequentialist concerns above consequentialist (Veatch 1995, 211). An alternative version of the lexical
ordering approach is suggested in (Stone 1987). As Callicott has pointed out Stone’s approach may not
really be lexical at all. This is because for Stone the ordering is considered anew in each case and
determined by intuition (Callicott 1999, 110-2).

88

Veatch, working within the paradigm of the Principles approach in Bioethics, is
concerned with what to do when the prescriptions of the various principles conflict.68 He
states that when the traditional approach borrowed from Ross of balancing these concerns
fails, “[t]he only other possibility for resolving conflicts amongst principles is to attempt
to rank-order them by assigning each a priority so that one principle must be completely
satisfied before another is allowed to come into play” (Veatch 1995, 210). Veatch then
stipulates that this is done by satisfying all nonconsequentialist concerns before satisfying
consequentialist concerns (Veatch 1995, 211). Thus, if a nonconsequentialist concern
conflicts with a consequentialist concern, only the nonconsequentialist concern has a
voice in making the decision. To see why this presents a problem for the pluralist
requires a little more analysis.
In many cases the lexical ordering deprives consequentialist concerns any
standing, a point inconsistent with motivations for adopting pluralism. Veatch provides a
clear example of how his approach is to work by considering the question about
conducting medical research on willing participants (Veatch 1995, 213-215). For the
sake of argument, he has us suppose that the overall social good produced by the research
is greater than the harm caused to the individual.

According to Veatch the

consequentialist concerns can never justify a violation of autonomy, but other
nonconsequentialist concerns can. He states these points as follows:
aggregate social good by itself can never justify research on a competent
patient against his or her autonomy, which takes priority over the mere
production of aggregate good results for the society. On the other hand,
other nonconsequentialist principles can, in principle, provide for the
68

For a detailed discussion of the Principles approach see (Beauchamp 1994) and (Beauchamp and
Childress 1994).
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exceptional case in which autonomy may be overruled (Veatch 1995,
213-214).
I think Veatch reaches the correct conclusion in the medical research case, but this single
case hardly proves the strong claim that no consequentialist concern can ever take
priority over a nonconsequentialist concern. A counterexample to Veatch’s strong claim
is the medical ethics case I detailed in Chapter 1. Recall that in that example the
physician violated the autonomy of the decision makers by disallowing the family to
carry out their considered plan of ending hydration and respiration. For the current
purpose, suppose that the physician’s reason for violating autonomy is not the virtue of
compassion, but strictly consequentialist in that he thinks that ignoring the family’s
request will produce less emotional pain in the long run than if he follows the family’s
wishes.69 According to Veatch’s lexical ordering approach, it would be incorrect for the
physician to justify his decision in this manner. The decision, based on consequentialist
concerns, should never be allowed to take precedence over the concern for autonomy.
Veatch’s method does allow for the physician to come to the right conclusion about
violating autonomy, but only if the physician’s reason was nonconsequentialist in nature,
say a substantive view of respect for persons that requires one to avoid killing.70 While I
grant that avoidance of killing is a concern that should be considered, I do not agree that
we should ignore all consequentialist concerns in making the judgment of whether to
follow the family’s wish or not. For one thing, in this case, it may very well be that

69

It is interesting to note that Vetch does not consider where, if anywhere, virtue based concerns should
enter the decision making process. Are they to come after the nonconsequentialist concerns but before the
consequentialist? Are they to come last? I think his failure to mention virtue based concerns is an
unfortunate oversight for someone who is interested in defending some form of pluralism.

70

Veatch mentions avoidance of killing as a possible nonconsequentialist concern (Veatch 1995, 204).
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concern for avoidance of killing is, taken by itself, outweighed by the concern for
autonomy. Yet, the concern for avoidance of killing combined with concerns for the
overall emotional suffering of the family is enough to override autonomy. The need to
consider overall suffering, both of the patient and his or her loved ones, strikes me as
intuitively plausible in any case in which the termination of life is at issue. If this is true,
then Veatch’s claim that nonconsequentialist concerns can be ignored in any case where
there are not ties in our rankings of the nonconsequentialist concerns is mistaken. There
is no tie in the case as presented here, but the non-consequentialist concerns tip the
balance. In fact, I do not see why a pluralist would accept Vetch’s lexical approach since
one motivation for moving away from moral monism to moral pluralism is to allow both
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist (as well as virtue-based) concerns a role in the
deliberative and justificatory processes. Lexically ordering the factors denies the lower
ordered factors a role in the justification process unless the higher ranked factors are
irrelevant or there is a tie higher up. Thus, a moral pluralist should not accept this
method since it goes against one of the reasons for being a moral pluralist.
Another problem with Veatch’s approach is that the method of lexically ordering
factors limits the instances of rational regret related to moral remainders associated with
making decisions. One context within which moral remainders occur is cases of dirty
hands. In cases of dirty hands, acts can be justified even though morally undesirable or
shameful. For example, it may be that even though abortion is legal in the United States,
any doctor who performs an abortion performs a morally undesirable act. Performing an
abortion can be justified, however, in cases where the doctor knows that the woman will
have an unsafe back-alley abortion if he does not perform the operation.
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This

justification does not eliminate the moral undesirability of the abortion. Thus, there is a
moral remainder or a moral disvalue that should be noted not just in the determination of
what act should be performed, but also after the act has been justifiably performed. This
moral remainder can then explain regret, loss, shame, etc., that one may, or should, feel
after performing the act.71 But if one denies a source of justification for a rejected course
of action—in this case, the nonperformance of the abortion procedure—then one has
denied the same source as the rational foundation of regret. If there is no rational
foundation for the regret, then whatever regret one does feel is not rational. By accepting
the method of lexical ordering as a method of conflict resolution, we deny some sources
of justification and regret, and thereby limit the instances in which regrets are seen as
rational. Thus, a pluralist, who typically wants to extend the limits for what counts as
rational regrets, must reject lexical ordering because it makes the limits on rational regret
too narrow.
There are at least three objections to my argument as presented above. The first
objection asks the following: if an outweighed pro tanto reason can ground rational
regret, then why can’t a concern that is trumped by lexically ordering ground rational
regret?

According to Kagan, “A pro tanto reason has genuine weight, but nonetheless

may be outweighed by other considerations” (Kagan 1991, 17).72 A concern has genuine
weight if an only if it has some influence on determining whether or not an act is
justified. Furthermore, a concern can be the foundation for rational regret if and only if it
has a role in justification. In a lexical ordering approach, whether or not lower level
71

For a detailed discussion of these points, see (Stocker 1992).

72

I agree with Kagan that a pro tanto reason is what Ross means by prima facie duty (Kagan 1991 17, fn;
Ross 1930, 19-20; 28-29).
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concerns have genuine weight is determined by whether there exist ties further up in the
lexical ordering. If there are no ties between the nonconsequentialist concerns, then
lower level consequentialist concerns do not have genuine weight. But then, according to
the above implications, if the concern has no genuine weight, then it cannot be the ground
of rational regret. Another way one might state this is that in an approach that uses pro
tanto reasons, every pro tanto reason has some genuine weight whether they are
nonconsequentialist or consequentialist in nature; in a lexical ordering approach, no
lower-level consideration has genuine weight until it is needed to break a tie. In either
case, Veatch’s lexical ordering approach is significantly different from an approach using
pro tanto reasons in that the latter allows both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist
reasons to have genuine weight in all choice situations where the former does not.
Another objection to my argument states that I ignore the possibility that regret
can be explained in monistic theories. If regret can be explained in monistic theories,
then regret can be explained in cases where a lexical ordering approach is used. While I
agree that it is possible for monistic theories to explain some examples of regret, I do not
think the above argument relies on the strong claim that only pluralistic theories can
explain regret. The point of the argument is not that a lexical ordering theory does not
allow for any rational regret but that it unacceptably limits what counts as rational regret
to those factors that justify an act. But, if an act is justified by a lexically prior factor, say
a duty to truthfulness, a lexical ordering may not see consequentialist concerns as a
source of regret since they were never consulted in the choice, and thus the
consequentialist sources of regret are not rational in such circumstances. In this sense, a
lexical ordering approach appears like a monistic approach: only those factors that
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justified the act can be the source of regret. It is not exactly like a monistic approach, for
if several duties are involved, as well as consequences, in justifying an act because of all
of the ties produced by the lexically prior duties, then there is more than one source of
rational regret. This still limits the sources of rational regret, however, and a pluralist, by
wanting to expand the sources of rational regret, would thus see lexical ordering as a
questionable method of conflict resolution.
This last point is related to another objection to my argument.

Someone may

argue that if a reason has moral weight in some situations other than the one the agent
finds herself in at the moment, that this reason can still be the ground for rational regret.
This criticism is interesting because it is partially correct—these reasons can be the
ground of regret about being in a given situation. However, it cannot be the source of
regret for what one does in a given situation.

To see this point more clearly consider

Thomas Hurka’s argument that rational regret is clearly allowed for under monistic
theories (Hurka 1996). Hurka’s first argument relies on the distinction between what he
calls the concentration view of regret and the proportionality view of regret. (Hurka 1996,
560-570). The concentration view is the idea that when you choose the greater good over
the lesser good, it is rational that “you should feel only and entirely pleased” (Hurka
1996, 556). On the surface, this view does not allow for any type of regret, however this
is false. On such a view one may feel regret because “you may and perhaps should wish
that you had not had to choose between the goods but could produce both
simultaneously” (Hurka 1996, 556). This makes sense. Suppose that it is possible to
prepare a Thanksgiving meal for your family in Ohio or, through a social organization,
help prepare the meal for a family in Tennessee that is struggling financially at this time.
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Further, suppose that you choose to help the Tennessee family because a greater amount
of good will result. One can still recognize that while these two actions are practically
incompossible at this time, they are not necessarily incompossible; surely one regrets not
having a way to overcome this incompossibility to achieve the even greater good of
making both meals. But regretting having to make the choice is not the same regret one
has by making the choice. The proportionality view makes just this distinction.
The proportionality view allows for one to have the regret for having to choose
between two incompossible goods. Furthermore, this view says “it is also rational to
regret not having produced the lesser good” (Hurka 1996, 556). In other words, there is a
different way to regret not making the meal for your family in Ohio. You regret not just
having to choose between one or the other—a regret about being in the situation—but
you also regret that the lesser good was not realized—a regret about the choice you did
make. You might state the distinction between the types of regret as follows: In a
situation S, rational regret about the choice made in S can only be grounded in a reason r
that has weight in S; alternatively, one can feel regret about having to make a choice in S
based on either a reason r in S or a reason r* that has weight in situation T that does not
have weight in S.
The fact that the proportionality view distinguishes both types of regret is a reason
to favor the proportionality view.73 This seems to rely on a criterion of theory choice
which states that an approach that allows for more rather than fewer forms of genuine
73

Hurka agrees with this conclusion, but for a different reason. He starts by noticing that both goods may
be intrinsically good, and that humans are limited creatures that “cannot love all things with infinite
intensity” (Hurka 1996, 557). Because of this limitation, he “finds it more attractive to hold, with the
proportionality view, that it is best to divide one’s love proportionally between different good objects”
(Hurka 1996, 558).
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rational regret is better theory, other things being equal. Since for a pluralist theory the
lexical ordering approach disallows certain forms of regret as rational—namely any
regret based on factors that are lexically ordered lower than the factor that in fact justified
the act which is to be performed—then the lexical ordering approach is less desirable
than an alternative theory that allows for those additional forms of rational regret, other
things being equal.74
To see how the lexical ordering approach limits what counts as rational regret,
suppose with Veatch that nonconsequentialist concerns are higher in the lexicon than
consequentialist concerns (Veatch 1995, 211-14). Suppose further that one has a choice
between performing two incompossible acts, A and B, such that both are acts can produce
good. On the lexical ordering approach, if you determine on nonconsequentialist grounds
to do act A rather than act B, at most you can regret—for nonconsequentialist reasons
only—having to make the choice between A and B. For example, you determine to do A
because it promotes autonomy even though it violates fidelity. In this instance any regret
is based only in the fact that you had to violate fidelity or, additionally, that you could not
satisfy both autonomy and fidelity at the same time. This approach, does not give
consequentialist concerns any voice since the nonconsequentialist concerns determined
the answer. But, let us suppose that even though A promotes autonomy, B promotes the
greater overall good. However, since autonomy was given preference over fidelity, the
question of overall good never arises on Veatch’s account. But, if the justification fails to
give consequentialist based concerns a role in justification, then it fails to allow them to
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It is of course incumbent upon the critic of the lexical ordering approach to supply such an alternative.
The theory I develop in Chapter 3 I believe will be such an alternative.
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be the source of rational regrets. Thus, lexical ordering puts limits on what regrets are
rational not by argument, but by fiat. In this case, the violation of fidelity is a source of
rational regret, but the fact that one could not produce the greater good by doing both acts
is not. Since it does seem rational to regret not being able to bring about the good
achieved by both actions, this limitation is unacceptable. This counts against lexical
ordering as a method, but is not sufficient by itself to say that the method is ultimately
unacceptable. However, with the prominent place that regret has had in the literature
since Bernard Williams’ article “Ethical Consistency”, such a limitation needs to be
shown as acceptable, or counts as some evidence against the view.
To conclude, then, there are at least three problems with the lexical ordering
approach concerning its ability to resolve the problem of decisiveness for pluralists. The
first is that, if Kekes is correct that any approach that countenances certain factors always
taking precedence is really monistic, then the lexical ordering approach is available only
to monists. The second problem is that in some cases Veatch’s lexical ordering approach
disallows some factors having any voice in justifying a course of action. Each of these
problems is sufficient to reject the method, at least for the pluralist. The third problem,
related to the second, is that Veatch’s approach eliminates certain grounds for rational
regret that we would want to keep. While not as convincing as the first two arguments, it
does draw out a concern that must be addressed. Thus, a pluralist cannot accept this
approach to resolving the problem of decisiveness without giving up too much of what
was attractive with pluralism to begin with.
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2.6 Procedural Solutions: The Specified Principle Approach
The above does not constitute a proof that all attempts to resolve the problem of
decisiveness in terms of heretofore unrecognized meta-values will be inadequate. These
failures, however, make it reasonable to look for a different kind of solution. One
alternative is a procedure-based approach.

One procedural based solution that is

available to resolve the problem of decisiveness is Specified Principlism. This idea was
originally developed by Henry Richardson as an alternative both to the deductivist75
approach of applying general rules to cases and to the balancing approach favored by
Ross and others (Richardson 1990, 280).76 The specified principle approach aims at
resolving conflicts by taking general ethical norms, principles, etc., and “qualitatively
tailoring our norms to cases” (Richardson 1990, 283).

This involves more explicitly

interpreting the norms or principles for a given case by having the general norms or
principles make reference to specific features of the case. This procedure thus leads to
the following assertion.
The central assertion of the model of specification is that specifying our
norms is the most important aspect of resolving concrete ethical problems,
so that once our norms are adequately specified for a given context, it will
be sufficiently obvious what ought to be done. That is, without further
deliberative work, simple inspection of the specified norms will often
indicate which option should be chosen (Richardson 1990, 294).
Actually, as should be obvious, this model is making two assertions. First, it asserts that
specification is the most important part of resolving ethical problems.
75

In our

A deductivist approach is not identical to the subsumptive model of practical reasoning I discuss in
section 4.2. While a subsumptive model is deductive, it may be the case that there are other deductive
models that are not subsumptive.

76

Specified Principlism was extended to Bioethics explicitly by (DeGrazia 1992).
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terminology, specification is the most important part of resolving situations requiring
decisive answers to the question ‘what ought I to do?’ Second, it asserts that further
deliberative work beyond specification is often unnecessary for indicating the justified
course of action. There are good reasons to doubt both assertions.
The main reason for doubting Richardson’s assertions is that Specified
Principlism fails to resolve the problem of decisiveness. This can be seen with his
example of the environmentalist who is trying to decide whether to use cloth diapers or
disposable diapers for his child (Richardson 1990, 306). In this example we see that a
specification of a norm can result in two distinct and incompatible specified norms.
Furthermore, we can see that, contrary to Richardson’s own earlier claims, deliberative
work beyond specification appears to be necessary in order to indicate the justified course
of action.
Richardson assumes in this example that a committed environmentalist has as an
action-guiding principle to ‘protect and preserve the environment’ (Richardson 1990,
306-7). He admits that there are two distinct specifications of this principle. The first
specification is that of an old-fashioned conservationist who is interested in “keeping
those parts of nature not yet touched by man from becoming disrupted” (Richardson
306). We can state this more formally as follows: it is morally wrong for individuals to
use products that will disrupt parts of nature not yet touched by humanity. This gives an
advantage to the action of choosing cloth diapers. According to Richardson, the use of
cloth diapers, while requiring a great deal of energy consumption and pollution both in
their creation and cleaning, does not require using new spaces for landfills nor does it
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require looking for new land to grow the cotton. Disposable diapers do, however, require
continued search for new oil resources in places such as the Alaskan wilderness in order
to make the plastic and new landfill space that can require the use of untouched land
(Richardson 1990, 306). Given these factors, the old-fashioned conservationist should,
according to this specification, use cloth diapers.
The second specification of the original norm is that of the new urban liberal who
“is concerned largely with human health, and seeks to minimize the pollution of
populated areas” (Richardson 1990, 306). We can state this specification as follows: it is
morally wrong for individuals to use products that will increase the pollution of
populated areas and thus adversely effect the health of human beings. This gives the
advantage to disposable diapers.

According to Richardson’s example, the manufacture

of cloth diapers requires the use of pesticides and air pollution from farming vehicles and
manufacturing plants, and the use of cloth diapers results in bleach and detergent being
put into water systems. The farms, plants, and sewage systems will all be located near
population centers, thus increasing the pollution near humans. Disposable diapers, on the
other hand, largely affect non-human animals in remote areas (Richardson 1990, 306).
Thus, the new urban liberal should, according to this specification, use disposable
diapers.
But now we have two different specifications that, if we follow Richardson’s
interpretation of them, direct us to incompossible courses of action. Thus, specification
did nothing to actually resolve the problem. At best it has highlighted what is at issue
between the opposing courses of action. One now has to determine which specification
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to choose as the justification for an action, but neither specification helps us determine
which one is correct.
Richardson does offer a solution to this specific problem.

He begins his

discussion of the diaper example by having the environmentalist make a list of the
environmental damage caused by each choice and then he develops “an ‘environmental
impact index’ that (1) develops a measure of each of these different types of effect and
(2) assigns that measure a weight” (Richardson 1990, 306). Having this environmental
impact index handy, Richardson suggests that the index
[t]hough incomplete and insufficiently precise to yield a single-valued
index, will nonetheless help, for it is likely that pattern of ranking reflects
one of these specifications more than the other. This differential could
draw his attention to the way he should specify his guiding norm [in terms
of either the old-fashioned conservationist or the new urban liberal]
(Richardson 1990, 307).
In other words, the justificatory work is done not by the specification, but by the creation
of the environmental impact index.

This index identifies concerns like ‘use of

pesticides’, ‘need for new landfills’, ‘use of oil’, and ‘disruption of forests’ among other
factors, and determines the impact of each factor on the environment. This impact is then
modified by a weighting of each factor in terms of importance. All of this assigning of
numbers is intuitive to a great extent. In other words, the environmental impact index is,
as Richardson himself suggests, just a complicated version of intuitive balancing
(Richardson 1990, 306). But that means all the justificatory work is done not by the
specification, but by the intuitive balancing that one has used in creating the index. All
that the specification has done has drawn attention to the course of action that is required
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given a certain specification, but the justification of the appropriate specification was
handled by a different process entirely.
does nothing to justify a course of action.

Thus, even in his own example, specification
I would argue, in fact, that it is always

necessary to rely on procedure beyond that of specification. This is because specification
is not a justificatory procedure. It is a procedure for articulating the implications of the
interpretation of a norm. In his later work, Richardson admits this: “note that the
definition of specification as a relation between two end-norms makes no mention of a
temporal or justificatory priority” between the two end-norms (Richardson 1997, 74). In
other words, specification only describes the relation between two factors—or as he calls
them, end-norms—but does not state in describing that relation which of those norms
plays a greater role in the justification of which act one ought to perform. I believe that
this is because in his later work Richardson, when discussing specification, is much less
concerned with justification than he is with what he calls ‘motivational transfer’.
Motivational transfer is the ability for a specified norm to motivate just as the general
norm does: if the general norm can motivate a person to action, then a specification of
that norm can as well.77 But Richardson, as do many other philosophers, seems to
conflate motivation and justification, moral psychology with moral epistemology. First
he states that “[i]f a specific end can give rise to action without further deliberation, then
specifying ends can be all the deliberation one needs” (Richardson 1997, 77). Here is he
clearly making a psychological point, namely, that specification can result in ends that
77

Richardson’s example of the diaper use conflict points out, however, an additional problem with
discussing this in terms of motivation. Both of the specific norms should be motivating, but which one
actually moves one to act when the actions are exclusive? Does the acceptance of one specification
neutralize the motivation of the other? Or is all motivation provided by the acceptance, and not by the
transference from general to the specific norm? These are questions that need to be addressed by
Richardson.
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motivate. But then he goes on to state that “the point is simply that once the end has been
deliberately specified, it is sufficiently obvious which of the available options to take that
no further stage of deliberation is required to determine which of the options is a better
means to the end as specified” (Richardson 1997, 77).

Here he is making an

epistemological point that specification will determine the better means to the end, and
that is a point about justification. The first problem here is that motivation does not
logically follow from justification, for we can be justified in performing an action that we
have no motivation to perform.

The second problem is that justification does not

necessarily follow from motivation, for we can be motivated to perform an action that is
not the best means to the end we are aiming toward. By conflating the motivational and
justificatory elements of his view, he arrives at too strong a conclusion. This is especially
true if, as we have seen, the general norm can result in two incompossible specifications
that leaves us in a quandary as to which specification is motivating and which
specification is justified.
None of the above criticism should be taken to say that specification is an
unimportant part of the overall process of rational decision making, for without
understanding the implications of one’s interpretation of a norm one can not determine
what course of action to take.

However, drawing out the implications is not a

justificatory procedure. Consider the example once again to highlight this shortcoming
of Specified Principlism. In the diaper example specification helps us see that if we are
committed to conservation we should choose one option, but if we are an urban liberal we
should be choose the other option. What fails to happen is a successful indication
through specification of which interpretation of the norm the environmentalist should
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endorse. In order to resolve this issue of how one determines which specification of the
general norm is the justified specification, which is tantamount to resolving the problem
of decisiveness, one must have a procedure that justifies which interpretation of the
specified norm one ought to act upon.

It is precisely at this point that specified

principlism fails. In fact, in a strange passage at the end of the article, Richardson seems
to admit this. He states that the claim being made by his examples “is that one can see
how the specifications involved count as courses of reasoning—not that one can see that
rationality dictates a specific answer” (Richardson 1990, 308). But, this takes back the
promise he made earlier in the paper that “specifying our norms is the most important
aspect of resolving concrete ethical problems, so that once our norms are adequately
specified for a given context, it will be sufficiently obvious what ought to be done”
(Richardson 294). So, while a specification can tell us the reasoned implications of a
norm or interpretation of a norm, it does not tell us whether that norm justifies a specific
course of action.

2.7 Procedural Solutions: The Overlapping Factors Approach
Although the Specified Principlism fails to provide a satisfactory substantive
solution to the problem of decisiveness it is the right kind of approach in that it focuses
on a procedure. Another procedural approach defines factors relevant to choice as only
those factors that the alternatives have in common. I will call this the ‘overlapping
factors approach.’

Even though this approach has some initial plausibility, it is

intuitively unsatisfactory.
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To see why this ‘overlapping factors approach’ might appear initially attractive consider
the evaluation of two persons who are being considered as candidates to fill the last roster
spot on a football team. Suppose that I. M. Slim is a receiver and I. B. Stocky is an
offensive lineman. Such players are evaluated using a variety of criteria, some of which
overlap as shown in Table 2. On this approach, to consider only the salient features that
I. M. Slim and I. B. Stocky have in common is to consider only their time in the 40 yard
dash and their overall strength. Both features can be relevant in game situations for both
the receiver and the lineman. This method requires us to ignore features relevant to the
receiver such as the yards gained after a catch is made and route precision, and also
ignores features relevant to the lineman such as the number of times the linemen knocks
down a defensive player (Pancake) and the number of sacks allowed. Depending on the
amount of meaning invested in the raw numbers listed above, one may then be able to
make a clear decision as to which is the better player. Comparisons are made between
those features, in this case specific overlapping skills, that allow for direct comparisons.
This method of running comparisons of only common features is at least prima facie
plausible, and a rejection of it due to mere theoretical commitments appears

Table 2. Athletic Skill Values
Person ↓ Skill→

I. M. Slim
I.B. Stocky

Yards
after
Catch
9
n/a

Route
Precision

40 Yard
Dash

Strength

Pancakes

Sacks
Allowed

9
n/a

8
4

6
10

n/a
7

n/a
7

105

Nevertheless, there is good reason to reject this approach. For example, why
should ignoring the other scores in order to ensure the possibility of numerical
comparison be considered reasonable? This method ignores the fact that I. M. Slim is
significantly better at his position-specific skills, namely yards after the catch and route
precision, than I. B. Stocky is at his position-specific skills of pancakes and sacks
allowed. If one compares these two players in order to determine which will be the last
player to make the team, then ignoring these facts appears mistaken. Even if one denies
that direct, numerical comparisons between these different sets of skills is possible, it still
seems to be a mistake to ignore such information.78 Thus, if we use a procedure that
limits the factors that we use in justifying a choice, namely to the factors the alternatives
have in common, there are extra-theoretical reasons to doubt the efficacy of accepting the
procedure.

2.8 Procedural Solutions: Wenz and the Concentric Circle Theory
Peter Wenz’s Concentric Circle Theory appears to avoid some of the problems
with previous approaches to the problem of decisiveness. He states the criticism for
opponents of pluralism as follows:
Without a single master principle in the background, what is to be done,
asks the critics of pluralism, when one of the independent principles in the
pluralistic theory requires a course of action required by one of the other
independent principles in the theory? In this kind of situation, the theory
yields either no recommended course of action or contradictory
78

One reason that someone might claim that it is not a mistake to ignore such information is that the score
for each feature is determined relative to the sample of players trying out for each position, thus making the
scores relative to different sets of individuals in each case. However, as discussed in the previous footnote,
this method has additional problems in terms of a clear outcome.
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recommendations, because there is no master principle that indicates
which of the conflicting principles to follow (Wenz 1988, 313).
So, once again, we see that pluralism is unable to be decisive in that it ether makes no
recommendation or contradictory recommendations. In the terminology borrowed from
Stocker, pluralistic theories are, respectively, incomplete and impractical. Wenz also
summarizes the critics challenge as requiring the pluralist to “be able to arrive through
reason at a definite answer to any realistic question” (Wenz 1988, 314). He then provides
a hierarchical account of the rankings of different factors as if this is sufficient to meet
the challenge put forth by the critic of pluralism. There are two difference between his
hierarchical approach and Kekes’. First, he provides a clear procedure for determining
the hierarchy, as opposed to giving us merely a promissory note. Second, he gives us
reason to think that the demand for a complete decision procedure is unrealistic. I believe
this combination of arguments is the correct strategy for taking on the challenge put forth
by the critics of pluralism. However, there are substantive problems with his particular
procedure for determining the justified choice in a given situation.
Wenz himself seems to recognize the failure of his Concentric Circle Theory to
meet this challenge. Near the beginning of the chapter discussing this theory, he states
that the theory
provides a framework that structures one’s thoughts about issues of
environmental justice. It indicates the kinds of considerations that are
relevant, and the factors that one should take into account when assigning
relative weights to those factors. The theory facilitates good judgment
instead of trying to replace it (Wenz 1988, 315).
He also ends the chapter with a similar recognition of his failure to meet the criticism
head on by noting that The Concentric Circle Theory “does not provide answers [about
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what one ought to do], but it provides a framework within which these questions can be
rationally and productively considered” (Wenz 1988, 335).
accurate description of his less-than-satisfactory

To see why this is an

accomplishment, we need to more

closely look at the theory.
The Concentric Circle Theory “indicates the kinds of considerations that are
relevant, and the factors that one should take into account when assigning relative
weights to those factors” (Wenz 1988, 315).

The factors that Wenz considers are

preferences, positive rights such as the right to healthcare, and negative rights such as the
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.79 These factors define our obligations
towards others, including non-human animals and the environment. The metaphor of
concentric circles provides a rough guideline to the strength of an obligation one has
toward another person such that the “closer our relationship is to someone or something,
the greater the number of our obligations in that relationship, and/or the stronger our
obligations in that relationship” (Wenz 1988, 316). Thus, when dealing with intra-factor
comparisons, i.e., comparisons of only positive rights or preference satisfaction, which
concentric circle the person inhabits determines the weight of the obligation toward that
person.80 Wenz states that
in general, the positive rights of people who exists in a small concentric
circle, a circle that is closer to me, have a stronger claim on me than do
the positive rights of people at greater remove. Similarly, the happiness
and the preference-satisfaction of people close to me have a stronger
claim on me than do the happiness and preference-satisfaction of others
(Wenz 1988, 321).
79

Wenz only discusses virtue theory as part of a discussion of property rights and justice, and dismisses it
as inadequate foundations for both, and thus does not include virtue theory in his concentric circle theory.
See especially (Wenz 1988, 27-55; 90-91).
80
For reasons that I will explain in a moment, negative rights do not have this feature.
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He also clearly ranks positive rights as having greater weight than helping someone
achieve preference satisfaction when he states “someone more remote from me may have
a stronger claim on me than someone closer, if the person who is more remote has a right
that I can respond to, whereas the person closer has only a preference that I can satisfy”
(Wenz 1988, 321). So, the strength of an obligation one has towards an individual is
determined, so far, by two independent considerations. First, what type of factor we are
dealing with establishes some of its strength such that in general, but not absolutely,
positive rights create a stronger obligation than preferences.

Second, the relative

placement of the person on the concentric circle map helps us adjust the weight such that
in general, but not absolutely, the closer the person is to me on the concentric circle map,
the stronger the obligations to that person. The implication of these two considerations is
that they help us understand why I can have a stronger obligation to help a friend or
family member achieve a preference than helping a very distant person, who I have never
met nor will I ever meet, ensure a positive right is not violated
Negative rights are different from both positive rights and preferences in that “in
the case of negative human rights, we are less concerned with a person’s placement on
concentric circles. We think that in many cases our obligations to respect people’s basic
freedoms are unaffected by our relationships to them” (Wenz 1988, 324). So, what we
get is the following general hierarchy: negative rights have more weight than positive
rights and positive rights have more weight than preference satisfaction. The relevant
placement on concentric circles, however, can adjust the overall strength of a preference
and positive right such that in a particular case I may have a stronger obligation to meet
someone’s preference than to ensure a positive right is not violated. One more wrinkle to
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this is that intra-factor comparisons of life and liberty within negative rights are such that
“the right to life takes precedence over the right to liberty” (Wenz 1988, 326). But, based
on the relative location on the concentric circle map, there can be times when one does
not ensure that a right to life is maintained because of someone else’s right to liberty.
Wenz says that an example of this is that we should not interfere with the traditional
Eskimo culture of hunting seals, which is a negative right to liberty they have, because of
the seals’ negative right to life. The seals are too far out on the concentric circle map to
outweigh the Eskimo’s right to liberty.
So far, Wenz’s view is very similar to a Kekes’ hierarchical approach that is not a
strict lexical ordering. In addition to the general weights, he gives us a metaphorical
procedure, the concentric circles, to help us identify how and why there are exceptions to
the initial general orderings. This is helpful, and definitely an improvement on Kekes’
view. However, it has the following problem. Wenz warns us not to take the metaphor
of weight to seriously. While it is true that the factors must be weighed, it is not the case
that they are weighted “literally, formally, or mathematically. Weighing such factors just
means considering them in an informed, unbiased manner” (Wenz 1988, 315-6). This in
turn implies that
there is nothing in the theory of justice comparable to Newton’s inverse
square law in physics which enables people to calculate pulls
mathematically. In the theory of justice, as in most human pursuits,
including most scientific investigations, one must employ good judgment”
(Wenz 1988, 322).
While some may think this is a problem for his theory, I do not think such a criticism can
be upheld. In fact, the theory I propose in later chapters also has this feature. In the end,
one must rely on good judgment. If this is the case, why not just accept Wenz’s solution
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to the problem, especially since it appears to just offer a different version than the one
I’m going to employ later? The answer is this: even though Wenz claims his theory does
not support sexism, racism, or speciesism, it in fact does do these things.
The key to this is Wenz’s claim that “obligations arise in the context of
relationships that are characterized by actual or potential interaction” (Wenz 1988, 317).
Because we have actual and potential interaction with people who are not biologically
related to us, and these interactions are the source of obligation, Wenz thinks that the
concentric circle theory does not support sexism, racism, and speciesism. As he points
out, “I obviously have more obligations toward an Afro-American who is my colleague,
my student, or my adopted daughter (yes, I do) than I have to a native European who has
never been to the United States and whom I have never met” (Wenz 1988, 319). This
analysis is correct, but it does not show that the Concentric Circle Theory does not
support various unacceptable -isms. For example, if I cloister myself in a community of
people that is all white and racist in both hiring practices and who owns property in the
town (we have a police force that ensures this), then my actual and potential interactions
with any other race is dropped to zero. Thus, I have no obligations to these people,
except on the very remotest concentric circle, and this mean that our racist community is
justified because we have chosen to live in a way that minimizes such interactions. If we
set up the community in a tight enough fashion, since negative rights are not absolute, we
can ensure that, given the nature of the theory, we can trump the negative rights given our
preferences and those with whom we do interact. The theory has no way of countering
such a situation. It not only allows for such racism, but can actually be used to justify it.
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So, in this substantive manner, despite Wenz’s claims to the contrary, the Concentric
Circle Theory can support racism and similar unpalatable views.
What needs to be dropped to avoid this is the notion that actual and potential
interaction determines obligation.

By doing this, we can reject racism on its face

(something his theory does not do) because it is just wrong. But by eliminating actual
and potential interaction in order to solve the problem of racism, Wenz’s view has no
way, as it is presented, to explain how our obligations can vary over time and space. This
is the chief virtue of his view over that of Kekes, since the relative placement in the set of
concentric circles is what helps determine the strength of an obligation. With out this, we
just have a view that has a rough hierarchy of negative rights, positive rights, and
preferences, and as we have seen with Kekes, this is not sufficient to overcome the
problem of decisiveness. Thus, Wenz is saddled with a dilemma: if he resolves the
problem of decisiveness, then his theory must allow for unacceptable –isms such as
racism, or, if he tries to eliminate racism, then he does not solve the problem of
decisiveness. Neither horn of the dilemma is acceptable, and thus we should reject his
theory.

2.9 Conclusion
Moral pluralism, with its commitments to incomparability and non-reductionism,
appears to preclude the possibility of rational decision and action. When conflict arises,
the theory appears to lack resources to resolve these conflicts. Furthermore, attempts to
overcome this problem have fallen short.

Most of the attempts fail by attempting

solutions that do not address the primary challenge posed by the problem, namely the
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development of a procedure for resolving disputes when they arise. Instead, the attempts
either rely upon newly identified values. Other approaches do develop a procedure, but
are either incomplete or intuitively questionable. I aim to do better.
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Chapter 3: The Comparability of Options
3. Introduction
At the end of Chapter 1 I briefly identified challenges to normative pluralism.
The first of these—that evaluation of options requires that they be comparable—is the
topic of this chapter. A critic of pluralism might argue that a pluralist is committed to the
claim that comparability is not possible. The argument would be stated as follows:
P1: If a theory does not provide a means to rationally justify an alternative
through comparison with other alternatives, then the theory is
indecisive.
P2: By endorsing incomparability, pluralism eliminates the means to
rationally justify an alternative through comparison.
C: Thus normative pluralism is indecisive.
In this chapter I argue that P2 is false. As I have already argued, there are different
degrees of comparability. While a defender of normative pluralism may defend a strong
thesis of incomparability in which no comparisons are possible, it is not necessary to do
so. So, to show that P2 is false, I show that the normative pluralist does not have to
endorse complete incomparability nor deny that there are cases of complete
comparability.
In section 3.2 I consider the nature of comparativism. Ruth Chang states that
“comparativism is the view that a comparison of the alternatives with respect to an
appropriate covering value ‘determines’ a choice as justified” (Chang 2002, 43).

I

examine Chang’s substantive version of comparativism in order to distill the main
components of a general version of comparativism.

This general account of

comparativism, which is not Chang’s view, but one that is neutral between her view and
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others, will guide for my development of an alternative substantive view of
comparativism. The alternative view I develop is acceptable to both a factoral and
foundational pluralist. The argument must proceed in this fashion for two reasons. First,
describing the general structure of comparativism doesn’t show that a pluralist can
embrace comparativism. Second, merely pointing out that a pluralist is not committed to
there being some choice situations that are not completely comparable is not sufficient to
show that normative pluralism is decisive; we also need a positive account of how one
can compare options. So, in the final section of this chapter I develop a procedural theory
of practical reason. This procedural account relies on two key features, namely criteria of
evaluation and interaction principles. First, I identify a non-exhaustive set of normative
level criteria for choice. Second, I identify classes of interaction principles that help us
resolve conflict in the presence of a plurality of factors.

3.1 Incommensurability and Incomparability
Earlier I mentioned that we can break down the notion of comparability, the one
focusing on a single scale of value, by noting that there are different levels of
comparability.81 By doing so we can see that premise two above, namely the claim that
‘by endorsing incomparabilty, pluralism eliminates the means to rationally justify an
alternative through comparison,’ is false.
Consider again the different types of comparability. If pluralism is committed to
complete incomparability for all choice situations, then pluralism eliminates the
possibility of rankings and comparisons and the argument is sound. However, even if
81

See section 1.5.3 above.
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pluralism allows for only ordinal comparability on at least one relation ℜ, then pluralism
does not eliminate the possibility of comparison. One can accept the possibility of
degrees of comparability and yet remain a pluralist. So, the exact question we must
answer is whether or not pluralism entails complete incomparability.
The answer is ‘no’. While a pluralist holds that some alternatives are completely
incomparable, a pluralist is not committed to the claim that all alternatives are completely
incomparable. The key here is that a pluralist is committed only to the claim that there
are at least two independently significant factors that apply to two alternatives in some
circumstances and these factors are not completely comparable. For example, suppose
that you, as a consequence of diabetes, have entered early stages of renal failure. For a
variety of reasons you are not a candidate for a kidney transplant. Different factors
appear to come into play here when determining whether or not to commit suicide at this
point. The first is pain and pleasure. In the coming weeks or months you will experience
extreme pain and it will not abate for any significant amount of time. A second factor is
the duty to oneself to not commit suicide.82 Now, ignoring the difference between
whether these factors are grounded in a single foundation or a set of separate foundations,
a pluralist can hold that each of these factors is independently significant. She can hold
that the duty is not grounded in the overall amount of pleasure or pain one is going to
experiences. Nor, of course, is the pain grounded in duty. When these factors are
independently significant you can make the following claim: in cases of early stage renal
failure, one can determine for oneself that the factors of avoiding pain are ordinally
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See the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1991, 31-32) and (Kagan 1998, 148-149) for a
discussion of these substantive constraints.
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ranked above the factor prohibiting suicide thus making it morally permissible for you to
commit suicide. This claim does nothing to suggest that there is some further, more
fundamental factor, say utility, to which all of these factors are reducible or for which
they are substitutable.

One is merely stating a ranking on a single scale with no

commitment to relative (interval scale) or absolute (ratio scale) distances between the
rankings. If pluralism is merely the claim that there are at least two independently
significant factors, then it does not preclude comparison in terms of ordinal rankings on
some relation ℜ. Ordinal rankings allow one to say that there are independent factors
that in this particular case have a certain rank and that this comparative rank allows for
one to develop a rational justification as to whether or not to commit suicide.

A

commitment to pluralism allows for ordinal comparisons and thus a commitment to
pluralism does not ‘eliminate the means to rationally justify an alternative through
comparison’. Therefore, P2 is false and the argument that pluralism is indecisive is
unsound. In some cases pluralism allows for the ordinal ranking of some alternatives
being considered because one can have a comparison of factors that leads to ordinal
rankings. In other cases, especially with a multiplicity of possible relations ℜ for a
multiplicity of factors, some of these relations may be ranked on numerical interval scales
and perhaps even ratio scales. All of these situations are possible even when maintaining
that two objects of comparison include independently significant factors.
One might object to this line of argument because, the critic claims, the
independence of the factors in my example is apparent, not actual.

In reality one

evaluates pleasure and the prohibition against suicide in terms of some overarching
factor.

Then one merely adds the positives and subtracts the negatives related to
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outcomes.

The problem with this criticism, however, is that it makes a strong

metaphysical claim about the relationship between reality and appearance. In short, it
discounts one’s experience that pleasure and prohibitions have independent significance
in favor of the view that there is in reality a realm with a shared factor of significance.
This view has a heavy burden to demonstrate the claims of the existence of such a realm,
the possibility of accessing it, and its relevance. The burden is on the defenders of the
reality - appearance distinction, not those who rely on their experiential claims of
independent significance.
So my conclusion remains: it is unsound to argue that comparisons are necessary
for choice and pluralism disallows comparison. Pluralism can allow comparisons. As
granted earlier, this is not sufficient to demonstrate that there exists a procedure of
comparison that will identify a justified course of action given incompossibles. Before
developing the substantive view, we must take a look at the general structure of a
comparativist position.

3.2 The Structure of Comparativism
A comparativist view, in its barest form, claims only that comparisons take place
in terms of properties and that the objects of comparison bear these properties. The most
significant work done on the nature and structure of comparativism is that of Ruth Chang.
Chang states that “comparativism is the view that a comparison of the alternatives with
respect to an appropriate covering value ‘determines’ a choice as justified” (Chang 2002,
43). This definition of comparativism includes a substantive claim that all comparisons
must be in terms of a covering value. This substantive claim can be denied while still
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accepting the structural elements of comparativism. These structural elements include (1)
that comparisons must take place in terms of properties and (2) that objects of
comparisons are bearers of those properties.
According to Chang, values allow for comparison to take place and these values
are composed of different qualities. This description of the nature of values is neutral
between two ways of comparing objects. First, one could compare the objects in terms of
the value. Second one could compare the objects in terms of the properties that compose
the value. To favor one of these methods of comparison is to make a substantive claim.
Chang herself favors the claim that all comparisons are in terms of the value and not in
terms of the underlying qualities. She moves away from the general discussion of
properties and values by substituting her ‘contributory value’ – ‘covering value’
terminology. In this terminology she states that “I have assumed that there is always one
covering value for any comparison. Put differently, I have assumed that whenever there
are multiple values relevant to a comparison, these values are all contributory values of a
single covering value” (Chang 2002, 9). This is a significant and strong claim. As we
have already seen in Chapter 2, the contributory value – covering value relationship is
quite suspect. For the reasons outlined there, I think the notion of a covering value must
be abandoned. If we suppose that the only two versions of comparativism are comparing
items in terms of a covering value or comparing items in terms of a plurality of
properties, then the failure of Chang’s covering value view entails that we seek a solution
in terms of the plurality of properties. This is the view that I develop and such a view
provides a procedure for pluralistic theories that is decisive.
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3.3 Components of Evaluation
Again, a comparativist view, in its barest form, claims only that comparisons take
place in terms of some property and that the objects of comparison bear these properties.
Justification proceeds by a comparison of these properties. So the defender of pluralism
needs to determine which properties are involved when a comparison, and thus a
justification, takes place.

One set of contenders for the properties are the factors

discussed in Chapter 1. But one might also think that the properties of comparison
include what I call normative criteria and normative interaction principles.

The

normative criteria are similar to what, on the meta-level, are called criteria of theory
choice. They describe ways to evaluate a factor in justification. Interaction principles
articulate the variety of ways that factors influence justification. Taken together, the
factors, the normative level criteria, and the interaction principles determine what is a
justified course of action.

3.3.1 Normative Level Criteria
Robert Audi discusses possible criteria for normative level evaluation in his 1982
book Practical Reasoning and his 2001 book The Architecture of Reason. In the earlier
work he discusses four sets of criteria. In the latter work he explicitly expands on one of
his earlier general categories. All the criteria are structural in that they identify properties
of factors used in justifying a course of action.

Each criterion helps determine the

importance of any given factor in justifying a course of action as the rational action.
In Practical Reasoning Audi identifies four sets of criteria to evaluate practical
reasoning (Audi 1982, 142-167). These are logical, material, inferential and epistemic
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criteria. The logical criteria govern the relation between the premises and conclusions of
a piece of practical reasoning. I take it that the logical criteria determine how one makes
inferences when only declarative sentences are involved. These are distinct from his
inferential criteria which govern the relations between the beliefs about the premises and
the conclusions. Audi states that the inferential criteria depend on the logical criteria, and
this dependence makes sense if we see them as providing similar inference rules, one for
declarative sentences and one for beliefs (Audi 1982, 144). Next, the material criteria
govern the truth and falsity of the premises.
Finally, the epistemic criteria govern the justification of beliefs. Audi in his later
work gives some detailed examples of epistemic criteria which break down into
psychological, process, capacity and compositional criteria. The psychological criteria
help us understand how our beliefs accord with experience (Audi 2001, 196). On Audi’s
moderate foundationalism we have criteria for evaluating beliefs based on perception,
introspection, memory, and the use of a rational faculty for mathematical and logical
proofs (Audi 2001, 13-16).83 These criteria describe how a belief is appropriately related
to, say, sensory experience so that the strength of belief can be assessed. Consider the
difference between the visual experiences of two people who witness a mugging. The
first witness is a man who sees the end of the mugging occur from across the street,
taking place in an unlighted spot, while on his way to get his new glasses with a much
stronger prescription. The second witness, a woman with 20/20 vision, is knocked down
by the mugger around the corner under a street light. The mugger falls on the second
83

For a more in-depth discussion of Audi’s epistemological views about these grounds of belief, see (Audi
1998). In chapters 1 through 5 he discusses perception, memory, consciousness, reason, and testimony as
independent grounds of belief.
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witness and spends several seconds trying to untangle himself from her. Due to the better
lighting conditions and the better physical apparatus of the woman, her beliefs about the
physical characteristics of the mugger have more epistemic support than those of the man
with poor vision seeing things at a distance under poor lighting. Thus we can say that the
beliefs of the woman about the identity of the mugger are better grounded. This is
because beliefs grounded in sensory experience have more warrant when both internal
conditions of a sensory apparatus and external conditions approach normal. Similar
examples of criteria can be made for the other grounds of experience.
The next set of criteria comprises what Audi calls process criteria. These criteria
identify adequate routes of justificatory transference from a ground for a belief to the
belief itself (Audi 2001, 197). One criterion here would be that a belief formed in a
moment of acute awareness is stronger than one formed when not in such a state (Audi
2001, 198). This criterion would have to clearly state conditions for what counts as a
state of acute awareness. The claim of the person who reports being acutely aware in the
throws of a psychedelic high are not to be granted the strength of someone who is drug
free. There are also capacity criteria. These essentially limit the types of grounds one
can have for a belief. Human beings have only five senses, but other animals have ones
different or superior to humans. For example, sharks can experience the magnetic fields
that surround us.84 This ability represents a sense that humans lack. Thus, a shark has
an expanded set of criteria accounting for the appropriate conditions under which this
additional sense records information. The sonar capacity of bats and the telescopic sight
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This is sense is the result of Ampullae of Lorenzini. Ampullae of Lorenzini are receptor cells located at
base of canals on sharks’ snout which detect electrical fields (Kalmijn 2002).
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of some raptors might be considered improvements on similar human capacities, and thus
the criteria accounting for the appropriate conditions under which such senses are
recording information might be more expansive in how they ground beliefs. The process
criteria primarily help lend additional justificatory strength to a belief and, in some cases,
restrict the strength of beliefs, based not only on the capacities that a type of animal
might have, but on the basis of what the particular token animal has developed. For
example, while human beings in general have the ability to hear, there are some specific
individuals who are deaf.
Audi’s final category of epistemic principles comprises the composition criteria.
These criteria break down into two further classes concerning what I will call the nature
of beliefs and the fit of beliefs. The category of nature criteria express the influence of a
belief independent of other beliefs while the category of fit criteria express the influence
of a belief as it relates to other beliefs. The first of the nature criteria is strength. We
have already seen how different psychological, process, and capacity criteria can
influence the justificatory strength accorded to a belief. However, this criterion would
state that a belief that has a higher degree of conviction is better than a belief with a
lower degree of conviction. Suppose that you have a choice to make about which of two
apartments to rent. You have a strong conviction that apartment one is in a quiet
neighborhood and that apartment two is in a neighborhood with a lot of noise.
Furthermore, you have a weak conviction that the neighborhood of apartment one has a
high crime rate while neighborhood of apartment two has a low crime rate. Everything
else being equal, it is better to base your choice on the strong conviction about quietness
as opposed to crime rates. It is rare that everything else is equal, and it is also the case
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that the strength criterion must be tempered with a further criterion, which states that a
belief whose degree of conviction matches that of its relevant evidence is better than one
that does not. For example, suppose that you have evidence that your new roommate has
been leaving all the lights on in the apartment even in rooms that are not occupied. Your
evidence is only that the electrical bill is significantly higher now than before the
roommate moved in. This evidence should only lead to a low degree of conviction
because there are several other possible explanations of the increased bill, such as a
general rise in electricity rates, your own increased usage due to weather and lighting
conditions, as well as other possibilities. Thus, if the higher bill is the only evidence one
has, then attributing a low degree of conviction to the belief that your roommate is
leaving the lights on is better than attributing a high degree of conviction. However, if
the evidence you have for your roommate’s behavior includes finding your roommate
eating lunch in the apartment and the only light not on is the one in your bedroom, then
attributing a higher degree of conviction to the belief that your roommate is leaving the
lights on is warranted.
Similarly we have the criterion of scope which states that a belief that is related to
a higher number of topics is better than a belief that is related to a lower number of
topics. Take as an example the beliefs that one might use to determine which is the best
movie to rent. You are trying to decide whether to rent Clint Eastwood’s Unforgiven or
Kevin Smith’s Mallrats. You believe that a movie that has won more awards is a better
choice. This belief applies to all movies. You also might believe that any comedy in
which Joey Lauren Adams has a role is better than one that does not. This belief only
applies to one genre of movies. The criterion of scope states that using the belief about
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awards is better than the belief about certain actresses in comedies because its scope is
greater. There is an obvious caveat to this, however, in that if you were sent to the store
not to get the best movie, but to get the best comedy, then the second criterion is better
than the first.

But that is because the choice one is trying to justify is narrower.

Furthermore, comedies are rarely given awards regardless of quality, so the belief that the
better movie is the one with more awards seems irrelevant.
Finally under the nature of composition, we have two opposing criteria. The
first is the entrenchment of a belief. This states that a belief that has a higher degree of
resistance to elimination from the set of beliefs is better than one that has a lower degree
of resistance to elimination. However, the positive case in which a belief has a high
degree of entrenchment must be tempered by a defeasibility criterion: a belief that can
eliminated upon the attainment of further evidence is better than one that could never be
eliminated.
Under the heading of the criteria of fit, Audi identifies psychological
connectedness, experiential harmony, intellective harmony, and integration (Audi 2001,
208-209). Psychological connectedness is the idea that a belief that affects a larger
number of other beliefs is better than one that affects fewer number of other beliefs. The
criterion of experiential harmony states that a belief that has a proper relation to
experiences—to be spelled out presumably by many of the criteria already discussed—is
better than a belief that does not have a proper relation to experience. Intellective
harmony states that a belief that has a proper relationship between its content and the
intellectual field of which it is a part is better than a belief that does not have this proper
relationship. The example Audi himself gives for such a relationship is the formation of
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a belief that is the conclusion of an obviously valid syllogism (Audi, 2001 209). Finally
we have the criterion of integration. This criterion states that a belief that is more
integrated into an entire web of beliefs is better than one that is less integrated. This
criterion affects ad hoc beliefs. According to Paul Thagard, a belief is ad hoc if it “is one
that serves to explain no more phenomena than the narrow range it was introduced to
explain” (Thagard 1978, 87). Such ad hoc beliefs are not integrated into the system of
beliefs because their focus is so narrow as to have little or no connection with any further
beliefs.

Such ad hoc, non-integrated beliefs are worse than beliefs that are more

integrated and explain the same phenomena
Audi describes these epistemic criteria in relationship to beliefs. However, he
thinks that these criteria can be used in the evaluation of any propositional attitude (Audi
2001, 208-209).

The most significant alternative propositional attitude is desire, often

expressed as “I want that …”. Other propositional attitudes can include striving, wishing,
doubting, and seeing. We can expand the possible intentional objects of the criteria to
include not just propositions but the normative factors such as consequences, duties,
constraints, and virtues related to an action. Thus, many of these criteria can take factors
as their objects. To see this requires that we go through some examples.
I want to focus on the epistemic criteria that Audi identifies because these criteria
are most obviously related to my aim of resolving the problem of decisiveness. The
epistemic criteria are justificatory criteria. Not all of the epistemic criteria for beliefs can
be transformed into epistemic criteria for factors, but many of them can. Most of the
nature criteria can be transformed. The criterion of strength is that a factor that has a
higher degree of conviction about its relevance in a situation is better than a factor with
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a lower degree of conviction about its relevance in a situation. For example, in the case
described at the beginning of the dissertation about what coffee I should drink I mention
several factors. One of these factors states that consequentialist concerns about the
number of sentient beings that are affected should influence my choice. I have a high
degree of conviction that this factor is relevant in this case. However, another factor
addresses concerns about the autonomy of the people who work on the coffee plantations.
I have a much lower degree of conviction about the relevance of this factor in making a
decision about what coffee to drink. According to the criterion of strength I should grant
more importance to the consequentialist factors than to the factor of autonomy.
The evidential criterion is that a factor whose degree of conviction about its
relevance matches that of the available evidence is better than one that does not. Again
consider my coffee drinking example. There is fairly good evidence that continued use
of non-shade grown coffee and non-worker-co-operative coffee has undesirable
consequences for both human beings and non-human animals that live in the rain forests.
This supports my strong conviction that this factor is relevant. However, I do not have
very good evidence that people who work for the coffee plantations will have their
autonomy promoted or subverted by my continuing to drink or ceasing to drink specific
types of coffee. According to the evidential criterion I should grant more importance to
the consequentialist factors than to the factor of autonomy.
The scope criterion is that a factor that is related to a higher number of topics is
better than a factor that is related to a lower number of topics. The keeping of promises
and the relevance of happiness to a variety of topics makes these factors important when
making determinations about what one ought to do. Other factors, such as the virtue of
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wittiness, are not related to a high number of topics.85 Outside of casual interaction with
other people, it is not clear that such a virtue is important for many decisions. According
to the criterion of scope I should grant more importance to the factors of happiness and
promise keeping than to wittiness.
The entrenchment criterion is that a factor that has a higher degree of resistance
to elimination from a set of factors is better than on that has a lower degree of resistance
to elimination. In general we treat rights such as the right to privacy and right to property
as highly resistant to elimination when making political and legal decisions. This is
different from the way we treat concerns about embarrassing other people, either publicly
or privately. According to the entrenchment criterion we should grant rights to privacy
and property as more important for our justification than concerns about how an action
may or may not embarrass someone.
The category of fit also has criteria that are applicable to both beliefs and factors.
The criterion of harmony is that a factor that has a proper relationship between its
content and the situation to which it is being applied is better than a factor that does not
have this relationship. In my example of the study performed by the International Joint
Commission, the international political agreements such as The Boundary Waters Treaty
and the Great Lakes Charter have a proper relationship to the situation of removing water
from the Great Lakes Basin. Until the world water situation reaches such a crisis that
most of the industrial world and non-industrial world is without water, it is not clear that
a factor concerning the current sanitation conditions in China has the proper relationship
85

David Hume advocates the importance of wit, ingenuity, and good manners in communication in his
second Enquiry (Hume 1990, 262).
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between it and the situation of water removal in the Great Lakes Basin. According to the
criterion of harmony I should grant more importance to The Boundary Waters Treaty and
the Great Lakes Charter than to the sanitation conditions in China when determining
whether to allow the bottling of Great Lakes water for sale.
The criterion of integration is that a factor that is more integrated into a set of
factors is better than one that is less integrated. Even though a pluralist is committed to
the idea that perfect integration of all factors is an unattainable ideal, that does not
eliminate the need to integrate our set of factors in some fashion. Consider the factors of
international treaties and the cultural impact of water removal that have been mentioned
in the case of the Great Lakes Basin. These factors are highly integrated with each other
because they specifically relate to concerns about water and the environment in the Great
Lakes region. However, the factor of interest by the military using remote areas in the
Upper Pennisula of Michigan for wilderness training is not well integrated into the set of
factors that bear on the impact of the removal of water from the Great Lakes Basin.
According to the criterion of integration we should grant more importance to the treaties
and cultural impact than to the interests of the military.
The above is only the beginning of a larger project of determining both what
factors exist and their importance. Additional categories of criteria as well as specific
criteria need to be developed. My suspicion is that many of these will be specific to
broad areas of inquiry such as medical practice, environmental ethics and policy making,
business practice, personal decision making, etc. Some of them will be more general.
There are many more criteria that can be articulated, but I believe these examples should
be sufficient to provide some initial understanding of the procedural approach to
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justification that I endorse. A more complete understanding will be achieved by looking
at an example of how some of the other criteria can be used.
Let us consider an extended example of a process criterion that uses factors and
not beliefs.86 A factor is any consideration that determines the normative status of an act.
When trying to determine the consequentialist value of an act, the main factors will be the
availability of probabilities and utilities, the precision with which we can express them,
and a consideration as to whether we are faced with an iterated or single-shot choice.
These factors help us determine the normative statues of an act by providing clear
information about the subjective value of an outcome to those it effects. To understand
the example, we have to lay some ground defining decision rules and choice situations.
Two of the choice rules we will consider are the Expected Utility Principle (EUP) and the
Minimax Principle (MMP). EUP states that a justified alternative is the one in which
expected utility is maximized. MMP states that a justified alternative is the one in which
the worst state of affairs associated with the alternative is at least as good as the worst
state of affairs associated with any other alternative. A third decision rule, Gregory
Kavaka’s Disaster Avoidance Principle (DAP), is less well known but important for the
example. DAP states that the justified alternative is the one in which the probability of
disaster is minimized.

A similar but distinct rule is the Probability Minimization

Principle (PMP) which states that the justified choice is the one in which the probability
of the worst outcome is minimized. Let us now turn to the types of choice situations. A
situation of risk is one in which an agent has quantitative estimates of utilities and
86

Recall that process criteria identify adequate routes of justificatory transference from a ground for a
belief to the belief itself. In terms of factors, process criteria identify the particular decision rule that is a
route of justification from the factors (utilities, probabilities, etc.) to the normative conclusion that one
ought to do act A.
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associated probabilities.

A situation of uncertainty is one in which an agent has

quantitative estimates of utilities, but the associated probabilities are unknown. Once we
recognize that we can have different mixtures of precise an imprecise probability and
utility information, we also recognize some further choice situation types. Kavka was
interested in situations of two dimensional uncertainty (Kavka 1980, 46). In such
situations an agent has no reliable quantitative estimates of utilities or probabilities, but
the states of affairs and their likelihoods can be ordinally ranked.
situations of one dimensional uncertainty.

There are also

In such situations an agent has reliable

quantitative estimates of the utilities or the probabilities, but not both (Cave 1998, 113119). Finally, there are what I call situations of mixed uncertainty. In such situations an
agent has some quantitative information for one gamble, perhaps even quantitative
information of both utilities and probabilities, while in the other gamble the agent has
only ordinal rankings of probabilities or utilities, no probability information, or other
combinations.
With these definitions we can state a process criterion for the different decision
rules. The general statement of the criterion says we should use a decision rule that is
more rather than less sensitive to the precision exhibited in the utilities and probabilities.
This might be developed in such a was as to have the following corollaries:
I. Use EUP in situation of risk, or in situations of iterated choice where uncertainty,
one dimensional uncertainty, two dimensional uncertainty, or mixed uncertainty is
present, and there is no possibility of disaster;
II. Use MMP in single shot situations of uncertainty where there is no possibility
of disaster;
III. Use DAP in situations of one dimensional, two dimensional, or mixed
uncertainty where at least one outcome is disastrous;
IV. Use PMP in situations of single shot choices in situations one dimensional, two
dimensional, or of mixed uncertainty where no outcome is disastrous.
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Suppose you face the following situation. You are offered the chance to play a game of
Russian Roulette, but you have only been given the following information. The gamble
has three possible outcomes: in o1 you die, in o2 you receive $100, and in o3 you receive
$10. Furthermore, we know that your preference ordering of the outcomes is such that
you prefer o2 to o3 and you prefer o3 to o1. The choice you are offered is between gamble
A, playing Russian Roulette, such that A = [o1, q; o2, 1-q] and gamble B, not playing
Russian Roulette, such that B = [03, 1]. Furthermore you know that the probability q is
very small, but you don’t know how small. Let us suppose that the game is set up so that
you have a table full of handguns to choose from, each gun has different size cylinder,
but you don’t know the distribution among 5 round, 6 round, and 7 round cylinders, and
at least one, and possibly as many as five of the guns are loaded. Here we have a case of
two dimensional uncertainty because we do not have enough information to refer to
precise probabilities and utilities.87

Furthermore, one of the possible outcomes is

disastrous, namely o1. Finally, this is offered to you as a single-shot situation. According
to our process criterion, the decision rule that provides the justificatory transference is
DAP according to corollary III. In order to minimize the probability of disaster, then, one
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One may say that you can have precise utilities of the outcomes of gaining $10, dying, etc. There are
methods to help determine the utility one assigns to a possible outcome once the exhaustive list of
outcomes is described. For example, von Neumann and Morgenstern provide a method for determining a
person’s utilities based on the risks that one is willing to take (Resnick 1997, 88-89). However, this
method as well as others are fraught with difficulties such as assuming that people are risk neutral and
requiring people to accept axioms beyond asymmetry, connectedness, and transitivity. Furthermore the
example does not express the values of outcomes in terms of utilities, but merely describes the state of
affairs that result. Without further information about the agent who is making the choice, information that
may not even be available to the agent herself, one cannot automatically assume that we have sufficient
information to ascribe interval rankings of the outcomes, even if we have information that tells us more
than mere ordinal rankings.
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would choose B since there is no possibility of disaster in that choice and a small
probability of disaster in choice A.
I am not claiming that all of these categories of criteria will survive further
argument, or that all the individually proposed criteria for beliefs, propositional attitudes
and factors will survive critical scrutiny. However, I think many of the above criteria can
be used to evaluate the factors employed in identifying the justified course of action.

3.3.2 Interaction Principles
The term ‘interaction principle’ is one that is already in use in the literature. 88
For example, Shelly Kagan defines an interaction principle as specifying “how various
factors interact so as to determine the moral status of particular acts.” (Kagan 1998, 183).
In other words, when you have a plurality of factors, they can influence each other in
different ways that affect the justification of action. Before I describe the general types
of interaction principles and some specific examples, a few comments should be made
about interaction principles. The first comment will help us see the difference between
interaction principles and normative level criteria. Normative-level criteria determine the
importance of a factor to a given situation. For example, the epistemic criteria explain
the variety of ways we evaluate the use of our beliefs in practical reasoning. Using a
belief or a normative factor that is tightly integrated into our entire web of beliefs is better
for justifying an action than using one that is loosely integrated. Interaction principles,
however, do not merely evaluate our use of a factor, but state when a factor has influence.
88

While the source of these principles can vary from one theorist to another—one might have a
foundationalist view of the sources while another might take a more particularist version of the sources—
my point is to describe the variety of interaction principles.
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Thus, the functions that normative level-criteria and interaction principles play in our
overall practical reasoning are distinct. This distinction highlights the importance of
interaction principles for my argument. A major part of the challenge that sees pluralistic
theories as indecisive is that critics cannot see how two distinct factors can generate an
answer to a question ‘ought I to do A?’ Interaction principles address this concern head
on and thereby provide an answer to such critics. Thus, interaction principles are at the
center of my solution to the problem of decisiveness.
Joseph Raz identifies two types of interaction principles, namely overriding
principles and exclusionary principles.89 An overriding interaction principle states that if
you have two factors pointing toward different actions as justified, then one of the factors
(or group of factors) overrides the other. 90 Exclusionary interaction principles state how
one factor eliminates other factors from bearing on the choice situation, thereby
eliminating its justificatory power. Raz explains this with the example of Jeremy who is
“ordered by his commanding officer to appropriate a van belonging to a civilian” (Raz
1990, 41). Independent of the officer’s order, Raz states that the balance of factors say
that Jeremy should not appropriate the van. But, the officer’s order, and the factor
supporting it—namely one ought to obey a superior—is such that the other factors, which
on balance say not to appropriate the van, are excluded from the justification. In this
case, the interaction principle says something like the following: if one is given a lawful
order by a superior officer, then it is the only factor that one should use in determining
89

Raz uses the language of overriding reasons and exclusionary reasons. I have modified this usage in
order to keep the discussion clear.
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The exact nature of how this overriding occurs can have many forms, but one possibility is that because
of features of S, one employs a discounting function on the strength of some or all of the factors favoring b.
The effect of this is that the factors favoring a come to override the factors favoring b, thus justifying a.
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whether the choice should be justified. A principle of this sort provides us with a very
clear example of an exclusionary interaction principle.
The next two types of interaction principles are synergy interaction principles and
activation interaction principles. Consider synergy interaction principles first. These
principles define how two or more factors can combine so that the overall influence of
the combined factors is greater than the sum of the influences of each factor. For
example, suppose that one is faced with a situation in which you must decide whether to
continue working on your book or to take the rest of the beautiful spring day off to enjoy
time with your children. Obviously you have a duty to those who employ you as well as
to the publisher who has accepted the book to continue working on the writing.
However, you also have special obligations to your children, because they are your
children, to be a part of their lives. Furthermore, you also have good consequentialist
factors suggesting that should you play with your children: it will be more fun for both
you and your children, and also be important in forming a positive bond between you.
Even though there is a deadline in the near future for having the book done, it may very
well be the case that the importance of the consequences of playing, as well as your
special duty to your children, interact in such a way that the strength of those two reasons
combined is greater than their mere sum. In fact, suppose that it is the case that the
synergy bonus that tips the justification in taking the rest of the day off. I think that such
situations can occur, and are regulated by the following interaction principle: if one’s
duty to one’s own children suggests performing action a is combined with positive
consequences of performing a, then the influence on justification of these two factors is
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greater than the sum of its parts. 91 Factors that are regulated by synergistic interaction
principles can be helpful in overcoming conflicts as we have in this case because they can
tip the balance of justification in one direction.92
The final type of interaction principle I want to consider is that of activation
interaction principles. These principles define when certain factors become activated as
relevant to the justification of choice.

Recall that at the beginning of chapter 1 I

discussed the International Joint Commission and its study with regard to the removal of
water from the Great Lakes Basin.

In the final report under “Section 11:

Recommendations,” the Commission lists a set of principles to be used in the
management of the Great Lakes Basin (International Joint Commission 2000, 45). The
very first principle they mention is the Integrity of the Ecosystem:
The Great Lakes Basin is an integrated and fragile ecosystem. Its surface
and groundwater resources are part of a single hydrologic system and
should be dealt with as a unified whole that takes into account water
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As Betsy Postow has pointed out, in this example I have left out some important concerns raised by this
situation in order to make clear what I mean by a synergistic interaction principle. One of these concerns is
in the form of an exclusionary principle that a duty which specifically demands doing an action a has more
influence on a choice than one which demands merely doing an action of type A. For example, it may be
the case that I have a general duty to do the action of type A: participate in my child’s life. However, that
does not confer any significant influence on the specific action a: playing with my children outside today.
First, there may be other actions of type A that I can perform to fulfill that duty. Second of all, if we
assume that I have a spouse, the duty of a parent to participate in a child’s life does not specify that it is I
that must participate in my child’s life at this moment. Compare this with my duty b: that I finish my book
by the stated deadline. This duty is a professional duty of type B and it specifically mentions both me and a
time. In this case, my duty b by being specific appears to have more influence than my duties of type A to
my children, even though it is arguable that duties of type A are weightier than duties of type B. For more
examples of this kind see (Postow 2004)
92

As John Nolt has pointed out, synergistic interaction principles may, on occasion, frustrate choice. A
synergistic interaction principle could increase the influence of otherwise weak factors or decrease the
influence of strong factors to a level that results in a tie where there was not one before. This would
produce a dilemma instead of resolving conflict. However, the probability of this happening is quite low in
comparison to a synergistic interaction principle either raising or lowering the influence of a factor away
from a tie: in any given situation, there is only one point in which there can be a tie and a large number of
points in which no tie occurs.
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quantity, water quality, and ecosystem integrity (International Joint
Commission 2000, 45)
This principle is an example of multiple activation interaction principles. At first it is
hard to see this because, according to philosophical standards, the principles are stated
very sloppily. It includes in the first sentence and the first clause of the second sentence
reasons for adopting the principle that are not relevant to the actual statement of the
principle. Furthermore, it implicitly relies on earlier comments made in the report. The
most important earlier comment states that “Water quantity and water quality are
inextricably linked” (International Joint Commission 2000, 41). But we can consider the
first interaction principle to be as follows: if in the course of a management decision for
the Great Lakes Basin water quality is seen as relevant factor, then considerations of
water quantity must also be considered a relevant factor.

The second interaction

principle is the converse of the first: if in the course of a management decision for the
Great Lakes Basin the issue of water quantity is seen as relevant factor, then
considerations of water quality must also be considered a relevant factor. Nowhere in
the report is a direct link made between water quality or water quantity and ecosystem
integrity prior to the statement of the principle of the integrity of the ecosystem. Here we
can restate the interaction principle as follows: if in the course of a management decision
for the Great Lakes Basin the issue of either water quantity or water quality is seen as
relevant factor, then considerations of ecosystem integrity must also be considered a
relevant factor.93 The important thing to notice here is how the presence of one factor in
93

It may also be the case that embedded within this principle is a synergistic interaction principle of the
following form: if the hydrologic system of the Great Lakes Basin should be dealt with as a unified whole,
the sum of the value of concerns about water quantity, water quality, and ecosystem integrity should be
modified according to a function f that increases the overall value of these factors.
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a decision making process activates other factors as well. In the course of making a
decision about whether to lower the quantity of water within the Great Lakes Basin, one
must also consider the quality of the water left behind as well as the impact on ecosystem
integrity.

If one is concerned with making decisions about allowing for additional

dumping of waste into the Basin or further restrictions of dumping of waste, this requires
not only considering the water quality impact, but also the effect on water quantity and
ecosystem integrity.
I hope the examples given for the various types of interaction principles have
been sufficient to illustrate how a theory of practical reason that uses them can identify
justified actions even when faced with a plurality of factors. This provides a sketch then,
of some of the main components of the theory of practical reason that a normative
pluralist can use to show that the theory allows for comparability of options in terms of
factors.

3.4 An Example
But, does the framework for a theory of practical reason presented here have the
resources to justify a course of action? I believe it does. First, note that there is a clear
procedure that can be defined as follows: for any given question about what one ought to
do in a given case, one must first identify possible normative factors, second assign an
initial value to the factors through the normative level criteria, and third adjust these
values through appeal to interaction principles. Once one completes this procedure a
judgment can be formed about what one ought to do.
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Consider the case elaborated in Chapter 1 concerning the physician who did not
return the calls of a family that wanted to remove a loved one from hydration and a
respirator. There were several factors that came into play in this scenario. The first was
the physician’s violation of the autonomy of the family who had the ability to make the
care-giving decision. If autonomy is a factor that should be respected, then by violating
that factor, the physician inappropriately ignored the family, other things being equal.
The virtue of compassion for the family and patient, however, seems to suggest that the
physician was correct in stalling. Since the patient passed away before the hydration and
respiration could be removed, the family was spared the long term mental suffering
associated with taking an active role in the patient’s death. Furthermore, compassion
directed toward the patient directly seems to favor ending his physical suffering sooner
rather than later. So, does the theory put forth in this chapter have the resources resolve
this conflict?
First consider one normative level criterion from Audi. We stated that a factor
that has a higher degree of resistance to elimination from the set of factors is better than
one that one that has a lower degree of resistance to elimination. The three factors being
considered here are the autonomy of the family to carry out its wishes, the compassion
for the mental suffering of the family, and compassion for the physical suffering of the
patient. This criterion requests that one provide a ranking of the three factors. Such a
ranking is needed in order to determine the level of resistance from elimination for each
factor. An interaction principle helps determine the influence of any given factor in a
given situation. In this case, I believe there is an exclusionary interaction principle that
eliminates the factor of the patient’s physical suffering as a justificatory factor. As I
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pointed out earlier, the non-responsive patient has been diagnosed with both Parkinson’s
and Alzheimer’s. Even though his suffering is in some sense physical, it is entirely
unclear whether or not he is, in a meaningful sense, experiencing pain. Thus, the factor
of compassion for the patient’s suffering is less important for the decision than the other
factors. So, the interaction principle being used here states that when a non-responsive
patient is suffering from severe neurological diseases such as Alzheimer’s or
Parkinson’s, the physical suffering of the patient should be excluded as a factor. This
interaction principle is generated by the circumstances of the situation, but the need for
an interaction principle is identified by the normative level criterion that requires some
sort of ranking or isolation of the relevant factors.
For the next two factors, a different interaction principle can be used. One
overriding principle might state that if two factors identify as justified different goals,
then the factor which identifies a goal that is more rather than less likely to be achieved
is the factor that should be active in the choice situation. In this case, by respecting the
autonomy of the family, one of the goals can likely be achieved. However, it is not so
clear that the goal of compassion by delaying the decision can be achieved. It is only a
conjecture on the part of the physician, although one that has a basis in the fact of the
family’s religious beliefs, that the family will endure long term suffering because of guilt.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the family will in fact suffer mental anguish at having
stopped respiration and hydration, so it is not clear that such a goal can be achieved by
ignoring the family’s request.

In this instance, the overriding interaction principle

reduces the importance of mental anguish as being a factor in the decision in favor of
respecting the autonomy of the family. So, in this case a solution to the conflict can
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arise—the physician should respond to the pages and respect the family’s wishes to end
hydration and respiration.94
I think this example indicates that the comparativist theory of practical reason
produced in this chapter is robust enough to provide solutions in many cases and is
acceptable to a pluralist. This, of course, cannot count as a proof that the theory resolves
enough cases, but then again, it is not clear what one means by ‘enough’. In either case, I
think the example clearly shows that a plurality of factors combined with this theory of
practical reason can provide guidance and answer the question ‘What ought I to do?’

3.5 What Remains to be Accomplished
If what I have said above is correct, I have met the first obstacle for overcoming
the problem of decisiveness. Pluralistic theories can in fact provide a clear answer to the
question what one ought to do in a given situation, even when one takes into account a
multiplicity of independent factors. Nevertheless, problems loom on the horizon. The
framework of a theory of practical reason that I have sketched in this chapter uses
imprecisely stated criteria and interaction principles. Thus, the critic might argue that I
still have to show that my view permits single correct answers. A second objection is
that the imprecisely stated criteria and interaction principles allow for actual dilemmas to
arise. In the final chapter I will deal with these objections by arguing that they rely on
unacceptable constraints on normative theory building.
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If I am correct, and here we are using an overriding principle as opposed to an exclusionary principle,
then the concern over the mental anguish can still have some importance. This means that it can be the
source of rational regret after the difficult choice has been mad and acted upon.
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Chapter 4: Practical Reason and a Single Answer
4. Introduction
The previous chapter sketched a view of practical reason and justification that is
procedural. The components of this view include normative level criteria, interaction
principles, and factors. A critic may argue that, even with this outline of a theory of
practical reason and justification, pluralistic theories will fail to give a single answer to
the question ‘What ought I to do?’

Without a single answer, the critic continues,

conflicts about the appropriate course of action become intractable, and thus the theory is
indecisive. This criticism comes in two versions. The first disallows the answer ‘It is
indeterminate’ to the question ‘What ought I to do?’ The second disallows a theory to
countenance genuine normative dilemmas.
The first part of this chapter attempts to uncover why the answer ‘It is
indeterminate’ is thought to be unacceptable. I first consider Ronald Dworkin’s Single
Right Answer Thesis, in other words, that for every given normative question about what
one ought to do there is a determinate and unique answer. A common interpretation of
Dworkin’s thesis is that it disallows the answer ‘It is indeterminate’. As it turns out, this
is an incorrect interpretation of Dworkin’s thesis that attempts to saddle him with what I
call the strong determinacy thesis. This thesis requires that there is only one right action
to perform in any given situation. Dworkin, however, is not committed to this thesis.
This does not mean that support cannot be found for the strong determinacy
thesis. One possible source of support for this thesis involves a common view about the
nature of practical reasoning, namely the subsumptive, or covering-law, model of
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reasoning. This ideal is embraced by John Stuart Mill: “the morality of an individual
action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an
individual case” (Mill 1974, 253). It is an acceptable interpretation of Mill that he views
such a model as workable not only for the narrow scope of moral reasoning, but for all
practical reasoning in general. We shall see that as a ground for accepting the strong
determinacy thesis this view of practical reason is problematic.
A third attempt to support the strong determinacy thesis relies on Michael
Stocker’s discussion of the three ways a theory can fail to resolve conflict. If a theory
fails to pick a single unique action as justified, the theory “would then be impractical—
telling us to achieve all the conflicting values. Or it would be incomplete—not telling us
which value to achieve. Or it would be non-realistic—denying that here there is a fact of
the matter” (Stocker 1992, 85-6). The upshot of this concern is that if any situation
exhibits one or all of these features, then rational choice is not possible. However, I
show that there is nothing about a theory being practical, complete, or realistic that
requires us accepting the strong determinacy thesis.
The second part of the chapter addresses concerns about pluralistic theories
countenancing genuine normative dilemmas.95

A genuine normative dilemma is

illustrated by the judgment ‘I ought to both do A and refrain from doing A’. This
judgment, in a sense, fails to meet the single answer requirement because it tells us to do
two incompatible actions. It might be argued that acceptable normative theories must

95

Normative dilemmas are informal dilemmas and not formal logical dilemmas. A formal, constructive
dilemma consists of conjunction of two conditionals and a disjunction, for example, (P → Q) & (R → S); P
v R; Q v S.
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prohibit genuine dilemmas,96 so normative pluralism is unacceptable if it permits
dilemmas. The first problem with this criticism, we shall see, is that it overstates the
meta-level criterion of adequacy for normative theories. With this criticism eliminated,
and given the view of practical reason sketched in Chapter 3, I conclude that there is
sufficient reason to view pluralistic normative theories as decisive.

4.1 Dworkin’s Single Right Answer Thesis
A significant challenge to my view comes from the Philosophy of Law. It is
based on a common interpretation of Ronald Dworkin’s Single Right Answer Thesis.
Dworkin believes that anyone who is engaged in an interpretive practice must affirm
“that one interpretation of some text or social practice can be on balance better than
others, that there can be a ‘right answer’ to the question which is best even when it is
controversial what the right answer is” (Dworkin 1988, 80). From early on in Dworkin’s
writings, it is clear that this guarded statement (for saying there ‘can be a right answer’ is
not the same as saying ‘there is always a right answer’) should be understood more
strongly.97 He states in “Is there Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?” that lawyers
talk and argue as if they accept the bivalence thesis about dispositive concepts98: “in
every case either the positive claim, that the case falls under a dispositive concept, or the
opposite claim that it does not, must be true even when it is controversial which is true”
(Dworkin 1985, 120). When dealing with dispositive concepts, i.e., concepts that either
96

Throughout this chapter I will use the shorter locution ‘genuine dilemma’ or just ‘dilemma’ to refer to the
special case of genuine normative dilemma.

97

Commentators have clearly seen this stronger position as Dworkin’s (Woozley 1979).

98

A dispositive concept in the law is a concept that brings about or decides the outcome of a court case.

144

do or do not hold in a particular situation, “then at least every case in which these issues
are dispositive has a right answer” (Dworkin 1985, 120). Elsewhere he states that “there
will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law” (Dworkin 1977b, 84). One
might suppose that I could easily dismiss an objection based on Dworkin’s view since I
am discussing practical reason writ large, while Dworkin is only talking about legal
reasoning. However, since it is easy to make the same claim for all of practical reason, I
still need to address this criticism as if it were to apply to all forms of practical reasoning.
Furthermore, I cannot merely dismiss the claim, for as Dworkin would point out, even
dismissing the claim requires some argument.
The problematic part of this thesis is Dworkin’s claim that for any given set of
answers, one answer is superior to all the others. On the common interpretation, this
view grounds a challenge to pluralistic theories because pluralistic theories allow for the
possibility that there is no single right answer in a given case. However, in “Truth and
Objectivity: You’d Better Believe It,” Dworkin has recently clarified his position about
what it means to hold the Single Right Answer Thesis. In this more recent work, he
makes explicit that ‘it is indeterminate’ is one of the dispositive concepts that is
employed in a interpretation of a text or social practice. Given this clarification, his
Single Right Answer Thesis poses no threat to my view.
In Law’s Empire Dworkin develops the method of creative constructive
interpretation.99 This method is similar to artistic interpretation “in that both [artistic and
99

Some may wonder why I am starting with such a late version of Dworkin’s writing, as opposed to
beginning with his collection of papers in Taking Rights Seriously (Dworkin 1977a). My reason for using
only the later works is that in these works we get a clear articulation of what Dworkin thinks the Single
Right Answer Thesis entails, whereas in his earlier work we do not.
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creative interpretation] aim to interpret something created by people as an entity distinct
from them rather than what people say, as in conversational interpretation, or events not
created by people, as in scientific interpretation” (Dworkin 1988, 50).

Such an

interpretation “is essentially concerned with purposes rather than mere causes” (Dworkin
1988, 51). To be concerned with purposes is to see interpretation as “a matter of
imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example
of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong” (Dworkin 1988, 52).

All

interpretation must take place from within the practice that is being interpreted. The
interpreter cannot take up a God’s-eye point of view to make judgments. If one could
take up the God’s-eye point of view, one would fail to be engaged with the substantive
points made by the rules, principle, policies, etc., of the normative system with which one
is trying to form a judgment (Dworkin 1988, 78ff).100 In the article “Objectivity and
Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, Dworkin is concerned with the point of views from
which one can interpret an evaluative domain of beliefs.101 The two points of view he is
concerned with are a God’s-eye point of view and an embedded interpreter’s point of
view. Each view, at least in this article, is a position from which one can interpret an
evaluative domain by articulating the difference between external propositions, or Epropositions, and internal propositions, or I-propositions. I-propositions set out positive
moral judgments within a normative framework, while E-propositions “express
100

I state ‘if one could take up the God’s-eye point of view …’ because it is part of Dworkin’s argument,
especially in “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,” that one cannot take up the God’s-eye point
of view.
101

One of the difficulties in articulating Dworkin’s position is that the language he employs changes
throughout his writings. In the earlier works cited he speaks of interpreting a text or a social practice. In
“Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” he speaks of interpreting an evaluative domain of beliefs.
I take it that an ‘evaluative domain of belief’ refers to a social practice that is created by people.
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metaphysical or philosophical opinions about the nature of positive moral judgments”
(Dworkin 1996, 92). The point is that interpretation is not something which takes place at
the meta-ethical level, but must take place at the normative level. Once one realizes the
correct point of view is internal to the practice—i.e., at the normative level—then
meaningful interpretive claims can be put forth. An initial step in this process is the
recognition
that an interpretation is by nature the report of a purpose; it proposes a
way seeing what is interpreted—a social practice or tradition as much as a
text or painting—as if this were the product of a decision to pursue one set
of themes or visions or purposes, one ‘point’ rather than another (Dworkin
1988, 58-9).
In other words, an interpretation is a way of taking up the viewpoint of those who in the
past have made use of rules, principles, etc., in making judgments. The viewpoint
requires that the current adjudicator assume, as much as possible, the same purpose for
the entire normative system as those who have in the past adjudicated over similar
questions.102 The goal of interpretation is to provide a rules that can be combined with
the current facts to produce a judgment about the truth or falsity of an evaluative
proposition such that one evaluative proposition “can be on balance better than others,
that there can be a ‘right answer’ to the question which is best even when it is
controversial what the right answer is” (Dworkin 1988, 80).
Unfortunately the claim that there is a right answer to every question is
misleading. It sounds as if Dworkin holds what I will call the strong determinacy thesis.
102

This is not to say that the current interpreter is reading the minds of those in the past. First, that would
be a strange metaphysical view of our capacities. Second, it could be the case that everyone in the past was
mistaken about the purpose of the normative system. Dworkin is aware of both of these possibilities and
allows for them, which in turn allows for radical revision. See his discussion of courtesy (Dworkin 1988,
47-48)
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This thesis states that for all possible actions in a given situation, only one of these
possible actions is the right action to perform.

In his writings on philosophy of law

Dworkin does not give us any reason to suppose his view differs from the strong
determinacy thesis. However, in “Objectivity and Truth” Dworkin does not dismiss
indeterminacy as an I-proposition answer. It may very well be the case that ‘It is
indeterminate what one ought to do’ is the unique answer. Dworkin argues for the
conclusion that “[i]ndeterminacy is a substantive view to be ranked alongside the other
substantive views in the neighborhood” (Dworkin 1996, 134). I take it that Dworkin
means that ‘indeterminacy’ is a substantive answer to a question about what one ought to
do just as ‘do A’ and ‘do B, not A’ are substantive answer to the same question. The
example he uses is one similar to that discussed in my Chapter 2 of comparing two
artists.103 He states that
if I were asked whether Picasso was a greater genius than Beethoven, … I
would deny both that one was greater than the other and that they were
exactly equal in merit. Picasso and Beethoven were both very great
artists, I would say, and no exact comparison can be made between the
two (Dworkin 1996, 133).
In other words, he allows for the possibility that judgments about whether Picasso is
better than Beethoven at the normative level, i.e., I-propositions, include the following:
Picasso is better than Beethoven, Beethoven is better than Picasso, and ‘it is
indeterminate whether Beethoven is better than Picasso or Picasso is better than
Beethoven’. Each of these three answers are substantive answers and one needs to
recognize, according to Dworkin, that the indeterminacy claim is not one that holds
103

Recall that in Chapter 2, we encounter Ruth Chang’s discussion of whether we can compare, with
definitive results, the creative ability of Mozart, Michelangelo, and the hack Talentlessi.
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without argument. To say that ‘it is indeterminate whether Beethoven is better than
Picasso or Picasso is better than Beethoven’ is an I-proposition that is substantive and
positive, and thus requires positive argument to establish.
If my reading of Dworkin is correct, then he and I have no quarrel. No part of my
theory entails that indeterminacy is a meta-level, skeptical claim. The question “What
ought I to do” is a normative level question. I am interested in normative level judgments
and answers. This implies that if I judge the answer to be indeterminate, that I am
making a substantive, normative level judgment. This judgment needs, as Dworkin says,
a positive argument. My view of practical reason allows for such a positive argument.
After completing the procedure of identifying factors, assigning initial values to the
factors through the normative level criteria, and adjusting those values through appeal to
interaction principles, I form a judgment. The outcome of the procedure is defeasible in
the sense that future information may change the judgment. But it is possible that the
final result of this process is indeterminate in that no answer uniquely identifies a
justified course of action.104 Each result has a positive justification for it in terms of the
procedure and the substantive interpretation of the components of the procedure. Thus,
the judgment that ‘it is indeterminate’ as to what one ought to do in a given
circumstances is a positive, substantive, normative level judgment.
I believe these comments show how closely allied my view is to Dworkin’s and
that his Single Right Answer Thesis is not a challenge to my view. It is not a necessary
feature of normative theory that it disallow the answer ‘it is indeterminate’. The answer
104

One additional answer that may seem indeterminate is that more than one act is permissible but no
single one is obligatory. But this is not true indeterminacy. This is a determinate answer expressed as a
disjunction.
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‘it is indeterminate’ is a single answer to the question, and can be the right answer to our
question.

4.2 The Subsumptive Model of Justification
One possible response to my discussion of Dworkin is to seek another way to
support the strong determinacy thesis. One suggestion that has some implicit support in
the literature is based the subsumptive model of practical reasoning. On this model of
reasoning, a rule or principle fixes the moral judgment about what one ought to do. The
subsumptive model “requires that conclusory ethical assessments be deducible from a
moral rule conjoined with a description of a concrete case” (Shafer-Landau 1997, 586).
As stated before, this is the same idea that John Stuart Mill supports when he says that
“the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the
application of a law to an individual case” (Mill 1974, 253). We can generalize this
model of moral reasoning to one of practical reasoning by noting that the model makes
use of a set of not only moral principles but also a variety of other practical principles
such as prudential, aesthetic, etc. These principles are combined with statements of fact
from which one can deduce conclusions about what one ought to do. There are two key
features to the subsumptive model of reasoning. First, it utilizes a rule or principle that
traditionally is seen as universal, and possibly even absolute (Shafer-Landau 1997,
587).105 The second feature is that it views reasoning as deductive in nature.
105

If we view the rule as prima facie as opposed to absolute, then the same conclusion does not follow.
This is because the conclusion only presumptively follows from the prima facie rule and description of
facts (Shafer-Landau, 589). But I shall contend shortly that even prima facie rules can, through iteration,
lead to a determinate answer.
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A paradigm of subsumptive reasoning is mathematical computation. Suppose we
are trying to compute the area of square.

We can formulate this computation in

accordance with the subsumptive model as follows:
Rule: Area of a square = (length of side)2;
Fact: Length of side of square A = 2 inches;
Conclusion: Area of square A = 4 square inches.
This model, at least for mathematics, appears initially to generate unique answers to
every question. Saul Kripke, in discussing rules for addition and how we grasp them,
makes an observation that is in line with idea that we get unique answers to questions
when we employ mathematical rules. He states that
[a]lthough I myself have computed only finitely many sums in the past,
the rule [of addition] determines my answer for indefinitely many new
sums that I have never previously considered. This is the whole point of
the notion that in learning to add I grasp a rule: my past intentions
regarding addition determine a unique answer for indefinitely many new
cases in the future (Kripke 1982, 7-8 emphasis added).
The language Kripke uses to describe mathematical reasoning in addition is both strong
and in line with thinking that by employing a subsumptive model of reasoning we can get
unique answers to every question. He states that an intention—the ‘intention’ being the
use of a specific rule—determines a unique answer.106

The defender of the strong

determinacy thesis might attempt to use these observations to provide support for the
strong determinacy thesis in normative discourse.
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Of course, this quote is near the beginning of reflections in Kripke about whether we can think of being
guided by rules. If we bracket off the rest of Kripke’s discussion, we can, at least for the moment, see this
applications of rules to facts as providing the jumping off point for defending the strong determinacy thesis.
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A problem arises for such a move by the defender of the strong determinacy
thesis. Kripke knows that while it is true that there can be a unique answer in every case
for addition, this does not apply to more complex mathematical systems. Kurt Gödel
showed in his incompleteness theorem that no finitely formalizible set of rules is capable
of answering ever mathematical question (Gödel 1986). This theorem is the result of
trying to determine whether all of the truths in a given domain of thought can be proved
in a given system purporting to formalize it. A system is complete if and only if the
system would prove either G or ~G for each sentence G of its language. Gödel proved
the theorem that if T is a consistent, recursively axiomatizable theory that includes an
elementary fragment of arithmetic, then there is a sentence G of the language of T such
that neither G nor ~G is provable in T. Thus T is incomplete.
Gödel’s theorem severely weakens the claim that there must be a unique answer
to every case in normative systems. Completeness is not a goal that can be achieved in
most mathematical or logical theories, and the more interesting theories are usually, if not
always incomplete. To hold normative theories to a standard of logical completeness
means that one is holding normative theories to a higher standard than logical theories.
But surely it is too much to ask of non-recursive theories like those found in the
normative realm to be held to a higher standard than the recursive theories of logic and
mathematics. But this means that one should not expect that using a subsumptive model
of practical reasoning in a normative theory will yield a unique answer in every case
because why should one expect normative theories to be held to a standard that most
logical and mathematical theories cannot reach.
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The above problem of the logical completeness of arithmetic and normative
theories however, is not sufficient to reject the subsumptive model of reasoning. This is
because the rules of normative theories do not have to be constructed as analogous to
formal, axiomatized rules of arithmetic. An alternative attempt to defend the strong
determinacy thesis through the subsumptive model is to make reference to absolute rules.
A normative rule can take many forms that are not necessarily formal axiomatized
rules. For example, Kant viewed prudential rules as hypothetical imperatives while he
viewed moral rules as categorical imperatives.

While decision theoretic models of

consequentialism rely heavily on axiomatized formal rules, their predecessors, either
Bentham’s or Mill’s greatest happiness principle, do not necessarily have to be
formalized.

Examples of non-consequentialist rules might include Rawls’ equality

principle and difference principle. The defender of the strong determinacy thesis might
claim that a notion of absolutism needs to be added to each of these forms in order to
ensure a single answer to every question.
Let us suppose that a rule is absolute if “it can never be overridden, and it
overrides all possibly competing considerations; [and] there are no circumstances where
its force is abridged” (Shafer-Landau 1997, 585). If we utilize a single absolute rule in a
given situation, and combine with it the relevant facts of the situation, then—so the
defender of the strong determinacy thesis claims—there should be a unique answer to
what one ought to do. To see this consider how an ethical egoist could use the
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subsumptive model.107 On an extreme form of this view, the only rule is the Expected
Utility Principle—perform that action which has the highest expected utility for oneself.
The descriptions for a case are that eating blueberry pie results in an expected utility of 5
while eating apple crisp à la mode has an expected utility of 5.5. In this case, the
conclusion is that one should eat the apple crisp à la mode. Alternatively, if both the
blueberry pie and apple crisp had the same expected utility, then one could choose either
dessert. In each of these cases there is a determinate conclusion as to what one ought to
do. That answer may be disjunctive, but a disjunctive answer is not equivalent to the
claim that, among the alternatives, it is indeterminate what one ought to do. As Jonsen
and Toulmin point out, since this model produces only determinate results, those who
accept a subsumptive model of reasoning with absolute rules or principles “believe that
such principles will provide ‘knockdown’ arguments for demolishing their opponents’
positions and so settling all moral disputes” (Jonsen and Toulmin 1989, 293).
So, the subsumptive model appears to provide support for the view that there must
be a determinate answer to every question of “What ought I to do?’ The argument runs
as follows: because practical reasoning both (a) is subsumptive in form and (b) utilizes
absolute rules it follows that (c) we must be committed to the strong determinacy thesis.
But this conclusion does not follow. First, Shafer-Landau argues that the subsumptive
model does not require that the rules be absolute, but allows that they could be prima
facie rules (Shafer-Landau 1997, 586-7).

Prima facie rules are usually found in

pluralistic systems that utilize more than one rule, and thus the conclusion of any piece of
107

I believe suitable examples can also be given for utilitarians since the utilitarian view can also have the
monistic commitment to only one rule of action from which a single, justified course of action can be
deduced.
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practical reasoning is only presumptive. But this is not a sufficient argument to deny that
the strong determinacy thesis follows from the model because a presumptive claim is not
the final answer. Once we have the presumptive answers, we could do something similar
to the expected utility calculus and assign numerical values to outcomes of the first
iteration of the subsumptive model. Once we have these values, a final iteration of the
subsumptive model which utilizes the rule ‘perform that action which (1) presumptively
follows from a rule of action and (2) has the most value determines uniquely what one
ought to do. In this way, the subsumptive model fixes a determinate answer in every
case.
One problem with this example is that it is unclear whether an absolute rule would
yield a determinate answer in every case. The non-overriding nature of a rule and the
non-abridgment of a rule does not entail, individually or jointly, that there is a
determinate answer in every case. For one thing, the example above must assume that all
utilities have a precise quantitative values. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, not
all outcomes can be assigned such precise utilities.108 Furthermore, as Shafer-Landau
states, even if one is an absolutist
[i]t is important to note that a commitment to absolutism does not entail a
commitment to thoroughgoing ethical determinacy. The absolutist model
purports to tell us how moral verdicts are fixed when they are fixed; it
does not by itself commit us to a view of whether such verdicts are always
available. Indeed, advocates of any but the strongest version of
absolutism might claim that those situations not covered by an absolute
rule are precisely those that are morally indeterminate (Shafer-Landau
1997, 588).

108

See section 3.3.1.
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This observation shows that determinacy is not necessarily connected to the subsumptive
model of reasoning because one could use this model and still allow for indeterminate
conclusions. Instead, the commitment to determinacy follows from the strongest form of
absolutism. Shafer-Landau states that
[a]bsolutist theories differ in their own matters of coverage. One
absolutist theory covers more than another just in case it fixes a greater
number of ethical verdicts. The strongest version of absolutism would
claim that every determinate ethical verdict can be deduced from an
absolute rule. Weaker theories would allow for a range of conclusory
ethical judgments that are not deducible from absolute rules (ShaferLandau, 588).
So, if Shafer-Landau is correct, then those wishing to defend the strong determinacy
thesis need only make the additional commitment to the strongest version of absolutism
to guarantee a unique answer to every question.109
However, it is not true that the commitment to the strongest version of absolutism
generates unique answers about what one ought to do in a given circumstance. Consider
the absolute rule to keep one’s promises. Through no fault of your own circumstances
may arise in which it is impossible to keep two promises that you made. Suppose you are
a physician on your way to your daughter’s wedding. On your way to the wedding you
come upon an auto accident involving a motorcyclist who injured and in need of aid. The
professional promises made in becoming a physician require that you aid the injured
motorcyclist. Doing so, however, means that you will miss my daughter’s wedding thus
breaking a promise to walk her down the aisle. So, by application of the subsumptive
model of reasoning, given only one absolute rule, you are given not one answer but two.
109

It should be noted that in a logical sense, the strongest version of absolutism in terms of coverage would
employ an inconsistent principle: an inconsistent premise would employ any conclusion and thus have the
most coverage. Given this, I think we need to qualify the notion of coverage being used by Shafer-Landau
to deal with the strongest consistent version of absolutism.
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To further complicate matters, the activities, due to circumstances, are incompossible.
Thus the model not only gives you two distinct answers to what you ought to do—aid the
motorcyclist and attend the wedding—but you cannot actually keep both promises. Thus,
even with absolute rules, practical forms of the subsumptive model do not provide unique
answers as do mathematical forms of the subsumptive model.
Some may think that the above example only shows that non-consequentialist
practical theories have difficulties with the subsumptive models not generating a unique
answer. However, this is not true. Consider the following decision rule: one ought to
perform that action in a game that results in an equilibrium solution to the game. An
equilibrium solution involves a pair of strategies (Rn, Cn) such that the pair is in
equilibrium if an only if once this pair is chosen neither player will want to unilaterally
change to another strategy. A strategy is “a plan that determines an agent’s choices under
all relevant circumstances” (Resnick 1987, 18). In games, the strategies are the choices
that a person makes and represented in the row for one person and in the column for the
other person. On occasion, a game can result in more than one answer to the question
what one ought to do as shown in Table 3. Consider the game known as the ‘Clash of
Wills’. Two friends, Jim and Judi, call each other to determine where to go for dinner.

Table 3. Dining Preferences
Utility
2
1
0
-1

Jim’s Preferences
Thai Restaurant with Judi
Italian Restaurant with Judi
Thai Restaurant alone
Italian restaurant alone
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Judi’s Preferences
Italian Restaurant with Jim
Thai Restaurant with Jim
Italian restaurant alone
Thai Restaurant alone

Just as each get as far as stating preferences, their cellular phone batteries die. Given
these preferences we can represent the game as in Table 4. In Table 4, Jim’s payoffs are
stated first and Judi’s payoffs are stated second. Both Jim and Judi have the strategies
‘Go to Thai Restaurant’ and ‘Go to Italian Restaurant. There are two equilibrium pairs:
(Go to Thai Restaurant, Go to Thai Restaurant) and (Go to Italian Restaurant, Go to
Italian Restaurant)—given that one player is at a location, the other player wants to be
there too. Suppose that the pair of strategies chosen is (Go to Thai Restaurant, Go to
Thai Restaurant). Jim will not want to unilaterally change his choice of strategy because
this will change his payoff from 2 to -1. Similarly, Judi will not want to unilaterally
change her strategy because this will change her payoff from 1 to 0. Now suppose that
the pair of strategies chosen is (Go to Italian Restaurant, Go to Italian Restaurant). Jim
will not want to unilaterally change his strategy because that will change his payoff from
1 to 0 and Judi will not want to unilaterally change her strategy because it will change her
payoff from 2 to -1. The problem thus arises that neither Jim nor Judi “has any reason to
choose one of these strategies as long as he [or she] cannot count on his [or her]
‘opponent’ to cooperate” (Resnick 1987, 146). Without having come to a decision before
communication was interrupted, neither Jim nor Judi can assume that the other will
choose a strategy that jointly results in an equilibrium pair, thus the rule ‘one ought to

Table 4. Clash of Wills
Jim ↓ Judi→
Go to Thai Restaurant
Go to Italian Restaurant

Go to Thai Restaurant
2, 1
-1, -1
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Go to Italian Restaurant
0, 0
1, 2

perform that action in a game that results in an equilibrium solution to the game’ does not
provide a determinate answer as to which action to choose.

In this case it is not that

there are two different answer given as to what one ought to do, but no answer is given at
all. So, even in a mathematically described consequentialist situation, it is the case that
one rule— perform that action in a game that results in an equilibrium solution to the
game—does not necessarily result in a unique answer about what one ought to do.
What this shows is that subsumptive models of reasoning, even employing rules
that are absolute in Shafer-Landau’s strongest version, do not guarantee that there is a
unique answer in every situation. But that means that the subsumptive model cannot be
the basis for accepting the strong determinacy thesis. The move from practical reasoning
is subsumptive and employs absolute rules to there being a unique answer is a nonsequiter.

4.3 Practical Reason and The Nature of Evaluative Concepts
The above views do not exhaust the ways in which one might defend the strong
determinacy thesis by reference to a model of practical reason.

Another aspect of

practical reason involves a discussion of the nature of evaluative concepts. The defender
might argue as follows: any logic of practical reason must employ concepts that are
understood in a ‘classical sense’ and these evaluative concepts must obey the laws of
excluded middle, contradiction, and identity.

In any case in which the evaluative

concepts meet these criteria, there will be a single right answer to a question about what
one ought to do. In order to evaluate this syllogism, we need to understand the technical
terms used in the arguments.
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First, consider the logical laws which are sometimes referred to as the ‘laws of
thought’. The law of excluded middle states that for any given statement S, S v ~ S is a
logical truth. We can apply this law not only to statements, but to the objects that they
refer to as well, in which case the law states that for every object x and a given property
P, either x has the property P or it is not the case that x has the property P. The law of
contradiction states that for any given S, ~(S & ~S). When applied to objects, this law
states that it is not the case that both x has the property P and x does not have the property
P. Finally, the law of identity states that for any given statement S, S = S. When applied
to objects, the law of identity merely states everything is identical to itself. Of these
laws, the law of excluded middle is the most important for our purposes. In order to see
its importance, however, we must understand what it means for any concept, including an
evaluative concept, to be understood in a ‘classical’ sense.
George Lakoff describes the classical view of categories as holding that every
category “has clear boundaries, which are defined by common properties” (Lakoff 1987,
16). In other words, two objects x and y are in the same category if and only if x and y
have certain properties in common and these properties are necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for defining the category (Lakoff 1987, xiv). On the classical view,
philosophical analysis is the attempt to specify these conditions. These conditions should
themselves have specific features of being fixed. In terms of being fixed, the conditions
should (a) result in sharp boundaries and (b) have be considered fixed in terms of their
application. Features (a) and (b) disallows for borderline cases of application of a
concept to an object. If the necessary and sufficient conditions do not meet feature (a) we
have intensional vagueness. As Michael Tye points out, one example of intensional
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vagueness is the concept ‘bald’. It is not clear when a person moves into the category
‘being bald’ because there is no sharp dividing line for being bald and not being bald
(Tye 1998, §1). If the necessary and sufficient conditions do not meet feature (b) we
have semantic indecision. Some concepts such as ‘being old’ can be made precise by
definition. We can define ‘old’ as ‘over the age of 60’. This makes the term ‘old’
precise, but so are the definitions ‘over the age of 65’, ‘over the age of 70’, etc.

Again,

as Tye points out, “The rules that govern the use of the term ‘old’ are not specific enough
for us to be able to choose non-arbitarily someone precise term as capturing its meaning’
(Tye 1998, §3).
Given these definitions, the argument is that if the evaluative concepts are neither
intensionally vague nor involve semantic indecision, and the concepts obey the law of
excluded middle, then the strong determinacy thesis holds. However, this conclusion
does not follow from these definitions.

Even if we take the evaluative concept of

‘justified’ as having all of these qualities, it may be the case that a person is not justified
in performing any action. Consider again the example of the game Clash of Wills. The
justified action is to choose a strategy that will result in an equilibrium pair. There is
neither intensional vagueness nor semantic indeterminacy in terms of what counts as
justified for this game. Furthermore, a choice of a strategy obeys the law of excluded
middle. But, without certain knowledge as to the choice of strategy that the other person
will settle on, neither person is justified in choosing either strategy that is available. In
other words, Jim, without knowing Judi’s choice of strategy, is not justified in choosing
the strategy ‘Go to Thai Restaurant’, nor is he justified in choosing the strategy ‘Go to
Italian Restaurant’. So, the evaluative concept of justification as used in this example
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meets the classical view of concepts, and yet does not tell us that we are justified in
performing either available action.
The opposite problem, namely that a person is justified in performing more than
one action, is also not avoided by assuming the classical view of concepts. In this case
we can use the previous example of making promises. The notion of a justified action in
these cases must be that either a given action is justified or a given action is not justified
as the action one ought to perform, and the notion of justification must be fixed and obey
the law of excluded middle.

In the case of making a promise, to be justified in

performing in accordance with that promise, there must be neither borderline cases of
promise keeping, nor should the rules of promise keeping lack specificity in
implementation such that we can arbitrarily decide what counts as keeping a promise.
Both of these features are met in our notion of promise keeping. The professional
promise of a physician to help the injured does not necessarily allow for borderline cases.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that there is an exhaustive list of which
situations require the physician to keep this promise and on that list is helping a victim of
a motorcycle accident. The personal promise of walking your daughter down the aisle
also does not allow for borderline cases for the date and time of your daughter’s wedding,
and your daughter, are unique. Neither promise exhibits semantic indeterminacy because
the nature of the situations and the nature of keeping the promises are such that the rules
for keeping a promise are not arbitrarily defined—keeping a promise means performing
the action as specified in the act of making the promise. In this case helping the injured
motorcyclist and walking one’s daughter down the aisle have very clear rules for
successful performance. In other words, the professional promise to help an injured
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motorcyclist is fulfilled by stopping and tending to the injured party until the ambulance
arrives regardless of the circumstances surrounding the event while the personal promise
to walk one’s daughter down the aisle is fulfilled by walking her down the aisle
regardless of the circumstances. Finally, we can assert that justification of an action
obeys the law of excluded middle by saying that one an act is shown to be an example of
promise keeping, then it is a justified act to perform.
In our example, then, there are two promises that have been made and the act of
fulfilling those promises is such that they are incompossibles.

One is justified in

performing either action separately because all the requirements for keeping each
promise have been met, and the nature of being justified in the keeping of a promise is
met in terms of a classical notion of concept and the law of excluded middle. But nothing
has changed in our example—you are still justified in keeping both promises even though
it is not possible to keep both. There is not a single answer to the question ‘what am I
justified in doing?’ because there are two different actions one could perform and one is
justified in doing either action. This demonstrates another failed attempt to show that the
strong determinacy thesis is a requirement of practical reason.
Both actions can figure in answers to the question ‘what am I justified in doing?’;
thus we deny the single answer requirement for practical reason.

So, even if an

evaluative concept as lacks intentional vagueness and semantic indecision, as well as
obeys the law of excluded middle, this does not guarantee that there is a single answer to
every normative question.
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4.4 Practical Reason as Practical and Directive
The strong determinacy thesis may be supported by something other than our
model of practical reasoning. It may be thought to be grounded in the aims of practical
reasoning. One aim of practical reasoning is that it be practical while another aim is that
it be directive. A theory is practical if and only if it does not tell us to achieve all the
conflicting values.

A theory is directive if and only if it tells us which value to

achieve.110 The defender of the strong determinacy thesis may argue that these aims can
be met only if there is a determinate answer in every case. Without a determinate answer,
the result of practical reasoning must be either impractical by guiding us to achieve all of
the conflicting values, or be non-directive by not guiding us at all. For a theory to be
practical and directive we must hold it as a requirement that every normative question
have a determinate answer. This question glosses over a very important distinction.
Should a theory always provide a determinate answer, or is it sufficient that a theory
provides determinate answers to a large number of cases?
I think the latter is the proper statement of the practicality requirement. If the
requirement were that a theory always provide a single answer to the question, then it
would be rare, and maybe impossible, for a theory to meet the requirement. Even
Bentham’s hedonistic act utilitarianism is not guaranteed to meet the requirement. In
Chapter IV of The Principles of Morals and Legislation Bentham says that a pleasure or a
pain has a force or value that is constructed out of its intensity, duration, certainty or
110

These definitions come from Michael Stocker. In order to maintain clarity in the exposition, I have
changed Stocker’s terminology of ‘complete’ to ‘directive’ (Stocker 1992, 85-86. There are two reasons
for this. First of all, it avoids confusion with the notion of logical completeness that I utilized earlier in this
chapter. Second, I believe the term ‘directive’ to better capture the meaning of what Stocker and I are
discussing.

164

uncertainty, and its remoteness (Bentham 1939, 803). Along these dimensions, which are
factors in our terminology, we can evaluate the mental experience of pleasure or pain.
When we evaluate an act we should also consider two additional factors. The first is the
fecundity of the act, in other words, the chance that the act “has of being followed by
sensations of the same kind: that is, pleasures if it be a pleasure; pains, if it be a pain”
(Bentham 1939, 803). The second is its purity, of the chance the act “has of not being
followed by sensations of the opposite kind” (Bentham 1939, 803). For simplicity, let us
consider only the factors of intensity and duration. Suppose act A has an intensity of
pleasure of 9 but only lasts 2 seconds while act B has an intensity of pleasure of 3 but
lasts for 10 seconds. The factor of intensity justifies doing A while the factor of duration
justifies doing B. Furthermore, it is not clear that there is a matrix that allows us to
determine that either act A or act B generates the most pleasure without precise
information about how to provide a sum of pleasure in these two instances.

So,

Bentham’s hedonistic utilitarianism is not absolutely determinate, but that fact has not
lead to the universal claim that Benthamite utilitarianism is to be abandoned as a viable
normative theory.111 Suppose, however, that the failure of Bentham’s utilitarianism to be
absolutely determinate is sufficient to abandon it as a normative theory. That, in itself, is
not sufficient to show that all consequentialist theories fail to be absolutely determinate,
nor that all consequentialist theories ought to be abandoned as viable normative theories.
So, the failure of a particular pluralistic theory to be absolutely determinate is not
sufficient to reject all pluralistic normative theories.

If we accept these two

conclusions—the specific one about Betham’s utilitarianism and the general one about
111

For a recent defense of both Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism see (Warke 2000).
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utilitarian theories—then it is too strong a requirement that a normative theory always
provide determinate answers to normative questions. So, the failure of pluralistic theories
to always provide determinate answers is not, in itself, sufficient to reject either specific
pluralistic theories or pluralistic theories in general.
A rule-based theory would fail to meet the practicality requirement unless it
included some procedure for resolving conflicts of rules. Yet historical examples of rulebased theories that fail to include conflict resolution procedures are not dismissed
because of this problem. Consider the Ten Commandments as one example of a rulebased theory. Each of the Commandments describes a moral factor that must be taken
into account when justifying our actions. The question arises, then, what do I do when
my father tells me to murder his enemy? A person ought to obey one’s parents, and yet a
person should not kill, especially in the case of murder, which is defined as a wrongful
killing.

Here is a conflict, and one that is not clearly resolvable based on the

Commandments themselves, and yet the view is still able to give us guidance about our
actions.
These theories do not always result in conflicts, and they are considered initially
satisfactory because they do provide, in many circumstances, a determinate, univocal
prescription as to what one ought to do. With the view of practical reason sketched in the
previous chapter, it is arguable that a pluralistic theory can in general meet these same
standards. It is not a requirement of practical reason, as the strong determinacy thesis
holds, that a theory be practical and directive in every case. This is most clearl when
different sorts of factors—such as egoistic factors, utilitarian factors, and constraints
against injustice—all support the same course of action. For example, suppose you have
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the opportunity to bill a client for several more hours of work on estate planning. In the
short run, this may land you a windfall, but in the long run you could lose the client
entirely for charging too much. Taking too much money from a client and getting caught
will surely provide less social utility than charging for only the number of hours worked.
Finally, it is unjust to over-bill clients, even if one does not get caught. So, all three
independent factors support the same answer: do not over-bill the client. Even when all
of the factors do not support the same course of action, a pluralistic theory can be
decisive about what one ought to do. For example, Postow argues that decisive guidance
is sometimes offered by W. D. Ross’ theory of prima facie duties. This may happen
when some of the prima facie duties are both of stringent kinds and also relatively
stringent instances of their kind (Postow 2004). So, if a prima facie duty A is supported
by some factors, while prima facie duty B is supported by other factors, but A is a duty
that is of a stringent kind and a relatively stringent instance of its kind, then one should
act in accordance to A even though one has reasons to act in accordance with B. As we
have seen then, one cannot claim that a pluralistic theory will never provide an answer.
Furthermore, it is only by accepting the strong determinacy thesis that one must provide a
theory that is practical and directive in every case.112 If we reject the strong determinacy
thesis, then pluralistic theories are no worse off, at least initially, than utilitarianism or
rule-based theories. Since these theories are seen to be at least initially plausible, as well
as initially practical and directive, then so too is a pluralistic theory.

112

Given the definition of directive as providing guidance, it is not redundant to state that it must be
complete in every case. In fact, it is just this additional phrase that makes the requirements of practicality
and completeness in line with the strong determinacy thesis.
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4.5 Practical Reason as Realistic
The above discussion might seem to lead straight into the problem of non-realism.
In other words, it may suggest that in cases of unresolved conflicts of factors, pluralism
must deny “that here there is a fact of the matter” (Stocker 1992, 85-6). The critic of
pluralism claims that one aim of practical reason is that it be realistic and that the claim
of realism can support the strong determinacy thesis. If there is a fact of the matter in
every case, then a theory which denies that there is a fact of the matter in every case is
unacceptable. The view of practical reason that focuses on a multiplicity of criteria,
interaction principles, and factors, along with the denial of a classical conception of
evaluative concepts, seems to force one to deny that there is a fact of the matter in every
case. Thus, it may seem, the theory I have put forth is not realistic.
I do not believe that realism requires that one adopt the strong determinacy
thesis.113

To understand why someone would think that a commitment to realism

supports the strong determinacy thesis, consider the common ways in which realism is
described. Michael Smith begins his survey article on moral realism with the following:
What do moral realists believe? The standard answer is that they believe
two things. First, they believe that the sentences that we use when we
make moral claims – sentences like ‘Torturing babies is wrong’ and
‘Keeping promises is right’ – are capable of being true or false, and
second, they believe that such sentences really are true (Smith 2000, 15).
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord describes a realist as follows:
in every case, what marks off some particular terrain as the realist’s
remains the same; over and over, it is the view that some of the disputed
claims literally construed are literally true. Whenever it is found, I’ll
113

It is also the case that I do not believe that the general characterization of pluralism is anti-realistic. A
pluralist can be a realist and in my opinion will be better off by adopting realism. However, I will not be
arguing that any pluralistic theory must be realistic.
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argue, realism involves embracing just two theses: (1) the claims in
question, when literally construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism),
and (2) some are literally true. Nothing more (Sayre-McCord 1988, 5).
Jonathan Dancy begins an article by stating that “Moral Realism is the view that there are
facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong” (Dancy 1998). David
Brink concurs with Smith’s assessment that moral realists hold that moral claims can be
right or wrong, and that the sentences describing these claims can be true or false. He
begins the first chapter of his book on moral realism by saying the following: “Moral
realism is a kind of metaphysical thesis about the nature and status of morality and moral
claims. A realistic view of ethics presumably asserts the existence of moral facts and true
moral propositions” (Brink 1989, 14). Later he says that
whatever else realists might claim, they usually agree on the metaphysical
claim that there are facts of a certain kind which are independent of our
evidence for them. That is, realism claims there are facts of a certain kind
that are metaphysically or conceptually independent of the beliefs or
propositions which are our evidence that those facts obtain” (Brink 1989,
15).
These quotations point out a strong connection in realism among the concepts ‘fact’,
‘truth’, and ‘proposition’. On this view of realism a normative judgment is necessarily
propositional, the proposition is compared to a fact independent of us, and the proposition
is true if it has the right relationship with moral facts.
Nothing in the description of realism implies that there is a single right answer in
every case. If a normative proposition of this form—‘person p ought to perform action
x’—is related to a fact such as I made a promise, then the proposition is true. In the case
I have repeatedly referred to in this chapter, it is a fact that I have made two distinct
promises—to walk my daughter down the aisle and to help injured motorists—and thus
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both propositions are true at the same time. Thus, realism, as understood above, does not
entail that there is only one action that I ought to perform in a given case. This failure,
combined with the other failures articulated above, means that the strong determinacy
thesis lacks support and cannot be used to support a claim that every normative question
should have a single answer unless succesful defense of strong determinacy thesis can be
articulated.

4.6 Normative Dilemmas
The above arguments show that several arguments in favor of the strong
determinacy thesis lack support and this in turn means that the single right answer thesis,
if it is to be accepted, must have support from a different source. For example, one might
try to support the single answer thesis with what I will call the no-genuine-normativedilemmas thesis. On the no-genuine-normative-dilemmas thesis practical reason can
cannot allow for genuine dilemmas to exist.

If a theory, say normative pluralism,

countenances genuine dilemmas, then the theory fails to be decisive and thus should be
rejected. However, as with the determinacy thesis, the no-genuine-normative-dilemmas
thesis has questionable support. In order to see this we must become clear about what
would count as a genuine normative dilemma.
I think the best way to define a genuine normative dilemma is in terms of nonoverriding requirements.114

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong states that “One moral
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This is not an uncontentious claim. Some believe that normative dilemmas must be about two allthings-considered judgments. These include David Brink, Terrence McConnell, and Mary Mothersill. It is
interesting to note that each of these people is skeptical of the existence of genuine dilemmas. Others, like
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Christopher Gowans, who are sympathetic to the existence of dilemmas, do
not use the phrase ‘all-things-considered judgment’. I think that Brink, McConnell, and Mothersill
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requirement overrides another if and only if they conflict and the first is morally
stronger” (Sinnott-Armstrong 1996, 49). From this we can provide a different definition
that says that two moral requirements are each non-overridden by the other if and only if
the second requirement, that conflicts with the first requirement, is neither morally
stronger nor morally weaker than the first requirement.115 We can generalize this, to
avoid the restrictions that come with only considering moral requirements, by saying that
two normative statements are each non-overridden by the other if and only if the second
normative statement, that conflicts with the first normative statement, is neither
normatively stronger nor normatively weaker than the first.

By using this in our

definition of normative dilemma we do not unfairly bias the argument. This is because it
is still an open question as to whether there can be two non-overriden ought-statements
such that each gives opposing prescriptions.
Given the above, then, a conflict is a normative dilemma if and only if it is a
conflict between two or more normative statements such that each statement is nonoveridden by the other and they require incompossible courses of action. This allows us
to ask the questions of whether normative theories ought to allow for dilemmas and
whether pluralistic theories must countenance dilemmas.

successfully make the case that if dilemmas involve competing all-things-considered judgments, there can
be no dilemmas. But that is because they have defined dilemmas in such a way that they cannot exist. By
making use of the idea of non-overridden requirements I avoid this questionable argumentative move.
Instead, I leave open the possibility that no genuine dilemmas exist, but also the possibility that genuine
dilemmas exist.
115

I use the locution ‘if and only if’ in this definition because I am assuming that the scope of the concern
includes only the two moral requirements under consideration. The same assumption is included the
following general definition of normative statements.
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The most straightforward way to determine whether theories ought to allow for
genuine normative dilemmas relates the question to our conception of normative theories.
For example, Norman Dahl, following Alan Donagan’s lead, asks “what conception of
morality would lead a person to affirm or deny the existence of genuine moral dilemmas”
(Dahl 1996, 86). The answer to this question is important to Dahl because it is supposed
to inform us as to whether we should expect moral theories to have the resources to
resolve conflicts (Dahl 1996, 87). His answer involves considering whether morality is
something about which more could be discovered or is something about which all is
known (Dahl 1996, 86).116 I want to generalize Dahl’s question to all normative theories:
what conception of normative theory would allow or disallow for the countenancing of
genuine dilemmas? Arguably, a conception of normative theory is made up of the metalevel criteria, or conditions of adequacy, that define what it is that we are looking for in
normative theory. Given the nature of the discussion so far, this strikes me as the best
way to deal with the question of whether or not normative theories can allow for genuine
normative dilemmas. One way to attack the problem would be to list all the meta-level
criteria. I do not think that generating a list will be helpful because of problems of
ensuring that the list is exhaustive and does not contain inappropriate criteria. Instead, I
propose to look at the way in which we understand meta-level criteria.

Thus we have

changed our question somewhat to ask what conception of meta-level criteria would
allow or disallow for the countenancing of genuine dilemmas.
116

John Nolt has pointed out that this answer appears to be a false dilemma since it focuses on only realist
conceptions of moral theory such as intuitionism. It addresses neither normative constructivism—which
typically sees moral principles as created out of notions of practical reason—nor normative relativism—
which typically sees moral principles as created by the society in which they are found operative.
However, nothing that follows depends on this apparent false dilemma in this answer since I am interested
in the question, not Dahl’s answer.
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There are a large number of possible interpretations of the no-genuine-normativedilemmas thesis. Several of these interpretations can be ruled out due to implausibility.
For example, if one were to interpret the thesis to mean that a theory only had to avoid
identifying as a dilemma one case of conflict, the thesis would have no real bite. Almost
any theory, no matter how crazy, can likely avoid identifying as a dilemma one case of
conflict. As I have shown in Chapter 3, a pluralist can easily do avoid identifying as a
dilemma one case of conflict. If one merely increases the number of conflicts that are not
identified as dilemmas—say in the case of two conflicts, three conflicts, and so on—these
interpretations also will lack bite. That is not to say that there will not be some point at
which the number of conflicts not identified as dilemmas is sufficient to have bbite in
determining the adequacy of a theory, it is just unclear what that point is. So a large
number of interpretations can be left off at the implausible end of only requiring that we
avoid identifying a few conflicts as dilemmas. At the other end of the spectrum we have
implausible interpretations of the no-genuine-normative-dilemmas thesis such as
requiring that all conflicts, even in cases where all the available options require someone
to perform an impossible action, are not identified as dilemmas. For example, suppose
that one faces a conflict such that the only ways to act require squaring the circle or
drawing a triangle with more than three sides. Clearly neither task can be performed, so
the failure of a theory to resolve a conflict in which these are the only two impossible
options for action is implausible. I submit that any interpretation of the no-genuinenormative-dilemmas thesis that uses a modal sense of ‘impossible’ stronger than and
including physically impossible are also ruled out as implausible interpretations.117
117

I do not mean to imply by this that it is irrelevant to all normative inquiry to consider options that are, at
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The above considerations clear out much of the logical space that one must
contend with when trying to interpret the no-genuine-normative-dilemmas dilemmas
thesis. Two interpretations that I believe must be considered are what I will call the
‘absolutist’ interpretation and the ‘in principle’ interpretation.

Both of these

interpretations can be understood as dealing with conflicts that have at least one option
that is a physically possible action to perform. Given this qualification, the ‘absolutist’
interpretation states that an adequate normative theory must exclude all dilemmas by
rationally justifying a single course of action in every case of conflict that includes at
least one physically possible act.118 Given the same qualification, the ‘in principle’
interpretation states that an adequate normative theory may allow for genuine dilemmas,
but it must rationally justify a single course of action in all the cases of conflict that are in
principle resolvable and include at least one physically possible act.

These two

interpretations cover one end of the plausible interpretation of the no-genuine-normativedilemmas thesis.
The remaining logical space of possible interpretations still contains a dizzying
number interpretations. For example, one might say that an adequate normative theory
must resolve an over-whelming majority of conflicts. Alternatively, one might say that
an adequate normative theory must resolve a simple majority of conflicts. In between
these possibilities there are a any number of specific points, say 55%, 60%, 62% and so

least in the current state of things, not physically possible to perform. Considering such actions may lead to
fruitful and inventive ways of overcoming such limitations so that the number of situations that are
physically impossible are reduced. Be that as it may, in terms of resolving conflicts immediately,
considering such options is irrelevant.
118

The term ‘conflict’ should still be understood as referring to the factoral account of incompossible
conflict articulated in Chapter 1.
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on that might be chosen as specific points. Each of these possibilities are specific
examples of what I will call the ‘degreed’ interpretation of the no-genuine-normativedilemmas thesis. The ‘degreed’ interpretation states that an adequate normative theory
may allow for dilemmas, but it must rationally justify a single course of action in more
rather than fewer cases of conflict. Each of the above interpretations merely specify the
appropriate meaning of ‘more rather than fewer’ and so can all be lumped in together
under the ‘degreed’ interpretation. 119
This leaves us with only three possible interpretations of the non-genuinedilemmas thesis that need to be considered, namely the ‘absolute’, ‘in principle’ and
‘degreed’ interpretations. I contend that we have to reject the both the ‘in principle’ and
‘absolutist’ interpretations in favor of the ‘degreed’ interpretation.
Let us first dispatch the ‘in principle’ interpretation. This interpretation says that
a theory should resolve conflicts in all cases that are in principle resolvable. This, of
course, runs into an epistemic problem. How can it be known ahead of time whether a
conflict is resolvable? The ‘in principle’ interpretation thus should be rejected because it
assumes wrongly that there is an independent way to tell which situations are rationally
resolvable and which are not.
I want to consider whether the no-genuine-dilemmas criterion should in general,
be stated in an absolutist way. I have severe reservations about stating meta-level criteria
119

These three basic interpretations can be modified even further by adding qualifications such as having a
certain percentage of all plausible conflicts resolved. For example, it is physically possible for me to take a
stroll on the moon next weekend, or to pilot a Concorde jet. Considering that I am neither an astronaut nor
a pilot, it is implausible that I will have to really make a choice between these options so a theory that does
not resolve this choice should not be faulted. Similar things can be said for modifications such as ‘salient’
or important’. I think we can ignore these modifications because they are just more specific interpretations
of the ones I have already enumerated.

175

in absolutist terms.120 I base these reservations on the fact that more than one meta-level
criterion is needed to assess the adequacy of a theory. For example, do we want a theory
that results in no dilemmas if it does so at the cost of great distortion of moral
phenomena? I do not think so. This is clearer when we are aware of an alternative
theory that, while it allows for a few dilemmas, has only a little distortion. To elevate
any one criterion to such a lofty status as a necessary condition of adequacy seems to
hamstring our ability to understand the normative world.
Suppose we have three theories, T1, T2, T3, each of which can be evaluated in
terms of unity and lack of distortion. T1 is unified, but seems to radically distort moral
phenomena. T2 has no distortion of moral phenomena, but has no unity. T3 has some
unity but very little distortion. Furthermore, let us suppose that it is necessary for an
adequate normative theory to meet both the criterion of unity and the criterion of nondistortion to their fullest extent. According to the unity criterion, neither T2 nor T3 can be
considered adequate theories because both fail to have the requisite amount of unity.
According to the distortion criterion, neither T1 nor T3 can be considered adequate
theories because both involve distortion. But this eliminates each one of the theories
from being considered an adequate theory, and thus there is no such thing as an adequate
theory. If one wishes to be more cautious, one might conclude that we can clearly
eliminate T3 because it fails on both criteria. Now, it may very well be the case that each
of these theories is in fact not adequate, but it is not clear from the above argument. This
120

We have already seen in chapter 1.3.1 that at least one criterion, that of simplicity, cannot be stated in
absolutist terms. It is unclear that a theory could be absolutely simple because it is unclear what it would
mean for a theory to be absolutely simple. This quick argument cannot be used here because it is easy to
conceive what it means for a theory to disallow any dilemmas. So, additional arguments must be put forth
in order to support the claim that we must reject the absolutist interpretation of the No Dilemmas claim.
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is because there is almost no substantive description of each theory. These theories have
been shown to fail for more formal reasons. If we examine examples of theories that fit
the form of each of the place-holders, I think we will agree that not only are T1 and T2,
adequate, but failure to meet each of these criteria in the fullest extent is not sufficient to
eliminate T3.
Recall that in section 1.4.1, we discussed Bernard Williams’ critique of
consequentialism.

Consequentialist theories are very unified.

In Bentham’s

utilitarianism there is only one principle of right action—perform that action that will
produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number—and decision theoretic forms of
egoism also typically have only one principle of right action—perform that action that
will produce the greatest amount of utility for oneself. But, arguably, Williams is quite
right to point out that these theories distort the role of emotions in normative discourse.
Even if we eventually reject Williams’ argument, other distortions occur with
consequentialist theories.

Historically, many have criticized utilitarian theories for

distorting the meaning of justice. Most people consider justice to provide side constraints
on performing certain actions regardless of the amount of good produced by an action.
For example, even if allowing a mob to lynch an innocent person will save the lives of
dozens of innocent people, such an act is unjust. However, on utilitarian grounds, not
only is the action to be considered—which is on its face a distortion of our conception of
justice—but some utilitarian theories will identify the lynching of an innocent as the
correct action to perform. So, what we have in consequentialist theories is an example of
a theory that is very unified, but appears to distort our conception of moral phenomena.
Thus utilitarianism is similar to T1. But I doubt that anyone wants to say that just because
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utilitarianism involves distortion, perhaps even a lot of distortion, that this is sufficient to
eliminate utilitarianism as an adequate normative theory. One reason for caution in
saying that a distortion is sufficient to eliminate a theory is that a defender of every camp
can put forth arguments to show that the opponents’ theory distorts part of the moral
landscape. For example, Kantian theories do not discuss the nature and role of emotions
in a way that could be claimed as non-distorting.

So it would be reckless for a

deontologist to draw such a strong conclusion.
I believe a candidate that matches the description of T2, namely a theory with no
unity and yet little distortion, is a foundationally pluralistic theory.

Recall that

foundational pluralism is the idea that different factors are grounded in different
foundations.

For example, egoistic concerns are grounded in a decision theoretic

foundation, while matters of justice, especially concerning business interactions are
grounded in a contractarian foundation, while the factor of fidelity that is important to our
relationships with close friends and family is grounded in virtue theoretic foundations,
etc. Such a theory has little if any unity since there are different foundations related to
different factors. But is this lack of unity sufficient to eliminate foundational pluralism
from our list of potentially adequate normative theories? If my argument in section 1.3.1
is correct, then lack of unity is not sufficient. But, even if one does not grant my
argument as presented there, I believe that it is easy to grant the claim that foundational
pluralistic theories, because they allow for different factors to be grounded in different
foundations that allow the factors to adequately explain our moral phenomenology,
should not be immediately eliminated from consideration just because they lack unity.
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So what might be an example of T3, the theory that fails to meet both criteria to
the fullest extent? I propose that a theory of Rossian intuitionism is one such theory.
Rossian intuitionism is a form of factoral pluralism where each factor is grounded in a
deontological foundation.

According to Ross we not only have duties of justice

concerning distribution of goods and duties of fidelity in promise keeping, but we also
have duties of beneficence and non-maleficence (Ross 1930, 20). So there is a great deal
of unity in Ross’s theory because, like a monistic theory of consequentialism, there is
only one foundation for the different types of duties. However, there is not absolute unity
in Ross’s theory. Consider the problem that many find with Ross’s theory concerning
conflicting prima facie duties.

If his theory were completely unified, like say

utilitarianism, it might provide us with certainty about which prima facie duty is our
actual duty.

However, as Ross states, “[o]ur judgments about our actual duties in

concrete situations have none of the certainty that attaches to our recognition of the
general principles of duty” (Ross 1930, 30). Furthermore, as for “the estimation of the
comparative stringency of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I
[Ross] can see, be laid down” (Ross 1930, 41). This results in the fact that in some cases
fidelity is more demanding than justice, and yet in other cases justice is more demanding
than fidelity, but there is no a priori mechanism in the theory to determine when one is
more demanding than the other. It is arguable that for a theory to be absolutely unified it
would require such meta-level interaction rules for every conceivable case, and Ross does
not think that there are such rules. Ross’s theory, however, does appear to lower the
distortion of our moral phenomena. He states that “there are three main things that are
intrinsically good—virtue, knowledge, and, with certain limitations, pleasure” (Ross
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1930, 24). So, not only does Ross’ theory make use of the notions of duties and
obligations, but unlike some deontologists, leave room for virtues and pleasures as
intrinsic goods. Thus, Ross’ theory is an example of T3 because it does have some unity
and minimizes the distortion. Yet, I don’t think that many people would consider Ross’
theory to be inadequate because it fails to meet either criterion fully. Nevertheless, even
the cautious defender of the claim that meeting a criterion to the fullest extent is
necessary—i.e. the one who thought T3 was clearly eliminated because unlike T1 and T2
it failed to meet each criterion fully—is committed to saying that Ross’ theory is
inadequate.

Since each one of the theories considered here, consequentialism,

foundational pluralism, and Rossian intuitionism, does appear initially adequate even
given their shortcomings, it would be a mistake to require a theory, as a necessary
condition for adequacy, that it meet absolute criteria. Given this, it is, eo ipso, a mistake
to require the no-genuine-dilemmas criterion to be a necessary, absolutist criterion.121
These considerations support the degreed interpretation of the no dilemmas
version of the criterion of decisiveness. Thus, the favored statement of this version is the
idea that it is better for a normative theory to allow fewer rather than more genuine
dilemmas. We must not demand that a theory disallow any genuine dilemmas, for it is an
open question whether genuine dilemmas exist. So one cannot merely cite the fact that it
121

An additional point should be made here. It does not follow from the above that the no-genuinedilemmas criterion cannot be a tie breaker when rival theories are equally good. All things being equal, it
may be the case that a theory that absolutely disallows dilemmas is better than a theory that allows for
some. But we still need an independent argument for the existence or non-existence of genuine normative
dilemmas. And this argument cannot be purely a priori. It must track reality in some sense. A theory that
disallows for the existence of genuine dilemmas may not be the most undistorted picture of the normative
landscape. And, to give the crown to the theory that disallows genuine dilemmas may be a mistake. Until
this question is resolved, it would be a mistake to state the no genuine dilemma criterion, or any criterion,
in absolutist terms.
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is possible for a plausible theory to eliminate all dilemmas—a claim that is itself
contentious—to show that a theory that allows for dilemmas is unacceptable.

Our

discussion of the meta-level criteria shows that our conception of normative theories does
not work like this. Instead the conception utilizes a multiplicity of meta-level criteria of
adequacy that admit of degrees.
As a closing note to this section, I want to address a concern that some have had
about allowing genuine normative dilemmas to exist. The concern is an epistemological
one in that it deals with how we know when we have found a genuine dilemma. Suppose
for a moment that genuine dilemmas exist. Defenders of their existence then face a
challenge that has been pointed out by Terrence McConnell:
Does the advocate of [the dilemmas thesis] have a criterion (in the
epistemic sense) for distinguishing situations that are truly dilemmatic
from those that erroneously appear so? Notice that if he did have a
plausible criterion he would, in effect, have a straightforward argument for
[the dilemmas thesis] (McConnell 1987, 167).
The challenge is straightforward, and one that I believe I can meet. A genuine dilemma
is evidenced to exist if and only if, after an exhaustive consideration of the factors
involved in the situation sufficiently evaluated in terms of the normative level criteria and
normative level interaction principles, one is left with a conflict in which there are nonoverridden reasons to perform A and non-overridden reasons not to perform A. Such a
criterion meets the challenge put forth by McConnell, and if genuine dilemmas exist, I
can think of no better criterion than one that is based on an exhaustive utilization of all
the resources of practical reason.122

122

A brief note on how this view avoids the criticism I put forth against the ‘in principle’ interpretation
earlier in this chapter. In that criticism, I pointed out that a theory must distinguish which conflicts are in
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The assumption that genuine dilemmas exist has not been defended here. It is
also unclear that this claim has been successfully defended by anyone else. But neither
has the opposing claim—the non-existence of genuine dilemmas—been successfully
defended. This makes the concern over allowing genuine normative dilemmas a red
herring until such time as a definitive answer to their existence is produced. Instead of
focusing on resolving this issue, one that may very well favor the existence of dilemmas,
I believe defenders of normative pluralism can push ahead with the next stage of the
project, namely, providing substantive accounts of normativity in a pluralistic world.

4.7 Conclusion
One of the main goals of any normative theory is to produce judgments about
what one ought to do which can be considered rational and justified. Critics of normative
pluralism have assumed such theories are incapable of providing a decision procedure
that will in fact result in such judgments. The commitment of incommensurability
understood as incomparability, as well as the commitment to non-reductionism are the
primary sources of the belief that meeting the goal of decisiveness is beyond the reach of
normative pluralism. By endorsing these views it seems as if normative pluralism lacks
the resources for a procedure that will provide rational judgments.

Furthermore it

appears as if these views run afoul of a requirement of practical reason, namely that there
be a single answer to the question ‘what ought I to do?’. Critics make the case that

fact resolvable from those that are in fact irresolvable before any attempt is made to justify a course of
action. In the case I just outlined, it is only after one has made an attempt to justify a course of action that
one can conclude that there is evidence of an unresolvable dilemma.
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normative pluralism by not allowing for comparisons of the properties borne by actions,
must be an inadequate type of normative theory.
The predominant strategy amongst defenders of pluralism is to find a way to
avoid the criticism through indirect arguments. In other words, instead of providing a
direct answer to the challenge of what ‘miraculous decision procedure’ does pluralism
have at its disposal by describing the procedure, the defenders of pluralism try to show
that the criticism is ill-conceived. Several of these attempts merely try to get around the
criticism by appealing to axiological systems. Of those who attempt to offer a direct
answer to the challenge, each view fails for substantive reasons to be acceptable
solutions.
The first step in my solution to the problem of decisiveness is to notice that
pluralism is not committed to the claim that all normative factors are completely
incomparable. In fact, even though a pluralist will defend the notion that some factors
are completely incomparable, a pluralist can even recognize that in some cases there are
instances of complete comparability. If one recognizes that complete incomparability
and complete comparability are endpoints on a spectrum, then one can allow for degrees
of comparability. All a pluralist is committed to is that some instances of comparison do
not allow for reduction to a common value nor for complete comparability. In those
cases that fall between complete comparability and complete incomparability it is
possible to have a rationally justified choice, but a new conception of practical reason and
a new procedure for producing rational and justified decisions is needed.
I propose a theory of practical reason for pluralism that is comparativist in nature
in that comparisons take place in terms of properties or characteristics borne by actions,
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but that the theory of practical reason does not wholly rely on mathematical forms of
reasoning as found in decision and game theory. Instead, the theory of practical reason
employs normative factors, normative level criteria, and normative interaction principles
to provide a decisive justification about what one ought to do. The decision procedure
can be stated as follows: for any given question about what one ought to do in a given
case, one must first identify possible normative factors, second assign an initial value (not
necessarily mathematical) to the factors through the normative level criteria, and third
adjust these values through appeal to interaction principles. Once one completes this
procedure a judgment can be formed about what one ought to do.
A major objection to the solution I propose is that it is not decisive in every case.
This is because my theory of practical reason does not endorse the single correct answer
thesis about normative questions about action. In this instance I use a strategy to avoid
this particular objection to pluralism that is similar to those I discussed earlier. I show
that the demand of the single right answer thesis is too strong.

The first attempt to

support this thesis can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin. However, it turns out
that Dworkin’s theory, as he has clarified, does not disallow that there are cases of
indeterminacy about what one ought to do and thus is not the extreme position some have
taken it to be. The second attempt is to support the single right answer thesis with the
strong determinacy thesis. However, the different reasons one might give to support the
strong determinacy thesis fail because they do not result in a single answer in every case.
The third attempt to support the single right answer thesis is the no-genuine-dilemmas
thesis. Again, the attempts to justify this thesis also fail, this time because they do not
actually eliminate dilemmas. While neither argument rises to the level of general proof
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that all such attempts will fail, it does show that the currently available attempts to justify
the thesis lack support and that the strong determinacy thesis also currently lacks support.
So, until support for the thesis can be developed, it is unjustified to claim that there be a
single correct answer to every normative question about action. Thus, it is unjustified to
use the single right answer thesis as the basis of a criticism of pluralism to show that
pluralism is not decisive. Instead of trying to show that pluralistic theories can meet
some mythical quality of decisiveness, defenders of normative pluralism can move on to
developing substantive theories of normative pluralism and further develop the theory of
practical reason I have developed. In other words, we can begin wrestling with the
problems of theory building, especially for a view that starts with the intuition that the
normative world is complex, so the theory about the normative world should also be
complex.

185

REFERENCES

186

Anand, P. (1993). Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. (1985). Nicomachean Ethics (T. Irwin, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company.
Audi, R. (1989). Practical Reasoning. New York: Routledge.
Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology:

A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of

Knowledge. New York: Routledge.
Audi, R. (2004). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Audi, R. (2001). The Architecture of Reason:

The Structure and Substance of

Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baier, K. (1995). The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and
Morality. Chicago: Open Court.
Beauchamp, T. L. (1994). The 'Four-principles' Approach. In R. Gillon (Ed.), Principles
of Health Care Ethics (pp. 3-12). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (1994). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Fourth
ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Bentham, J. (1939). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In E. A.
Burtt (Ed.), The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (pp. 791-852). New
York: The Modern Library.
Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Brink, D. O. (1996). Moral Conflict and Its Structure. In H. E. Mason (Ed.), Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory (pp. 102-126). New York: Oxford University Press.
187

Brink, D. O. (1997). Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism. In D. Lyons (Ed.), Mill's
Utilitarianism (pp. 149-183). New York: Rowan and Littlefield, Publishing.
Brody, B. (1988). Life and Death Decision Making. New York: Oxford University Press.
Callicott, J. B. (1990). The Case Against Moral Pluralism. Environmental Ethics, 12(2),
99-124.
Cartwright, N. (1983). The Truth Doesn't Explain Much, How the Laws of Physics Lie
(pp. 44-53). New York: Clarendon University Press.
Castle, T. (2001). A Cup Fraught with Issues. Specialty Coffee Retailer, 8(11), 20-27.
Cave, E. (1998). Preferring Justice: Rationality, Self-Transformation, and the Sense of
Justice. Westview Press: New York.
Chang, R. (Ed.). (1997). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Chang, R. (2002). Making Comparisons Count. New York: Routledge.
Dahl, N. O. (1996). Morality, Moral dilemmas, and Moral Requirements. In H. E. Mason
(Ed.), Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory (pp. 86-101). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Dancy, J. (1998). Moral Realism. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved
September 20, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/LO59
DeGrazia, D. (1992). Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory:

Theories, Cases and

Specified Principlism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 17(511-39).
Donagan, A. (1993). Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy.
Ethics, 104( 1), 7-21.
188

Dupré, J. (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of
Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1977a). Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1977b). No Right Answer? In P. M. S. Hacker & J. Raz (Eds.), Law,
Morality, and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1985). Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, A Matter of
Principle (pp. 119-145). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1988). Law's Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1996). Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 25(2), 87-139.
Edwards, R. B. (1975). Do Pleasures and Pains Differ Qualitatively? Journal of Value
Inquiry, 9(4), 270-281.
Gettier, E. (1995). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? In P. K. Moser & A. vander Nat
(Eds.), Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (pp. 273274). New York: Oxford University Press.
Gödel, K. (1968) On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and
Related Systems. In S. Feferman et al. (Eds.), Collected Works, vol. 1,
Publications 1929–1936 (pp. 144–195.) New York: Oxford University Press.
Gowans, C. W. (1987). Introduction: The Debate on Moral Dilemmas. In C. W. Gowans
(Ed.), Moral Dilemmas (pp. 3-33). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hinman, L. M. (2003). Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory (Third ed.).
Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth.
Hirsch, E. (1982). The Concept of Identity. New York: Oxford University Press.
189

Hooker, B., & Little, M. (Eds.). (2000). Moral Particularism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hurka, T. (1996). Monism, Pluralism, and Rational Regret. Ethics, 106(3), 555-575.
International Joint Commission. (2000). Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes:
Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States. Retrieved
October 10, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.ijc.org/boards/cde/finalreport/finalreport.html
Jonsen, A., & Toulmin, S. (1989). The Abuse of Casuistry:

A History of Moral

Reasoning. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kagan, S. (1991). The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kagan, S. (1998). Normative Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Kalmijn, A., et. al. (2002). The Physical Nature of Life. Journal of Physiology, Paris,
96(5-6), 355-362.
Kant, I. (1981). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (J. W. Ellington, Trans.).
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Kavka, G. (1980). Deterrence, Utility, and Rational Choice. Theory and Decision, 12, 4160.
Kekes, J. (1993). The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1983). Two Distinctions in Goodness. Philosophical Review, 92(2),
169-196.
Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary
Exposition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

190

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second ed.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1998). Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice. In E. D. Klemke &
R. Hollinger & D. W. Rudge (Eds.), Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of
Science (Third ed., pp. 435-450). Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific
Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mason, H. E. (Ed.). (1996). Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. New York: Oxford
University Press.
McConnell, T. C. (1987). Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics. In C. W. Gowans
(Ed.), Moral Dilemmas (pp. 154-173). New York: Oxford University Press.
McConnell, T. C. (1996). Moral Residue and Dilemmas. In H. E. Mason (Ed.), Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory (pp. 36-47). New York: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1989). Virtue and Reason. In S. G. Clarke & E. Simpson (Eds.), AntiTheory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (pp. 87-109). Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Mill, J. S. (1974). Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham. New York: Penguin
Books USA Inc.
Moore, G. E. (1988). Principia Ethica. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
Mothersill, M. (1996). The Moral Dilemmas Debate. In H. E. Mason (Ed.), Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory (pp. 66-85). New York: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.

191

Nagel, T. (1991). The Fragmentation of Value, Mortal Questions (pp. 128-141). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Nolt, J. (1997). Logics. Cincinnati: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1990). The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of
Private and Public Rationality, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and
Literature (pp. 54-105). New York: Oxford University Press.
Postow, B. (1999). Reasons for Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level
Criteria. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer.
Postow, B. C. (2004). A Partial Application Procedure for Ross's Ethical Theory. Paper
presented at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting,
Chicago.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word & Object. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Raz, J. (1990). Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Resnick, M. D. (1997). Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Richardson, H. S. (1990). Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical
Problems. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19, 279-310.
Richardson, H. S. (1997). Practical Reasoning about Final Ends. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Ross, W. D. (1930). The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company.
Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in Action. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
192

Shafer-Landau, R. (1997). Moral Rules. Ethics, 107(4), 584-611.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1996). Moral Dilemmas and Rights. In H. E. Mason (Ed.), Moral
Dilemmas and Moral Theory (pp. 48-65). New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. (2000). Moral Realism. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical
Theory (pp. 15-37). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd.
Stocker, M. (1992). Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stone, C. D. (1987). Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism. San
Francisco: Harper & Row.
Stone, C. D. (1988). Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics.
Environmental Ethics, 10(2), 139-154.
Thagard, P. (1978). The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice. The Journal of
Philosophy, 75(2), 76-92.
Tye, M. (1998). Vagueness. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 27,
2004, from the World Wide Web: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/X040
Veatch, R. M. (1995). Resolving Conflicts Among Principles: Ranking, Balancing, and
Specifying. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 5(3), 199-218.
Walker, R. L. (1998). Moral Variety and Plural Theories. Unpublished Dissertation,
Stanford University.
Warke, T. (2000). Multi-Dimensional Utility and the Index Number Problem: Jeremy
Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Qualitative Hedonism. Utilitas, 12(2), 176-203.
Wenz, P. S. (1988). Environmental Justice. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Williams, B. (1973). Ethical Consistency, Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers
1956-1972 (pp. 166-186). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
193

Williams, B. (1988). Consequentialism and Integrity. In S. Scheffler (Ed.),
Consequentialism and its Critics (pp. 20-50). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Woozley, A. D. (1979). No Right Answer. Philosophical Quarterly, 29(114), 25-34.

194

VITA
James Michael Okapal was born in Bowling Green, Ohio on September 9th, 1970. He
grew up just south of Bowling Green in Findlay, Ohio where he attended Findlay Senior
High and matriculated in June of 1988. He then attended The Ohio State University in
Columbus, Ohio where he received a Bachelors of Arts in Philosophy and minored in
Political Science and English. He graduated from The Ohio State University cum laude,
with honors in the Liberal Arts, and distinction in Philosophy in June of 1993. In June of
1994 he was made a member of Phi Beta Kappa by the chapter at The Ohio State
University. He attended Bowling Green State University from August 1994 to June 1996
where he received his Masters of Arts in Philosophy. Finally, he attended the University
of Tennessee where he received his Philosophical Doctorate in Philosophy in August of
2004.

195

